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1 - 9 of 9 (0.28 seconds)Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing ... vs Union Of India & Anr on 30 April, 1976
I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Anup Engineering Co. v. Union of India (supra), and the said decision is also in accord with the view taken by this Court in Madura Coats Ltd. v. The Collector, Central Excise (supra). I accordingly conclude that the petitioner company was entitled to exemption from payment of excise duty in respect of lead suboxide and lead monoxide processed by the petitioner from pure tead or lead ingots supplied by its customers. The respondents had acted illegally by levying excise duty in respect of the said products processed by the petitioner as job work.
Madura Coats Limited vs Collector Of Central Excise on 1 September, 1978
I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Anup Engineering Co. v. Union of India (supra), and the said decision is also in accord with the view taken by this Court in Madura Coats Ltd. v. The Collector, Central Excise (supra). I accordingly conclude that the petitioner company was entitled to exemption from payment of excise duty in respect of lead suboxide and lead monoxide processed by the petitioner from pure tead or lead ingots supplied by its customers. The respondents had acted illegally by levying excise duty in respect of the said products processed by the petitioner as job work.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 35 in The Central Excise Act, 1944 [Entire Act]
State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Bhailal Bhai & Ors on 20 January, 1964
11. Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 was inserted with effect from 17th November, 1980. Sub-section (1) of Section 11B provides that any person claiming refund of any duty of excise may make an application for refund of such duty to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise before the expiry of six months from the relevant date provided that the limitation of six months shall not apply where any duty has been paid under protest. Rule 11 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 which was omitted with effect from 17th November, 1980 contained similar provision for refund of excess excise duty paid. The learned advocate for the respondents has not disputed that when levy of a tax or duty is found to be illegal, exercising writ jurisdiction the court has discretionary power to direct refund of illegal tax or duty paid. Thereafter, I am not impressed with the further submission on behalf of the respondent that this court need not issue a mandate for refunding the duty paid by the petitioner in breach of exemption under the said notification. In my view, this is a proper case where the respondents ought to be directed to refund excise duties paid under protest. It would be a travesty of justice to relegate the petitioner to fresh proceeding for obtaining refund of amounts which have been illegally recovered from the petitioner in disregard of the exemption granted by the aforesaid Notification No. 119/75-C.E., dated 30th April, 1975. The facts of the present case fully satisfied the test laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai - , and therefore, discretion ought to be exercised to direct the respondents to refund to the petitioner excise duties levied in disregard of the aforesaid Notification No. 119/75 C.E., dated 30th April, 1975.
Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. vs Delhi Cloth And General Mills Company ... on 1 January, 1800
Article manufactured means to bring into existence a new substance and does not mean merely to produce some change in the substance (vide Union of India and Anr. v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.- . Thus when, an article undergoes a manufacturing process, a new or different article emerges. The notification and the explanation thereunder referred to manufacturing processes undertaken as job works. Therefore, the respondents cannot be heard to say that the exemption under the aforesaid Notification is confined to those manufacturing processes undertaken by a job worker which do not result in the change of identity of the article handed over by the customer for job work. If, in spite of the process undertaken by the job worker, the article does not undergo any change in its character or use, it would not be possible to say that the process in question is a manufacturing process. Only those processes which result in making a new or a distinct article could be termed as manufacturing process. Therefore, the use of expression "that article" in the explanation to the aforesaid Notification No. 119/75-C.E. dated 30th April, 1975 does not contemplate that after job work the same or the identical goods is to be returned in order to qualify for exemption under the said Notification,
Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs Union Of India & Others(And Vice Versa) on 25 November, 1980
It is settled law that the test for determining whether a particular process through which a commodity passes amounts to manufacture is to ascertain whether such "proceeding of the original commodity brings into existence a commercially different or distinct commodity" (vide Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. The Union of India and Ors. ).
Collector Of Central Excise And Ors. vs Madura Coats Ltd. on 28 February, 1980
5. G.N. Ray, J in 1980 Excise Law Times had occasion to consider the scope and effect of the aforesaid Notification No. 119/75-C E dated 30th April, 1975. The Division Bench consisting of M.M. Dutt and Sharma JJ in Collector of Central Excise and Anr. v. Madura coats Ltd. Serampore 1980 E.L.T. 129, dismissed the appeal preferred by the Collector of Central Excise and affirmed the decision Of G.N. Ray, J. in Madura Coats Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise -1980 E.L.T. 582. In the said reported case the petitioner company used to arrange in a particular manner nylon or rayon yarns supplied by its customers. The said arrangement was known as tyre chord warpsheet. According to the Excise Authorities, the said proceeding of nylon or rayon yarns amounted to manufacture and a new commodity or goods were produced; which would be subject to levy of excise duty under Entry No 68 of the First Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Both the learned trial Judge and the Division Bench in appeal held that as a result of such combination there was no transformation and, therefore, no new and different article or goods were thereby manufactured. Accordingly, the said warpsheets were not subject to excise under Entry No. 68. Alternatively it was held that even if tyre chord warps were new commodities, the petitioner manufactured the same as job work and therefore the petitioner was entitled to the benefits of the Notification No. 119/75-C.E., dated 30th April, 1975. G.N. Ray J at page 592 of the report held that the petitioner of the said case fulfilled the criteria under the explanation to the said Notification in spite of the fact that the petitioner supplied cotton wefts to hold the nylon or rayon yarns supplied by the customers for performing the job work in question The Division Bench in appeal at page 132 of the reports discussed the alternative contention that even assuming that nylon or rayon warpsheets were within Entry No. 68 of the First Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the respondent company would be entitled to exemption of excise duty as it performed the job work in accordance with the said Notification dated 30th April, 1975. The Division Bench held that a work does not cease to be a job work simply because the job worker supplies some additional articles which does not constitute a substantial part of the manufacturing process.
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