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1 - 6 of 6 (0.18 seconds)Binod Singh vs District Magistrate Dhanbad Bihar & ... on 26 September, 1986
In our opinion, the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Binod Singh's case (supra) squarely applies to the facts in hand and on that ground the detention of the petitioner is liable to be set aside.
M. Ahamedkutty vs Union Of India & Anr on 31 January, 1990
(12) The lack of "co-ordination" between the prosecutor/customs authorities appearing in the Criminal Court and the detaining authority, has been noticed by the Supreme Court in M.Ahamedkutty v. Union of India, (1990) 2 S.C.C. Page 1. In that case the tention order was belatedly served on the petitioner and a contention was raised that the petitioner was appearing in the Criminal Court on certain dates and still the detention order was not served and the detention is to be quashed on the ground of undue delay in execution of the detention order. In that context the Supreme Court referred to lack of "co-ordination" between the prosecutor/customs authorities on the one hand and the detaining authority on the other and observed that the delay occurring on that account could not be treated as undue. The Court observed: "WE may pause here to point out that the circumstances in the present case seem to indicate a certain degree of lack of coordination between the detaining authorities and those entrusted with the execution of the detention order. This is clearly seen from two circumstances in the present case. Though the detention order was sent for service on June 27, 1988, a reminder was issued only on July 19, 1988. Apparently, the Superintendent of Police was finding it difficult to trace the detenu but he did not report this immediately and mentioned it to the detaining authority only on July 27, 1988. He was obviously not aware that, under the terms of the bail order the detenu had to report every week at the customs office. If he had reported his difficulty earlier or if the detaining authority had apprised him of the terms of the bail order, it would have been possible to have had the detention order served earlier. These communication gaps should, we think, be avoided since it is of the very essence of a detention order to have it served at the earliest. While we have accepted the explanation tendered in the present case for this delay, we would like the State to ensure that such delays do not occur as, apart from giving the detenus a ground for attacking the detention order, such delay really tends to frustrate and defeat the very purpose of preventive detention".
Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 8 October, 1991
(13) It is not an abstract proposition of law that a person in judicial custody cannot be detained under COFEPOSA. There may be circumstances, as noticed in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, and Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, to make a detention order against a person in judicial custody. In such cases, the detaining authority must be satisfied that there are circumstances present on the record to show that the said person presently in judicial custody would act prejudicially if he is not detained. In the case of a person in judicial custody, the detaining authority ordering his detention should be aware of the fact that he is actually in custody and has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material that there is a possibility of his being released and that on being so released, the detenu would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activities. If the authority passes an order to this effect after recording the satisfaction, the Supreme Court held, the same cannot be struck down.
Veeramani vs State Of T.N on 4 February, 1994
(13) It is not an abstract proposition of law that a person in judicial custody cannot be detained under COFEPOSA. There may be circumstances, as noticed in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, and Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, to make a detention order against a person in judicial custody. In such cases, the detaining authority must be satisfied that there are circumstances present on the record to show that the said person presently in judicial custody would act prejudicially if he is not detained. In the case of a person in judicial custody, the detaining authority ordering his detention should be aware of the fact that he is actually in custody and has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material that there is a possibility of his being released and that on being so released, the detenu would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activities. If the authority passes an order to this effect after recording the satisfaction, the Supreme Court held, the same cannot be struck down.
Section 108 in The Customs Act, 1962 [Entire Act]
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