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1 - 10 of 16 (0.22 seconds)Article 21 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Customs Act, 1962
Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat & ... vs Union Of India And Others on 9 February, 1990
The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging such prejudicial activities the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu: : Dharmendra Suganchand v. Union of India: ).
Kamarunnissa Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 14 September, 1990
The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India . The principles ware set out as follows. Even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed (1) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him; (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities, and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show awareness of custody and/or possibility of release on bail.
Kubic Dariusz vs Union Of India & Ors on 18 January, 1990
14. In case of preventive detention no offence is proved, nor any charge is formulated and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonability and there is no criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive justice requires an action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable activities. (See Rex v. Nallidev (1917 AC 260); Mr. Kubic Dariusz v. Union of India and Ors. . But at the same time, a person's greatest of human freedoms, i.e., personal liberty is deprived, and, therefore, the laws of preventive detention are strictly construed, and a meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguard, however, technical is mandatory. The compulsions of the primordial need to maintain order in society, without which enjoyment of all rights, including the right of personal liberty would lose all their meanings, are the true justifications for the laws of preventive detention. This jurisdiction has been described as a "jurisdiction of suspicion", and the compulsions to preserve the values of freedom of a democratic society and social order sometimes merit the curtailment of the individual liberty.
Ayya Alias Ayub vs State Of U.P. & Anr on 25 November, 1988
(See Ayya alias Ayub v. State of U.P. and Anr. ). To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law, said Thomas Jafferson, would be to lose the law, absurdly sacrificing the end to the means. No law is an end itself and the curtailment of liberty for reasons of State's security and national economic discipline as a necessary evil has to be administered under strict constitutional restrictions. No carte blanche is given to any organ of the State to be the sole arbiter in such matters.
Raghavendra Singh vs Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur ... on 28 November, 1985
15. Coming to the question whether the representation to the President of India meets with the requirement of law it has to be noted that in Raghavendra Singh v. Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur and Ors. and Rumana Begum v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. it was held that a representation to the President of India or the governor, as the case may be, would amount to representation to the Central Government and the State Government respectively. Therefore, the representation made to the President of India or the Governor would amount to representation to the Central Government and the State Government, But this cannot be allowed to create a smokescreen by an unscrupulous detenu to take the authorities by surprise, acting surreptitiously or with ulterior motives. In the present case, the order (grounds) of detention specifically indicated the authority to whom the representation was to be made. Such indication is also part of the move to facilitate an expeditious consideration of the representations actually made.
Ichhu Devi Choraria vs Union Of India & Ors on 9 September, 1980
In Smt. Ichhu Devi v. Union of India , this judicial commitment was highlighted in the following words:
R. Keshava vs M.B. Prakash & Ors on 12 December, 2000
In R. Keshava v. M.B. Prakash and Ors. (2001 (2) SCC 145) it was observed by this Court as follows: