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Laxmikant V.Patel vs Chetanbhat Shah & Anr on 4 December, 2001

39. Mr Tulzapurkar relies on Laxmikant V Patel v Chetanbhai Shah & Anr,34 but this does not, I think, serve his cause very well. The law does not permit, the Supreme Court said, anyone to do business by deluding customers or clients into mistaking his goods are those of another or vice versa. Fraud is immaterial, and so is the defendant's state of mind. That only tells us that the misrepresentation may be unintentional. From this, the factum of misrepresentation cannot simply be presumed in every single case; and we must distinguish between likelihood of misrepresentation and likelihood of damage. Actual damage need not be proved; its likelihood is enough. When the Supreme Court said that the goods are in effect telling a falsehood about themselves, something calculated to mislead, what is it those goods are saying? Only that those goods are so designed or put into sale to convince consumers the goods originated from a source other than the one from which they did.
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 184 - R C Lahoti - Full Document

Wander Ltd. And Anr. vs Antox India P. Ltd. on 26 April, 1990

45. In the present case, I am not satisfied that any of these tests are met. Reputation as to source is not sufficiently demonstrated. The rival products have long co-existed and I cannot and will not presume misrepresentation by Wockhardt as to source, even assuming there is similarity. There is no explanation at all for Torrent's past conduct and the inaction with knowledge, or deemed knowledge, of Wockhardt's trade mark registration application, its advertisement and subsequent registration, with not a single objection from Torrent or its predecessor-in-title. There is no answer about the caveats or about the co-existence of other players in the market. There is simply no misrepresentation shown as required by law, at this prima facie stage. There being no prima facie case made out, I cannot grant the injunction. The balance of convenience seems to me to favour entirely the Defendants; after all, to the Plaintiff's knowledge, they have had their product in the market for a very long time, at the very least for five years, possibly more, and an injunction at this stage is far removed from the prima facie status quo that Wander v Antox tells us is the primary objective. There is no injury, let alone an irreparable one, to the Plaintiff that I can tell if an injunction is refused. It has not had one all this time while the Defendants' business has grown into crores. To grant the injunction would be unfairly monopolistic.
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 1060 - Full Document

Cadila Healthcare Limited vs Cadila Pharmaceuticals Limited on 26 March, 2001

13 Cadila Health Care Ltd v Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd, (2001) 5 SCC 73, paragraph 32: "Public interest would support lesser degree of proof showing confusing similarity in the case of trade mark in respect of medicinal products as against other non-medicinal products. Drugs are poisons, not sweets. Confusion between medicinal products may, therefore, be life threatening, not merely inconvenient."
Supreme Court of India Cites 20 - Cited by 545 - Full Document

Ruston & Hornsby Ltd vs The Zamindara Engineering Co on 8 September, 1969

53. He also relied on the judgment of this Court in Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engg. Co. [(1969) 2 SCC 727] wherein the Court observed as under: (SCC p. 729, para 3) "3. The distinction between an infringement action and a passing-off action is important. Apart from the question as to the nature of trade mark the issue in an infringement action is quite different from the issue in a passing-off action. In a passing-off action the issue is as follows:
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 289 - V Ramaswami - Full Document
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