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Premji Bhai Parmar & Others Etc vs Delhi Development Authority & Others on 21 December, 1979 cites

Radhakrishna Agarwal & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 17 March, 1977

And Art. 14 cannot camouflage the real bone of contention. Conceding for this submission that the Authority has the trappings of a State or would be comprehended in 'other authority' for the purpose of Art. 12, while determining price of flats constructed by it, it acts purely in its executive capacity and "is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transacting entered into the exercise of its constitutional powers But after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the Constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Art. 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the. terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract" (see Radhakrishna Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.) Petitioners were under no obligation to seek allotment of flats even after they had registered themselves. They looked at the price and flats and applied for the flats. This they did voluntarily. hey were advised by the brochures to look at the flats before going 714 in for the same. They were lucky enough to get allotment when the lots were drawn. Each one of them was allotted a flat and he paid the price voluntarily. They are now trying to wriggle out by an invidious method so as to get back a part of the purchase price not offering to return the benefit under the contract, namely, surrender of flat. I The Authority in its affidavit in reply in terms stated that it is. willing to take back the fiats and to repay them the full price. The transaction is complete, viz., possession of the flat is taken and price is paid. At a later stage when they are secure in possession with title, petitioners are trying to get back a part of the purchase price and thus trying to re-open and wriggle out of a concluded contract only partially. In a similar and identical situation a Constitution Bench of this Court in Har Shankar & ors. etc. etc. v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commr. & ors. has observed that those who contract with open eyes must accept the burdens of the contract along with its benefits. Reciprocal rights and obligations arising out of contract do not depend for their enforceability upon whether a contracting party finds it prudent to abide by the terms of the contract. By such a test no contract would ever have a binding force. The jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred. It would thus appear that petitions ought not to have been entertained. However, as the petitions were heard on merits, the contentions canvassed on behalf of the petitioners may as well be examined The principal contention canvassed on behalf of the petitioners is that the treatment meted to them by the Authority is discriminatory inasmuch as no surcharge was levied on flats in MIG scheme constructed and allotted prior to November 1976 and after January 1977. MIG flats involved in these petitions were constructed and were available for allotment in November 1976 and the lots were drawn in January 1977. There is one more MIG scheme at Munirka where the allotment took place at or about the same time but in which case no surcharge was levied. The contention is that once for the purpose of eligibility to acquire a flat, the criterion is grounded in income brackets, MIG, LIG, et . those in the same income bracket form one class even for the purpose of determining disposal price of flat allotable to them irrespective of situation, location or other relevant determinants which enter into price calculation and therefore, in the same income group there cannot be differentiation by levying of surcharge in some cases and charging only the cost price in other cases and that the discrimination is thus writ large on the face of the record 715 because by levying surcharge in case of petitioners they have been treated unequally and with an evil eye. It is difficult to appreciate how Art. 14 can be attracted in the circumstances hereinabove mentioned. Cost price of a property offered for sale is determined according to the volition of the owner who has constructed the property unless it is shown that he is under any statutory obligation to determine cost price according to certain statutory formula. Except the submission that the Authority has a proclaimed policy of constructing and offering flats on 'no profit no loss' basis which according to Mr. Nariman has a statutory flavour in the regulations enacted under the Act, the Authority is under no statutory obligation about its pricing policy of the flats constructed by it. When the flats were offered to the petitioners the price in round figure in respect of each flat was mentioned and surcharge was not separately set out and this price has been accepted by the petitioners. The obligation that regulations are binding on the Authority and have provided for a statutory price fixation formula on 'no profit no loss' basis will be presently examined but save this the Authority is under no obligation to fix price of different flats in differed. schemes albeit in the same income group at the same level or by any particular statutory or binding formula. The Authority having the trappings of a State might be covered by the expression 'other authority' in Art. 12 and would certainly be precluded from according discriminatory treatment to persons offering to purchase flats in the same scheme. Those who opt to take flats in a particular income- wise area-wise scheme in which all flats came up together as one project, may form a class and any discriminatory treatment in the same class may attract Art. 14. But to say that throughout its course of existence the Authority would be bound to offer flats income-groupwise according to the same price formula is to expect the Authority to ignore time, situation, location and other relevant factors which all enter the price structure. In price fixation executive has a wide discretion and is only answerable provided there is any statutory control over its policy of price fixation and it is not the function of the Court to sit in judgment over such matters of economic policy as must be necessarily left to the Government of the day to decide. The experts alone can work out the mechanics of price determination; Court can certainly not be expected to decide without' the assistance of the experts (See Prag Ice & oil Mills and Anr. etc. v. Union of India) In the leading judgment it has been observed that mechanics of price fixation have necessarily to be left to the executive and unless it is patent that there is hostile discrimination against a class the processual basis of price fixation has to be accepted in the generality of cases as valid.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 684 - M H Beg - Full Document
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