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1 - 10 of 19 (0.61 seconds)Section 55 in The Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 [Entire Act]
Section 53 in The Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 [Entire Act]
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Article 14 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Municipal Corporation For Greater ... vs Advance Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. & ... on 25 August, 1971
In Bombay Municipality v. Advance Builders, AIR 1972 SC 793, while dealing with this relevant scheme in Ss. 53 to 55 of the Act their Lordships pointed out at pages 797 and 798 that all that the local authority had to see for the purpose of S.54 was whether any person was occupying any land in of the rights, determined under the final scheme and, if he did so, he was to be evicted by the local authority, while S.55 provided a self-contained code by which buildings and works situated in the whole of the area under the Scheme were liable to be removed or pulled down the local authority if those buildings or works contravened the town planning schemes. Therefore, the settled interpretation is that the two provisions deal with these two different situations as they occupy two different fields. Further proceedings their Lordships pointed out that the Scheme and the regulations leave no doubt that the local authority was entirely responsible for removing the huts, sheds, stables and other temporary structures which contravened the town planning scheme. It was inherent in the town planning scheme that owners or occupants were liable to be discoursed and even an owner may get a reconstituted plot which belongs to some other owner. Therefore the innocent owner could not be put to undeserved hardship and the object of removing the slum dwellers as expeditiously as possible which is the very object of such a town planning scheme would be frustrated if a provision of eviction which is visualized in Section 54 giving ample powers to the local authority to do the needful had not been enacted. Further proceeding at page 800 it was pointed out that since development and planning was primarily for the benefit of the public, the Corporation was under an obligation to perform its duty in accordance with the provisions of the and, therefore, in such cases even by a mandamus, a Municipal Corporation could be directed to perform its statutory duty of evicting the unauthorized occupiers from the finally reconstituted plots.
K. Ramadas Shenoy vs The Chief Officers, Town Municipal ... on 9 August, 1974
10. Even in K. R. Shenoy v. Udipi Muni. capacity, AIR 1974 SC 2177 at p. 2182, where a cinema house had been erected in violation of a town planning scheme even at a huge expense, their Lordships held that if the Municipality had arbitrarily acted to sanction such a plan, the Court must enforce the performance of statutory duty by such public bodies as obligation to rate-payers who had a legal right to demand compliance by a local authority with its duty to observe statutory rights alone. The town planning scheme was for the benefit of the public. There was special interest in the performance of the duty. All the residents in the area had their personal interest in the performance of the duty. The special and substantial interest of the residents in the area was injured by the illegal construction and the town planning scheme could not be allowed to be nullified even by arbitrary unauthorized act of the municipal body and. therefore, the Resolution of the Corporation sanctioning the plan for permitting such a cinema house in a residential area was held to be without any legal foundation and the building had to be pulled down because illegality in such cases was held to be incurable. If this is the statutory guideline of the duty of eviction which the local authority has to discharge for the benefit of the public, it is obvious that the provision must be widely interpreted to carry out its benevolent purpose so that all occupiers, whether of land or buildings whose right to occupation has ceased under the scheme, could be summarily evicted under this provision of S. 54 read with R. 27 and that benevolent statutory provision should not be frustrated, The same view is taken in Special Civil Applu. No. 1151 of 1965 decided on July 0, 1969 (Guj) by the Division Bench consisting . g of Bhagwati C. J. as he then was and Divan J., and in Special Civil Application No. 265 of 1967 decided on March 16, 1970 (Guj) by the Division Bench con sifting of myself and A. D. Desai J. In that view of the matter, even the second contention raised by the petitioners must fad when the present context admittedly is of eviction of the petitioners whose right of occupation of the final plots in question has ceased in absence of any reservation in their favor made in the final scheme.
A. K. Kraipak & Ors. Etc vs Union Of India & Ors on 29 April, 1969
In such a context under the developed administrative law after Kraipales case (AIR 1970 SC 150) the minimum requirement of natural jute would be by way of fair-play and justice. Therefore, the said requirement of principle of only fairplay would be complied with when the eviction notice is given and the petitioners have failed to show any substantial ground by any substantial question. In such cases the notice would have to be implemented when no ground whatever has been made Out by giving any explanation raising a substantial question or even suggesting the same sit the hearing before us, Therefore, in such cases there is no question Of any Preludal decision and the impugned notices could not be attacked on a mere academic ground. The principles of natural justice would be vf0lated if the petitioners are said to be substantially or prejudicially affected by the notices. The principles of natural justice when they are read impliedly for making the administrative decision a fair one in such a context are not by way of mere technicalities. These objections are of substance and not of mere form and. therefore, when the petitioners admittedly have 'no right under the final scheme to continue their occupation, they could never invoke any Prejustice or desideration of the principle at fair-play and, justice so as to have these impugned notices invalidated.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Kaushikprasad Chandulal Mahadevia And ... vs The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation ... on 8 July, 1969
3. As far as the first question was conceded, it is completely concluded by the Full Bench decision in Special Civil Appln. No. 1663 of 1970 decided on Aug. 4, 1976 - (AIR 1977 Cuj 23) where the learned Chief justice spoke for all of us. It has been finally held in that decision that the two decisions in Kaushikprasad v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, (1970) 11 Guj LR 993 , and Mohanlal Jesingbhai v. P. J,. Patel, (1970) 11 uj LR 1035 were wrongly decided to the extent that a right to individual notice under R. 21 (3) and (4) was held to be so mandatory as to have a nullifying consequence. It was in terms held that old sub-rule (3) and sub-rule (4) were merely additional procedural safeguards and were not the essential minimum requirements and the violation of such an additional procedural safeguard which was not in the nature of essential minimum procedural requirement as in the case of R. 21 (1) of a general notice would not render the scheme null and void or as transgressing the jurisdictional limits so as to entitle a party to challenge the same under Art. 226 or in any Court after it became a part of the Act under S. 51 (3). While coming to this conclusion, the learned Chief justice had reconsidered the two earlier decisions on the following vital considerations which had been unfortunately not earlier considered in those decisions :-