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1 - 10 of 84 (0.96 seconds)Section 34 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 149 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 394 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
State Of Rajasthan vs Smt. Kalki & Anr on 15 April, 1981
Recently, this difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v. State
of T.N., in the following terms, by referring to the three-
Judge Bench decision in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki:
Section 32 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 174 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 July, 1991
10. Omissions in the inquest report are not sufficient to put
the prosecution out of court. The basic purpose of holding
an inquest is to report regarding the apparent cause of
death, namely, whether it is suicidal, homicidal, accidental
or by some machinery, etc. It is, therefore, not necessary to
enter all the details of the overt acts in the inquest report.
Evidence of eyewitnesses cannot be discarded if their
names do not figure in the inquest report prepared at the
earliest point of time. The inquest report cannot be treated
as substantive evidence but may be utilised for
contradicting the witnesses of inquest. (See Pedda
Narayana v. State of A.P., Khujji v. State of M.P., George v.
State of Kerala, Sk. Ayub v. State of Maharashtra, Suresh
Rai v. State of Bihar, Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh,
Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P. and Aqeel Ahmad v.
State of U.P.)
Rizan & Another vs State Of Chhatisgarh Thru Chief ... on 21 January, 2003
74. The Supreme Court in the case of Rizan v. State of
Chhattisgarh, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 661 has held as under :
Raghunath Laxman Wani And Ors vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors on 6 August, 1971
Notwithstanding the same, care and caution must be
exercised in considering the weight to be given to these
species of evidence on account of the existence of many
circumstances which may affect their truth. The court has
always to be on guard to see that the statement of the
deceased was not the result of either tutoring or prompting
or a product of imagination. The court has also to see and
ensure that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had
the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant.
Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy itself that
the deceased was in fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration, has to look for the medical opinion. Once the
court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary,
it undoubtedly, can base its conviction on the dying
declaration without any further corroboration. It cannot be
laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying
declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless
it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is
merely the rule of prudence. These well-settled principles
have been recognised and reiterated by this Court in
Paniben v. State of Gujarat; Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan;
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra; P.V. Radhakrishna v. State
of Karnataka; State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay; Muthu Kutty
v. State.