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K.A.N. Chidambaram Chettiar vs Krishna Vathiyar And Ors. on 15 August, 1916 cites

Subramania Pillai vs Kumaravelu Ambalam Alias V.E.K.R. ... on 1 March, 1915

It is very doubtful whether a question relating to the stay of execution of a decree can be a question relating to its execution and although in Subramania Pillai v. Kumaravelu Ambalam (1915) 38 I.C. 66 a bench of this Court has held that the omission of the words from Section 47, has no effect, because they were mere surplus ages in the old Section 244, I must with all deference differ, for the words were added to Section 244 by an amendment to the Code of 1882 passed in 1888. When therefore the words were added the legislature deemed them to be of importance, and not mere surplus age. Their omission therefore from Act V of 1908 must have been deliberate, and consequently I think importance should be attached to it. However that may be, I think the matter can also be decided on another ground. The agreement sought to be pleaded could have been brought to the notice of the Court which passed the decree, and the Court might have been asked to pass a decree in accordance with its terms. The defendant allowed a decree to be passed, and, now that execution is sought, wants to go behind the decree and substitute another arrangement in its place. This does not appear to me to be a question which can be gone into by the Court executing the decree, for it impeaches the validity of the decree, It is a well settled principle for which no authority is now required that a decree must be executed as it stands, and the executing Court cannot go behind the terms of the decree. The legislature has enacted certain provisions which enable the Courts to recognise agreements between the parties after the decree has been passed, for instance, adjustments under Order 21, Rule 2, postponement of payment or payment by instalments under Order 20, Rule 11 (2), but in order that these modifications may be enforced certain special procedure is prescribed. Again a Court has no inherent power to stay execution of a decree, and the various circumstances in which stay can be granted are duly set forth in the Civil Procedure Code. None of those circumstances exists in the present case. Otherwise under Order 21, Rule 17(4), a Court shall execute a decree upon application, provided certain rules have been complied with by the applicant. For this reason there is ground for holding that the words " and stay of execution" have been deliberately omitted by the legislature with a view to excluding questions relating exclusively to stay of execution from the jurisdiction of the executing Court. A further ground for excluding an agreement like the present from consideration in execution proceedings is that the conduct of the parties amounts to an abuse of process of the Court for they have collusively induced the Court to pass a decree, which according to their agreement was never to have effect.
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Sheo Golam Lall vs Beni Prosad on 24 February, 1879

It is true that the view of the Calcutta Judges has been uniformly and consistently against this position, Sheo Golam Lall v. Beni Prasad (1879) I.L.R. 5 C. 27, Thakoor Dyal Singh v. Sarju Pershad Misser (1892) I.L.R. 20 C. 72 and Durga Prasad Banerjee v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy (1897) I.L.R. 25 C. 96. In this state of the law, I do not think it desirable or proper, that we should upset a practice which has been prevalent for a long period of time in this Presidency. I have always held that in matters of procedure, the principal of consistency will conduce to justice more than a strict adherence to logic. What, after all, is the change advocated? It is that the validity of the agreement should be separately litigated upon, and should not be enquired into in execution. This means further litigation and expense to the parties.
Calcutta High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Ponnusami Nadar And Ten Ors. vs Letchmanan Chettiar And Three Ors. on 21 September, 1911

2. I, therefore, do not propose to examine the case law on the question at any length. The agreement in question is not an adjustment within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 2. The adjustment presupposes an existing decree, Lodd Govindass v. Ramdoss (1915) M.W.N. 225, Ponnusami Nadar v. Letchmanan Chettiar (1911) I.L.R. 35 M. 659, and Fateh Muhammad v. Gopal Das (1885) I.L.R. 7 A. 424 Therefore, the agreement is not obnoxious to Order XXI, Rule 2.
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 14 - Full Document

Durga Prasad Banerjee And Ors. vs Lalit Mohon Singh Roy on 13 July, 1897

It is true that the view of the Calcutta Judges has been uniformly and consistently against this position, Sheo Golam Lall v. Beni Prasad (1879) I.L.R. 5 C. 27, Thakoor Dyal Singh v. Sarju Pershad Misser (1892) I.L.R. 20 C. 72 and Durga Prasad Banerjee v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy (1897) I.L.R. 25 C. 96. In this state of the law, I do not think it desirable or proper, that we should upset a practice which has been prevalent for a long period of time in this Presidency. I have always held that in matters of procedure, the principal of consistency will conduce to justice more than a strict adherence to logic. What, after all, is the change advocated? It is that the validity of the agreement should be separately litigated upon, and should not be enquired into in execution. This means further litigation and expense to the parties.
Calcutta High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Thakoor Dyal Singh And Ors. vs Sarju Pershad Misser And Anr. on 21 July, 1892

It is true that the view of the Calcutta Judges has been uniformly and consistently against this position, Sheo Golam Lall v. Beni Prasad (1879) I.L.R. 5 C. 27, Thakoor Dyal Singh v. Sarju Pershad Misser (1892) I.L.R. 20 C. 72 and Durga Prasad Banerjee v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy (1897) I.L.R. 25 C. 96. In this state of the law, I do not think it desirable or proper, that we should upset a practice which has been prevalent for a long period of time in this Presidency. I have always held that in matters of procedure, the principal of consistency will conduce to justice more than a strict adherence to logic. What, after all, is the change advocated? It is that the validity of the agreement should be separately litigated upon, and should not be enquired into in execution. This means further litigation and expense to the parties.
Calcutta High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 6 - Full Document
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