Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 23 (0.30 seconds)Article 182 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Mohitosh Dutta vs Rai Satish Chandra Chaudhuri And Anr. on 13 May, 1931
35. The actual facts in Mohitosh Dutta v. Satish Chandra were that a decree-holder had applied for execution of a money-decree, and the judgment-debtor's property had been sold before the judgment-debtor was adjudicated insolvent. Then an interim receiver was appointed in whom nothing vested but who had the power of a receiver under the Civil Procedure Code. This receiver applied under Order 21, Rule 90 to set aside the sale. It was held that the application was not one competently made by the receiver under Section 47, Civil P. C. The precise circumstances under which a receiver in insolvency may maintain, as representative of the judgment-debtor an objection to execution under Section 47 of the Code, do not require to be discussed here. We are concerned with a receiver appointed under the Code who occupies a capacity by no means identical with that of a receiver in insolvency, the powers and functions of the latter being very different in extent. The fundamental distinction is that the legal estate in the property of an insolvent is vested in the receiver in insolvency, whereas no property is vested in a receiver appointed under the Code who is merely the manager appointed by the Court of the properties in question.
Ajodhya Roy vs Hardwar Roy And Ors. on 18 February, 1909
In Ajodhya Roy v. Hardwar Roy ('09) 1 I. C. 213, a mortgagee having applied for execution of a decree obtained by him against the mortgagors who were members of a mitakshara joint family, sought to proceed also against a son of one of the mortgagors who was born after the decree, and the question was whether the son was a proper party to the execution proceedings. It was held that upon the son's birth the aggregate of rights then vested in his father, his grand-father and his uncles, who were the mortgagors, became vested in him conjointly with them, and that by this devolution of interest the son became the representative of a party to the suit within the meaning of Section 244 of the Code of 1882.
Dwijendra Narain Roy vs Joges Chandra De And Ors. on 31 December, 1923
37. The true position of a receiver in possession of property which is the subject of litigation was again expounded by Mookerjee J. in Dwijendra Narain v. Jogea Chandra of the report there is a passage in the judgment which is in the following words:
Section 7 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Harihar Mukerji vs Harendra Nath Mukerji on 10 May, 1910
36. The observation just quoted in no way supports the contention that a receiver appointed under the Code is in exactly the same position as the owner of the equity of redemption of a mortgaged property, or that he is the latter's representative in all litigation relating thereto. To illustrate the true position of a receiver in proceedings affecting property of which he is in charge, reference may briefly be made to the following cases cited on behalf of the respondent. Harihar Mukerji v. Harendra Nath Mukerji ('10) 37 Cal. 754. The question in this case was whether a receiver appointed by a Court of the assets of a deceased person could be described as a person claiming to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person within the meaning of Section 4, Succession Act of 1889. Mookerjee and Cam-duff JJ. said:
Collector Of Benares And Anr. vs Jai Narain Rai on 21 October, 1937
22. We are not really called upon to consider the application of this ruling to a case like the present, where the question is raised by or against a person who is neither the judgment-debtor nor a person claiming through him, but a stranger to the decree. Apart from that, upon the facts of the case, we do not think it possible to say that the application for execution had not become fruetuous. It is quite true that so far as Seddon was concerned, he took time, but did not file any objections, but as we have seen, objections were raised by Saradindu Nivanani, and these were dismissed after adjudication, and, it was thereafter that the sale was held. Mr. Mookerjee relied on another Allahabad case, A.I.R. Collector of Benares v. Jai Narain Rai , which went to show that even if an execution sale had taken place, but the sale had not been confirmed, the execution would be deemed to remain infructuous within the meaning of the Pull Bench ruling. Whether this is a correct view or not, the facts here, as already explained, are wholly distinguishable. We must consequently also overrule the second objection.
Raj Raghubar Singh vs Thakur Jai Indra Bahadur Singh on 29 July, 1919
In Raj Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh ('19) 6 A. I. R. 1919 P. C. 55: 42 All. 158 their Lordships of the Privy Council made it clear (p. 236 of the report) that Sections 47 and 144 of the Code apply only to the parties or the representatives of the original parties and not to sureties.