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1 - 10 of 11 (0.26 seconds)The General Clauses Act, 1897
Sree Mohan Chowdhury vs The Chief Commissioner, ... on 29 April, 1963
Now, if we look at the definition of the word "instrument" as given in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Third Ed. Vol. 2, at pp. 1472-1474, we find that the word "instrument" bears different meanings in different contexts and that it is defined variously in several statutes. The general meaning of the word "instrument" as given in the passage from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary quoted in the judgment is "a writing". What their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to construe in the case of Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commr., Tripura was the meaning of the word "instrument" in the context of the General Clauses Act. That meaning cannot, however, be attributed to the word "instrument" occurring in all other contexts and in Rule 254 of the Original Side Rules. Rule 254 and other identical Rules have been the subject-matter of construction both in England and in India as pointed out above, in which a much wider construction has been placed on the words "written instrument" than when used in the context of the General Clauses Act. The words "written instrument" in Rule 254 of the Original Side Rules must be construed in the context of the Rules governing and relating to originating summonses in our Original Side Rules and not in the context of Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act. In this connection, the discussion under the word "instrument" in Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, Vol. 2, at pp. 984, 985, is also useful to show that the word "instrument" ordinarily does not bear so narrow a meaning as canvassed by Mr. Desai. It is stated in Jowitt :
Article 22 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 2 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 [Entire Act]
Section 7 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 [Entire Act]
Section 38 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Vithaldas Cursondas vs Dulsukhbhai Vadilal on 22 February, 1919
In Vithaldas v. Dulsukhbhai , following English cases, Pratt J. held that an originating summons was not the proper procedure to be adopted where there were disputed facts of such complexity as to involve a considerable amount of oral evidence.