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1 - 10 of 11 (0.46 seconds)The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
The Indian Contract Act, 1872
Bahu Bali Ramappa Padnad And Another vs Babu Alias Babu Rao S. Padnad And Others on 2 July, 1999
19. Respondents 2 and 4 strongly relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in BAHU BALI RAMAPPA PADNAD v. BABU @ B.R.S.PADNAD, ILR 1999 KAR 3344 wherein it was held that sons of a party to a suit for partition which ended in a compromise can neither file suit to set aside the compromise decree, having regard to the bar contained in Order 23 Rule 3A, nor file a petition in the suit itself to set aside the consent decree, as they were not parties and therefore not having any locus standi. The said decision considered only Order 23 Rule 3A, but did not take note of Rule 3B of Order 23. A decision is not binding as a precedent, if it is rendered, either in ignorance of or by failing to take note of a relevant statutory provision. Therefore, the said decision, rendered per incurium, is not a binding precedent.
Banwari Lal vs Smt. Chando Devi (Through L.R.) And ... on 11 December, 1992
16. Before parting with this aspect, we find it necessary to deprecate the mechanical manner in which decrees are passed on compromises. More often than not, Courts overlook the fact that representatives suits are different from normal suits, as any decision in a representative suit binds not only the parties to the suit, but others who are not parties. When a compromise or agreement is filed under Order 23 Rule 3, the Court therefore has to first examine whether the suit is a 'representative suit' as defined in Order 23 Rule 3B and if so, then proceed with the matter as provided in that Rule. Secondly the Court should satisfy itself that the agreement or compromise is lawful and is signed by the parties. Thirdly, the Court should ensure that the decree is passed in terms of the compromise or agreement, only in so far as it relates to the parties to the suit. We find that Trial Courts in my cases, merely record the filing of the compromise or agreement and order that a decree be passed in terms of it, without applying the judicial mind to the relevant aspects. The Supreme Court has referred to this aspect in the case of BANWARILAL (supra) thus, while pointing out that once a compromise is accepted, it acquires the sanctity of a judicial order.
Section 11 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Kumaravelu Chettiar vs T.P. Ramaswami Ayyar on 11 April, 1933
13. But what happens if such safety mechanism is ignored or not complied with? Let us consider, by way of illustration, a case under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC which enables a person to sue or defend on behalf of others having the same interest in the suit and provides that a decree passed in a suit under the said Rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case may be. The said Rule requires that in every case where permission to sue or be sued is granted under that Rule, the Court shall give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons interested. If such notice is not given to the persons interested, then the decree passed in such a suit, will not bind the persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended. The PRIVY COUNCIL in KUMARAVELU CHETTIAR v. T.P. RAMASWAMY AYYAR, AIR 1933 P.C. 183 considered the question as to whether the previous suit in regard to a public right without complying with the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 CPC will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. The Privy Council answered the question in the negative, holding thus:
M/S. United India Insurance Company ... vs Smt. Sharada Adyanathaya And Others on 26 June, 1997
Another example of representation action is claim petitions for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. The said Act provides that an application for compensation should be made by all the legal representatives of the deceased. It also provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in such application, the application can be made by any of the legal representatives on behalf of or for the benefit of all the L.Rs of the deceased, provided the L.Rs. who have not so joined shall have to be impleaded as respondents in the application. Where a claim application was filed by only some of the L.Rs. without impleading other L.Rs., a question arose as to whether a subsequent claim application by one of the other L.Rs. who was not impleading in the first claim petition, was barred by principles of res judicata. A Full Bench of this Court in UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. SHARADA ADYANTHAYA, held thus:
Bhima Rama Jadhav vs Abdul Rahid on 21 September, 1967
9. Earlier there were divergent views as to the effect of a decree based on a compromise which was opposed to public policy. One view (expressed by this Court in BHIMA RAMA JADHAV v. ABDUL RASHID, AIR 1968 Mysore 184 ) was that a consent decree is not a nullity merely because the terms of compromise on the basis of which such decree is passed, contained a term opposed to law or public policy. This is on the reasoning that when a Court puts its seal of approval to a compromise between the parties, it ceases to be a contract simplicitor and becomes binding on the parties, unless it is set aside in appropriate proceedings, that a consent decree may be got set aside within the period of limitation prescribed, on grounds which may be sufficient to invalidate a contract, and that where a compromise decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction contains any term which is opposed to law or public policy, and if that decree has not been set aside in proper proceedings, it operates as estoppel and res judicata in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties.
Tadikonda Ramakrishna Rao And Anr. vs Kottagundu Subba Rao on 11 November, 1936
In R. SUBBA RAO v. SUBBA RAO, AIR 1936 MAD 689 it was held: