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1 - 10 of 11 (0.33 seconds)Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
Dilip Kumar Sharma & Ors vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 10 October, 1975
In Dilip Kumar Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh (4), the Court observed as follows:
Hanuman Prasad vs District Judge, Merta & Ors. on 16 March, 2001
12. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Hanuman Prasacl v. District Judge, Merta (5) distinguished the decisions of the Apex Court in Mani Lal's case as well as Vidhya Charan Shukla's case (supra) on the ground that the said cases pertained to conviction resulting into acquittal, whereas the case under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act pertained to a distinct happening of commencement of the trialon framing of charge. According to the learned Single Judge, the statutory disqualification provided under Section 19(gg) cannot be wiped off by a subsequent acquittal. We are unable to subscribe to the view of the learned Single Judge. We fail to understand the distinction drawn between 'conviction resulting into acquittal' or 'the commencing of a trial on framing of charge concluding into acquittal'. In our view, the learned Single Judge has erroneously distinguished both the decisions of the Apex Court. The ratio decidendi of both the cases is that if the successful candidate is disqualified for being chosen at the date of election or at any earlier stage of any step in the election process on account of his conviction and sentence but his conviction and sentence are set aside and he is acquitted on appeal before the pronouncement of judgment in the election petition pending against him, his disqualification is annulled and rendered non-est with retroactive effect from its very inception and the challenge to his election on the ground that he was disqualified, can no longer sustain. We are of the view that courts should be extremely slow in ousting a person elected by a democratic process. It is well settled that in the matter of challenge to the election, if two views are possible, the court will favour a a view sustaining the election particularly in a case where there are no allegations of misuse or corrupt practice. A distinction has to be made between 'a right to contest the election' and 'removal of a person duly elected by a democratic process' by. Court order. The constitutional mandate is in favour of the person in whom people have reposed confidence. The object of amended Clause (gg) of Section 19 is to keep a person under cloud away from election till he is facing a trial before the competent court. The purpose is not to punish a person because he is facing trial.
Section 420 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 447 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
The Representation Of The People Act, 1950
Vidya Charan Shukla vs Purshottam Lal Kaushik on 15 January, 1981
12. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Hanuman Prasacl v. District Judge, Merta (5) distinguished the decisions of the Apex Court in Mani Lal's case as well as Vidhya Charan Shukla's case (supra) on the ground that the said cases pertained to conviction resulting into acquittal, whereas the case under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act pertained to a distinct happening of commencement of the trialon framing of charge. According to the learned Single Judge, the statutory disqualification provided under Section 19(gg) cannot be wiped off by a subsequent acquittal. We are unable to subscribe to the view of the learned Single Judge. We fail to understand the distinction drawn between 'conviction resulting into acquittal' or 'the commencing of a trial on framing of charge concluding into acquittal'. In our view, the learned Single Judge has erroneously distinguished both the decisions of the Apex Court. The ratio decidendi of both the cases is that if the successful candidate is disqualified for being chosen at the date of election or at any earlier stage of any step in the election process on account of his conviction and sentence but his conviction and sentence are set aside and he is acquitted on appeal before the pronouncement of judgment in the election petition pending against him, his disqualification is annulled and rendered non-est with retroactive effect from its very inception and the challenge to his election on the ground that he was disqualified, can no longer sustain. We are of the view that courts should be extremely slow in ousting a person elected by a democratic process. It is well settled that in the matter of challenge to the election, if two views are possible, the court will favour a a view sustaining the election particularly in a case where there are no allegations of misuse or corrupt practice. A distinction has to be made between 'a right to contest the election' and 'removal of a person duly elected by a democratic process' by. Court order. The constitutional mandate is in favour of the person in whom people have reposed confidence. The object of amended Clause (gg) of Section 19 is to keep a person under cloud away from election till he is facing a trial before the competent court. The purpose is not to punish a person because he is facing trial.
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Shiv Ram Etc. vs The State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 28 January, 2000
7. The constitutional validity of the said provision has been upheld by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Shiv Ram v. State of Rajasthan (3). While considering the validity of the provision, this Court has taken into consideration the political scenario in the Country i.e. criminalisation in politics. This Court while rejecting the contention that there is a violation of the fundamental rights of a person in not permitting him to contest the election, held that to contest the election is not a fundamental right. It was also observed that as far as the violation of statutory right is concerned, a reasonable restriction can be imposed in the public interest. It appears that the Court was also conscious of the fact that while there is an increase in the criminalisation in the country, there is also growing tendency of false implication to achieve political, business or private motives. The Division Bench also held that the object of the amendment was to keep the persons under cloud, away from the election fray in the larger public interest. The Division Bench in detail examined the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure with respect to framing of charge, discharge of the accused person at the stage of charge and quashing of the proceedings. Thus, it appears that the object of the amended provisions of Clause (gg) in Section 19 is to keep away persons against whom on a judicial scrutiny, a prima facie substance is found in the allegations constituting any criminal offence levelled against them, to appear that purity is maintained in election. To say that the intention of the legislature was to completely delink the qualification of the candidate with the result of the trial, is going too far destroying the basics of criminal jurisprudence, so much so even if a person is declared innocent by a competent court, he will carry the stigma once levied by a jealous political opponent, forming a category of "deemed convict" without trial.