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1 - 10 of 16 (0.30 seconds)Section 28 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
The Specific Relief Act, 1963
Section 38 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Anandilal Poddar vs Gunendra Kr. Roy And Anr. on 19 June, 1961
In Anandilal Poddar v. Gunendra Kr. Roy , Ray, J., speaking for the Court, said that the Court retains control over the matter even after passing a decree for specific performance and that virtually, the decree is in the nature of a preliminary one.
Tribeni Tewary And Ors. vs Ramratan Nonia And Ors. on 3 December, 1958
In Tribeni Tewary v. Ramratan Nonia it was held that the Court retains seisin of the case notwithstanding the fact that a decree for specific performance has been passed and that the decree is really in the nature of a preliminary decree. Fry in his book (Fry on Specific Performance 6th Edn. p. 546 on Specific Performance) states the Law in England as follows:---
Cotton Corporation Of India vs United Industrial Bank on 19 September, 1983
A bare perusal of the aforesaid sub-sections clearly shows that section 28(1) postulates that the application for rescinding the contract has to be made in the same suit. Sub-section (4) clearly postulates that no separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of any of the parties. In view of the above, I am prima facie of the view that the present suit itself is not maintainable. Mr. Shah again seems to be on a sound footing when he states that by virtue of section 41 no interim relief or permanent relief in the nature of injunction can be granted in the facts and circumstances of this case. Section 41(a) prohibits the Court to grant any injunction restraining any person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit which the injunction is sought, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. Sub-section (b) of section 41 of the Act makes it abundantly clearly that the Court shall not grant any injunction to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceedings in a
Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. In view of this clear provision of the section it cannot be held that this Court even has the power to grant any such injunction. Mr. Shah in support of this proposition has relied upon a judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. (supra). In paragraph 7 of the said judgement it is held as follows:-
Chen Shen Ling vs Nand Kishore Jhajharia on 20 January, 1972
Since the decree based on consent terms also imposes obligations on both the parties which have not been performed by both the parties, the decree has to be set aside. It is submitted that it is in the control of the Court to see that the decree for specific performance is obeyed by complying with the conditions laid in the consent decree. For this proposition Mr. Kadam has relied upon two judgements of the Supreme Court which may be noticed. First judgement was a judgement in the case of Chen Shen Ling v. Nand Kishore Jhajharia . This judgement has been cited by Mr. Kadam in support of his proposition that since, the defendants themselves had not complied with the obligations which were contained in the consent decree there is no question of the Court permitting the execution of the said decree. Mr. Kadam relied particularly on the observations of the Supreme Court contained in paragraph 7 which are as under:--