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Bhucha Dhana Danger And Ors. vs Jiviben Madeva Lukhel And Ors. on 25 February, 1992 cites

Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors on 6 September, 1991

2. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Motor Vehicles Act was a complete code in itself and since a statutory period was prescribed in Section 166(3) of the Act in respect of an application for compensation, it was not open to the Tribunal to condone the delay which was much beyond the statutorily prescribed period of one year. The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the proviso of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act circumscribed the powers of the Tribunal in condoning any delay beyond the period of 12 months which was to be computed from the date of the accident. It was also submitted that having regard to the provisions of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and also the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions under Section 6 could not have been resorted to. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 1991 ACJ 1060 (SC), in support of the contention that the Tribunal could not have resorted to the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court while construing the provisions of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act found that having actually initiated the proceedings when the old Act covered the field a claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing of the claim petition could not be taken away. However, in the case before the Supreme Court, the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after the repeal of the old law. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the benefit of the repealed law could not be available simply because the cause of action arose before the repeal. It is thus clear that the question that arises in the instant case never arose before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act in context of the provisions of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The said decision, therefore, cannot help the petitioners. It is clear from the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act that the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 are made applicable where any special or local law prescribes for a period of limitation which is different from the one prescribed under the Limitation Act, in so far as, and to the extent to which, these provisions are not excluded by such special or local law. The Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 does not exclude the applicability of the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act. Even the provisions of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act operate totally in a different field than the one covered under Section 6 of the Limitation Act. As is, inter alia, provided in Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act, where a person entitled to institute a suit is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor, he may institute the suit within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified there for. In view of the special provision contained in Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, in normal circumstances where Section 6 of the Limitation Act is not attracted, a claim application is required to be made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. However, if a person is minor at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, that is, in context of the present case at the time when the accident took place, then the period of limitation prescribed under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act would start running only after such person attains majority. In other words, the period contemplated in Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act will start running only from the date on which such person attains majority. In this view of the matter, there is no substance in this Revision Application. This Civil Revision Application is, therefore, rejected.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 97 - L M Sharma - Full Document
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