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1 - 10 of 11 (0.26 seconds)Section 3 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 29 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
State Of Kerala & Ors vs Unni & Anr on 1 December, 2006
29. Heavy reliance is placed on the decisions in Unni v. State of Kerala , State of Kerala v. Unni and State of Kerala v. Unni 2007 (1) KLT 152 (SC). The learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that it has already been held by the said decisions that the prescription of 8.1% as the maximum percentage of ethyl alcohol in toddy is unreasonable. No better or more scientific studies have been conducted by the State subsequent to those decisions to hold that such prescription is legal and valid. All materials presently relied on by the State in support of such specifications were before the learned Single Judge, Division Bench and the Supreme Court when they rendered the above three decisions. In these circumstances the subsequent fixation of the maximum percentage of ethyl alcohol in toddy in Clause (1) of Ext.P4 must be held to be improper, unreasonable, unsustainable and perverse. For the same reasons that are referred to in the said three decisions the notification must be held to be bad. This in short is the contention raised.
The Bombay Abkari Act, 1878
Section 2 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 114 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Article 47 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Vasu Dev Singh & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors on 7 November, 2006
37. The learned Counsel for the petitioners raised the only contention that the courts in the three decisions referred above have refused, while considering the challenge against the earlier Rule 9(2), to accept that the maximum percentage of alcohol in toddy can be as prescribed under the earlier Rule 9 (2), which is repeated in Clause (1) of Ext.P4. Except that assertion, there is not a scintilla of material before court to assail that scientific conclusion, which is justified by the materials placed before court. I must, in these circumstances, hold that the contention that the stipulation in Clause 1 of Ext.P4 is not scientifically justified, is perverse and consequently the notification is unreasonable and unworkable cannot be accepted.