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Mayawati vs Markandeya Chand & Ors on 9 October, 1998 cites

Tata Cellular vs Union Of India on 26 July, 1994

In cases where the authority vested with jurisdiction has to consider and reach a fresh decision it is necessary that after exercising judicial scrutiny the matter must go back to such authority for fresh decision. But in the present case the situation is different. A remit to the Speaker will not serve any additional purpose because there is nothing further for him to decide. As the respondents, having given up their membership from the parent political party voluntarily, have sought to insulate such severance with the cover provided in Paragraph 3 of the Xth Schedule the only issue to be decided is whether the respondents are entitled to such protection. When this Court found that the aforesaid protection is not available to them under law in substitution of the contra finding made by the speaker, its inevitable sequetor is that all the twelve respondents stand disqualified under Paragraph 2(1) of the Xth Schedule of the Constitution. The impugned order would stand thus altered. I may point out, in this context, that the action of the Speaker, in allowing the 12 respondents to register their votes in a "composite poll" held by the Speaker on 26.2.1998 (as between Sri Kalyan Singh and Sri Jagdambika Pal - a rival claimant to the post of Chief Ministership) without deciding the complaint made by the appellant seeking their disqualification from the membership of the House, was criticised before this Court in special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4495 of 1998. This Court then noted in the Order dated 27.2.1998 that out of 225 MLAs who voted in favour of Sri Kalyan Singh as against 196 MLAs (who supported Sri Jagdambika Pal) the votes of 12 respondents were also counted. However, the Court did not in that case pursue the said criticism made against the Speaker mainly for the following reasoning:
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 3275 - S Mohan - Full Document

Kihoto Hollohan vs Zachillhu And Others on 18 February, 1992

In Kihoto Hollohan V. Zacnillnu & Others, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC, the majority, in Paragraph 109, has summed up the nature of the function exercised by the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6(1) to be that of a Tribunal and the scope of judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6 to be confining to jurisdictional errors only vix., infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity. The question however as to whether a Member of the house has become subject to disqualification must arise for decision under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule only on its being referred for decision of the Speaker/Chairman and not on his own, whose decision shall be final. The defence against disqualification incurred on ground of defection under Paragraph 2 is separately provided in Paragraph 3 to say that such disqualification is not to apply to a case of split. Is not the cognition of the Speaker/Chairman of the occurrence of split not administrative in nature, unconnected with decision making on disqualification is it an adjunct thereto? Kihoto Hollohan is silent on this aspect. If the act of cognoscing the time of such split is the administrative function of the Speaker/Chairman, the scope of judicial review of the said administrative act would, to my mind, be qualitatively different than what it is when testing his quasi-judicial order as a Tribunal. Kihoto Hollohan, as is evident from Paragraph 111 the report, apparently confines to decision making by the Speaker/Chairman in Paragraph 6(1) on reference of the question of disqualification, inviting his decision, and leaves his role under Paragraph 3 untouched. These determinations of importance, in my view, are necessary to be made before the matter can be examined as to the perversity or otherwise of the Speaker's decision, obligating him at a point of time to record categorically when the split took place thereby pinning the time of such split. I opine therefore that the matter be referred to the Constitution Bench for decision.
Supreme Court of India Cites 75 - Cited by 173 - Full Document
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