Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 24 (0.20 seconds)Section 254 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 177 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 227 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Paul De Flondor vs Emperor on 24 March, 1931
The next case is the case of Paul De Flonder v. Emperor decided by Mr. Justice Lort-Williams and Mr. Justice S.K. Ghose.
Sheo Shankar vs Mohan Sarup on 2 December, 1920
In the case of Sheo Shankar v. Mohan Sarup reported in AIR 1921 All 12 (FB), the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that where the duty to account was at a certain place and the misappropriation is made at another place, the offence can be tried at the place where account was to be given.
Daityari Tripatty vs Subodh Chandra Chowdhury on 18 June, 1942
But where the offence is completed at one place, the further liability to render accounts at another place and failure in rendering such false accounts at the second place does not confer jurisdiction under Section 179 upon the Magistrate at
the latter place since the offence is already completed at the former place". A reference again may be made to the case of Daityari Tripatty v. Subodh Chandra Chowdhury, . Mr. Justice Blagden, delivering the judgment of the court after considering different decisions by the various High Courts including the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1930 Bom 490 (FB) observed at page 577 that "neither failure to account for breach of contract, however dishonest, is actually and in itself the offence which Section 405, Penal Code defines, but merely evidence of that offence."
The State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Kandimalla Subbaiah And Another on 8 March, 1961
As was held by Mr. Justice Mudholkar delivering the judgment of the court in the case of the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Subbiah, that there is no analogy between Section 120B and Section 109 I. P. C. There may be an element of abetment in a conspiracy but conspiracy is something more than an abetment. Conspiracy to commit an offence is itself an offence and a person can be separately charged with in respect to such conspiracy. I respectfully agree with the said observations and I hold that an offence created by Sections 109 and 120B I. P. C. are quite distinct and accordingly the statements made in the petition of complaint do not make out a case of a conspiracy under Section 120B I. P. C. The next point that cannot be overlooked is that even after the judicial enquiry and the evidence adduced therein, the learned enquiring Magistrate did not recommend any process against Mr. Koszarek under Section 406/114 I. P. C. and the complainant also did not come up against the same so far as Mr. Koszarek is concerned or even against Sri B. Pattanayak because he was not summoned under Section 120B I. P. C. It is pertinent again to refer to the application dated the 4th November, 1967, filed on behalf of the complainant after the principal witnesses were examined, praying that Mr. Koszarek may be summoned under Section 120B /406 I. P. C. and the order that was passed therein rejecting it. The Court was not moved against the said order of rejection nor was any prayer made under Section 227 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure for adding a charge against Sri Pattanayak under Section 120B read with Section 406 I. P. C. The sanction that was prayed for is under Section 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure but no application is there for adding a charge against Sri Pattanayak. On the 27-3-1968 again, when a second application in that behalf was filed praying for a process against Mr. Koszarek for being tried along with Sri Pattanayak, and an order was passed thereupon, there is significantly no prayer made for adding such a charge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is material again to note that on the 24th April, 1968, when the application for a process against Mr. Koszarek was rejected, the complainant moved against a part of the said order viz.. the refusal to summon Mr. Koszarek and did not move against any refusal to add a charge against Sri Pattanayak under Section 120B/406, I. P. C. In the other Rule again, against Mr. Koszarek and others, Sri Pattanayak was not made a party. In short, at no stage was any prayer made against Sri Pattanayak under Section 120B, I. P. C. or any prayer for the addition of such a charge under Section 227 Cr. P. C. I find also no offence of conspiracy in the evidence, either oral or documentary and the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta is right in holding that it is non est. P. W. 1 does not refer to any allegation of conspiracy and P. W. 4 follows suit. The documents proved again do not make out any conspiracy. The facts referred to therein are in course of usual business and do not constitute any overt acts, germane to the issue of a conspiracy. Ext. 'K' was sworn at Bombay and the Kalinga Air Lines besides having its head office at Cuttack, has, amongst others, an office at Bombay. I hold therefore that this ancillary contention of Mr. Mitter is not only belated but is also unwarranted and untenable on merits and that on the ground of a purported conspiracy between Mr. Koszarek and Sri Pattanayak, the court of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta cannot be held to have the requisite jurisdiction. On a perusal therefore of the petition of complaint and the averments made therein as also on an appraisal of the evidence on record, and on a consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties, I ultimately hold that the venue of the trial of the instant case is not the Court of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta and accordingly the proceedings pending there are vitiated by the absence of any jurisdiction. The stage also at which this objection to jurisdiction has been taken, is the proper stage.
H. N. Rishbud And Inder Singh vs The State Of Delhi(And Connected ... on 14 December, 1954
6. The only other point that abides determination is the ancillary ground viz., the concept of liberal consideration or a broad approach to issues involved, as pinpointed by Mr. J, P. Mitter. The learned counsel has contended that the spirit of law enjoins some remedy for the claims of unsophisticated persons, bona fide aggrieved, and the same should not be brushed aside on hypertechnical grounds. The complainant in a criminal case, according to Mr. Mitter, is as much a part of the proceedings as the accused is and his interests should not be equated at a lower level. The said submission is true to a degree but cannot overstep the bounds of the principles laid down by law, enjoining a benefit of doubt to be given to the accused and not to the prosecution, apart from the presumptions of innocence and the standard of proof required. The point, however, need not be weighed in golden
s as it ultimately does not arise out of the facts and circumstances of the present case. The point involved here is not of a liberal consideration but one of a proper construction of the law, relating to jurisdiction which transgressed, must render the proceedings into a nullity. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions of Mr. Mitter, but I am unable to overlook the non-conformance made to the mandatory provisions of law, relating to jurisdiction vitiating the entire proceedings. Mr. Mitter has ultimately pressed his case on the grounds of justice. There appears to be however no chemistry of justice when in the context of the Judicial Reforms in England, Bentham posed the question: "Does justice require less precision than chemistry?" It could only be answered on the footing that "the precision attainable in the one case, is of a nature which the other does not admit." Justice may not be as precise as chemistry but nonetheless it must be in accordance with law and as has been observed by Francis Bacon "Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere and jus dare; to interpret law, not to make law or give law." Applying the said yardstick to the facts of this case and in con-formance to the provisions of the law relating to jurisdiction, as incorporated in Section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I hold ultimately that the present proceedings under Section 406 I. P. C. are vitiated by the absence of jurisdiction.