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State Of Himachal Pradesh vs Tara Dutt And Anr on 19 November, 1999 cites

Arun Vyas & Anr vs Anita Vyas on 14 May, 1999

In view of the observations made by a Bench of two Judges of this Court, while this appeal was placed before Their Lordships, for hearing that the decision in the case of Aruna Vyas and Anr. v. Anita Vyas, [1999] 4 SCC 690, requires re-consideration, we think it necessary to notice the same. In the said case of Anna Vyas. one of the questions for consideration was whether the offence under Section 498A of the JPC is a continuing offence. The Court ultimately answered that the essence of the offence in Section 498A, being cruelty, the same is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation- On fact, the Court found that the last act of cruelty being committed on 13.10.88 and the period of limitation having commenced from that date, the charge-sheet that was filed on 22.12.95 and the subsequent cognizance on that basis was clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we see no infirmity with the said conclusion. One other question that was raised and adverted to in the aforesaid case is that in the absence of any specific order by the Magistrate, taking cognizance, after the period of limitation provided in Section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by invoking the power under Section 473 and condoning the delay, the Magistrate committed error by discharging the accused on the ground of limitation. The aforesaid observations made by this Court indicates that the order of the Magistrate at the time of taking cognizance in case of an offence under Section 49SA, should indicate as to why the Magistrate does not think it sufficient in the interest of justice to condone the delay inasmuch as an accused committing of an offence under Section 498A should not be lightly let of. We have already indicated in the earlier part of this Judgment as to the true import and construction of Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said provision being an enabling provision, whenever a Magistrate invokes the said provision and condones the delay, the order of the Magistrate must indicate that he was satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained and that it is necessary in the interest of justice to condone the delay. But without such an order being there or in the absence of such positive order, it cannot be said that the Magistrate has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in law. It is no doubt true that in view of the fact that an offence under Section 498A is an offence against the society and, therefore, in the matter of taking cognizance of the said offence, the Magistrate must liberally construe the question of limitation but all the same the Magistrate has to be satisfied, in case of period of limitation for taking congnizance under Section 468(2)(c) having been expired that the circumstances of the case requires delay to be condoned and further the same must be manifest in the order of the Magistrate itself. This in our view is the correct interpretation of Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Supreme Court of India Cites 15 - Cited by 122 - S S Quadri - Full Document

State Of Punjab vs Sarwan Singh on 2 April, 1981

The plain and unambiguous language of the aforesaid provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it crystal clear that under sub-section (2) (a) of Section 468 where the offence for which the accused is charged is punishable with fine only, the prosecution must be launched within six months from the date of commission of the offence. Similarly, under sub- section (2Xb) of Section 468, the period of limitation is one year if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and under sub-section (2Xc) of the said Section where the offence charged is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, then the period of limitation provided is three years for taking cognizance. Sub-section (3) of Section 468 which was added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1978, provides that in relation to offences which may be tried together, the period of limitation shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more or most severe punishment. The language of sub-section (3) of Section 468 makes it imperative that the limitation provided for taking cognizance in Section 468 is in respect of the offence charged and not in respect of offence finally proved. This being the position, in the case in hand, when the respondents were charged under Section 468 read with Section 120-B for which the imposable punishment is seven years and Section 5{2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and for such offences no period of limitation having been provided for in Section 468, the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge cannot be said to be barred by limitation. The High Court in recording its conclusion relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, [1981] 3 SCC 34. In the said case, the respondent was charged under Section 406 for misappropriation. The challan was presented on October 13, 1976 and therein it was clearly mentioned that the offence was committed on August 22, 1972. The learned trial Judge acquitted the accused of the charges under Section 468 but convicted him of the charge under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court came to the conclusion that since the charge-sheet itself mentions that the offence was committed on August 22, 1972, the cognizance was barred under Section 468(2)(c) of the Code. At the outset it may be stated that in the aforesaid case the Court had not considered the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 468 which was in fact not there on the statue book when the alleged offence was held to have been committed. But in view of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 468 which we have already considered this decision will be of no application and the High Court committed error in relying upon the aforesaid decision to come to the conclusion that in the case in hand the cognizance itself was barred by limitation.
Supreme Court of India Cites 10 - Cited by 174 - S M Ali - Full Document
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