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1 - 10 of 29 (0.97 seconds)Indian Railways Act, 1890.
Section 20 in The Railways Act, 1989 [Entire Act]
Section 18 in Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
The Union Of India vs C.R. Prabhanna & Sons on 14 February, 1977
20. We have given our own reasons for reaching the conclusion that Section 20 of the Code and Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act no longer apply to suits mentioned in Section 80 of the Railways Act. We respectfully agree with the view taken in the case of Union of India v. C. R. Prabhanna (supra) that the decision in the case of M/s. Assam Cold Storage Company (AIR 1971 Assam 69) (supra) and the cases which follow the said decisions do not lay down the correct law.
The Indian Railways (Amendment) Act, 1983
Section 4 in The Railways Act, 1989 [Entire Act]
The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) Private ... vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963
21. We respectfully differ from the two: Division Bench decisions of this Court in the cases of Bengal Coal Company v. Union of India (1979 (2) Cal LJ 363) (supra) and Union of India v. Cominco Binani Zinc Company (1978 Cal HN 546) (supra). In the said two reported cases the Division Bench had no occasion to fully consider the question of implied repeal and the effect of providing in Section 80 of the Railways Act a special or a particular procedure relating to suits for compensation against the Railways. The said two decisions of this Court accordingly may be held to have not been correctly decided.
Municipal Council Palai vs T.J. Joseph And Others on 14 February, 1963
In the case of Municipal Council, .Palai v. T.I. Joseph (supra) the question was whether provisions relating to construction of public halting places, etc. and levy of fees for the use of the sam contained in Travancore District Municipalites Act, 1941 which was a special statute was repugnant to Section 72 of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, 1950 which was a general statute and was enacted later in point of time. Upon consideration of the provisions of the said earlier enacted special legislature and the later enacted general law, the Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the provisions of Section 72 of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act was not intended to replace the provisions of Travancore District Municipalities Act. The intention of the legislature appeared to be to allow both sets of provisions to co-exist because both were enabling ones. But the Supreme Court was also careful enough to add that although an implied repeal was not intended provisions of Section 72 of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act represented the latest will of the legislature and will have overriding effect on the earlier provision in the sense that despite the fact that some action had been taken by Municipal Council by resorting to the earlier provision, the appropriate authority may nevertheless take action under Section 72
of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, the result of which would be to override the action taken by the Municipal Council under Section 287 of the District Municipalities Act. In the case before the Supreme Court it was noted that no action so far had been taken by the Government under Section 72 of the Motor Vehicles Act In the instant case before us, Section 20 of the Code was part of the general law of procedure enacted earlier in point of time. Section 80 inserted by Act 39 of 1961 in the Railways Act, was a subsequently enacted special provision relating to certain classes of suits and we have already indicated our reasons for holding that it should be inferred that the legislature thereby intended to make general provisions relating to territorial jurisdiction of courts inapplicable to su its for compensation against the Railways.