Vallabhdas Naranji vs The Development Officer on 16 April, 1929
7. The statement of the law was quoted with approval by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Vallabhdas Naranji v. Development Officer, Bandra.
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Narayan Das Khettry vs Jatindra Nath Roy Chowdhry on 21 March, 1927
11. It is now well settled that if a person who, whilst lawfully in possession, had constructed on the land of another, does not remove the superstructure when parting with the possession of the land, he loses his right to remove the superstructure. It was so held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Narayan Das v. Jatindra Nath. One Satyendra Nath Roy who was the predecessor of the defendants was the proprietor of a holding and he had constructed a house upon it. The holding was purchased by the plaintiff. Before possession of the holding could be given to the plaintiff, the entire property was acquired and the question arose as to how the compensation should be apportioned. The Privy Council held that what the revenue sold was only the holding and the ownership of the building did not pass to the plaintiff by reason of the revenue sale and proceeded to consider whether, in the circumstances, "the defendants are entitled to the compensation money which was awarded in respect of the building, or to what, if any portion of such money." The Privy Council said :
The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882
Section 5 in Estate Duty act, 1953 [Entire Act]
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Dr. K. A. Dhairyawan And Others vs J. R. Thakur And Others on 28 April, 1958
Then at the end of the bye-laws, there are two Forms, A and B. We are not concerned with Form A for that relates to a co-partnership tenancy society but Form B is relevant. The heading of this form indicates that it concerned only with regulations relating to leases to be granted by the society to members desiring to purchase their houses but in fact, as clause (1A) of that form shows, the regulations relate also to leases to be granted by the society to members desiring to construct their own houses. The scheme of the bye-laws, therefore, clearly is that out of the land belonging to the society a plot may be allotted and given by the society on lease to a member who holds at least five shares and the member may build his own house upon it; the plot would continue to be held by the member so long as he is a member; if he cases to be a member for any reason, by expulsion or otherwise, the society can determine the lease and take back the plot and if it does so, the building built by the member on the plot would also go to the society with the plot and the society would be bound to pay the value of the member's interest in the house : vide clause 8 of Form B. Now, in the present case, the deceased was member of the society holding at least five shares and out of the land of the society, a plot, being plot No. 1, was allotted to the deceased but no lease as contemplated by the bye-law was yet executed by the society in favour of the deceased. The deceased was lawfully in possession of the plot under an implied agreement to be gathered from the bye-laws for execution of a lease by the society in terms of the regulations set out in Form B and being lawfully in possession of the plot, he constructed a superstructure upon it. Now having regard to the observations of the Privy Council in Narayan Das v. Jatindra Nath and Vallabhdas Naranji v. Development Officer, Bandra, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. K. A. Dhairyawan v. J. R. Thakur, it must be taken as well settled that the doctrine of English law embodied in the maxim quick quid plantatur solo, solo credit, that is, what in annexed to the solid goes with the soil, has no application in this country. Unlike the English law, the law in India recognizes dual ownership, the land belonging to one person and the structure upon it belonging to another. There can, therefore, be little doubt that, whilst the deceased was lawfully in possession of the plot, though the land of the plot was owned by the society, the superstructure upon it belonged to the deceased.
The State Of Madras vs Gannon Dunkerley & Co.,(Madras) Ltd on 1 April, 1958
8. The effect of these decisions was summarised by Venkatarama Aiyar J., speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court, in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., in these terms :
Khimjee Thakarsee vs The Pioneer Fibre Co. Ltd. on 3 December, 1940
13. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Khimjee Thakarsee v. Pioneer Fibre o. Ltd. is also to the same effect. It is, therefore, indisputable that the deceased lost his right to the superstructure when his right to remain in possession of the original plot No. 1 came to an end and he handed over possession of the reconstituted plots to Sakarchand and Ramanlal without removing the superstructure. He had thereafter no interest in the superstructure and it was not liable to be included in the principal value of his estate.
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