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Karnataka State Road Transport ... vs Ksrtc Staff And Workers' Federation And ... on 18 February, 1999 cites

The Life Insurance Corporation Of India vs D. J. Bahadur & Ors on 10 November, 1980

7. Shri M.C. Narsimhan, learned Counsel for the Union, on the other hand, submitted that once there is a binding settlement regarding the Pay Roll Check off Facility holding the field between the parties from July 28, 1988, till the said settlement was legally terminated as required by Section 19(2) of the ID Act, it remains binding on the Corporation. That whether the Corporation subsequently got trifurcated or not becomes irrelevant as even to the successors of the Corporation the settlement would be binding. It was next submitted that the Notification of the Corporation dated September 21, 1993 cannot be treated to be a notice as contemplated by Section 19(2) of the ID Act. Even assuming that it was such a notice, the binding effect of the settlement of 1988 would not come to an end automatically till a fresh settlement on the topic is substituted by negotiations between the parties, as was clearly laid down in the decision of three Judge Bench of this Court in The Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur and Ors. 1981-1-LU-l. It was then submitted that the Memorandum of Understanding dated May 10, 1993 was in connection with entirely different demands put forward by the Union for consideration of the Corporation. That it had nothing to do with the Pay Roll Check off Facility which was already governed by a binding Settlement of July 28, 1988. Consequently, there was no occasion for the State to pass the impugned order dated September 10, 1993 in connection with withdrawal of the said facility by the Corporation. It was also contended that in any case the said order could not be covered by Section 34 of the Corporation Act. That the State had no power to direct the Corporation to commit breach of statutory provisions of Section 19(2) of the ID Act. Nor could it issue any general directions under Section 34 in connection with those industrial matters which were already covered by binding settlements or awards under the ID Act. That such general directions, if any, could be issued by the State for consideration of the Corporation only on industrial matters which were not covered by any such binding agreements or awards under the ID Act and when the field was open for negotiations between the employees' Union and the Corporation wherein the parties could take independent decisions in the first instance without violating any of the provisions of the ID Act. It was, therefore, contended that both Government Order dated September 10, 1993 and Notification dated September 21, 1993 were rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge and that decision was rightly confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court. It was also submitted that the Union had not ceased to be the sole bargaining agent, as upto July 16, 1996, it was already operating as a Union recognised by the Corporation itself and thereafter it was not the case of the Corporation that at any time by fresh referendum it had lost the majority of the membership of the workers of the Corporation nor was it replaced by any other recognised Union. That the question of locus standi of the Union to maintain the proceedings was neither raised before the learned Single Judge when he passed the impugned judgment nor before the Division Bench which confirmed the decision of the learned Single Judge.
Supreme Court of India Cites 93 - Cited by 519 - V R Iyer - Full Document
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