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1 - 10 of 14 (0.80 seconds)Section 8 in The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Section 100 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Rohit Chauhan vs Surinder Singh & Ors on 15 July, 2013
“20. Some other judgments were cited before us for the proposition
that joint family property continues as such even with a sole surviving
coparcener, and if a son is born to such coparcener thereafter, the joint
family property continues as such, there being no hiatus merely by
virtue of the fact there is a sole surviving coparcener. Dharma
Shamrao Agalawe v. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe (1988) 2 SCC 126,
Sheela Devi v. Lal Chand, (2006) 8 SCC 581, and Rohit Chauhan v.
Surinder Singh (2013) 9 SCC 419, were cited for this purpose. None of
these judgments would take the appellant any further in view of the fact
that in none of them is there any consideration of the effect of Sections
11/20
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
S.A. Nos.330 & 331 of 2017
4, 8 and 19 of the Hindu Succession Act. The law, therefore, insofar as
it applies to joint family property governed by the Mitakshara School,
prior to the amendment of 2005, could therefore be summarized as
follows:-
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Thamma Venkata Subbamma (Dead) By L.R vs Thamma Rattamma & Ors on 6 May, 1987
(iv) Thamma Venkata Subbamma (Dead) by LR vs. Thamma
Rattamma and others reported in (1987) 3 SCC 294.
Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs Pandurang Miragu Agalawe & Ors on 22 February, 1988
“20. Some other judgments were cited before us for the proposition
that joint family property continues as such even with a sole surviving
coparcener, and if a son is born to such coparcener thereafter, the joint
family property continues as such, there being no hiatus merely by
virtue of the fact there is a sole surviving coparcener. Dharma
Shamrao Agalawe v. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe (1988) 2 SCC 126,
Sheela Devi v. Lal Chand, (2006) 8 SCC 581, and Rohit Chauhan v.
Surinder Singh (2013) 9 SCC 419, were cited for this purpose. None of
these judgments would take the appellant any further in view of the fact
that in none of them is there any consideration of the effect of Sections
11/20
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
S.A. Nos.330 & 331 of 2017
4, 8 and 19 of the Hindu Succession Act. The law, therefore, insofar as
it applies to joint family property governed by the Mitakshara School,
prior to the amendment of 2005, could therefore be summarized as
follows:-
Sheela Devi And Ors vs Lal Chand And Anr on 29 September, 2006
“20. Some other judgments were cited before us for the proposition
that joint family property continues as such even with a sole surviving
coparcener, and if a son is born to such coparcener thereafter, the joint
family property continues as such, there being no hiatus merely by
virtue of the fact there is a sole surviving coparcener. Dharma
Shamrao Agalawe v. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe (1988) 2 SCC 126,
Sheela Devi v. Lal Chand, (2006) 8 SCC 581, and Rohit Chauhan v.
Surinder Singh (2013) 9 SCC 419, were cited for this purpose. None of
these judgments would take the appellant any further in view of the fact
that in none of them is there any consideration of the effect of Sections
11/20
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
S.A. Nos.330 & 331 of 2017
4, 8 and 19 of the Hindu Succession Act. The law, therefore, insofar as
it applies to joint family property governed by the Mitakshara School,
prior to the amendment of 2005, could therefore be summarized as
follows:-
Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma And Ors. on 29 October, 2013
18. Recently, in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma and
Ors, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 1, the larger Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, held that irrespective of the father being alive or not, the daughter
would become a coparcener in the joint family property. On an overall
conspectus of the ratio laid down the above decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court as well as this Court, it is clear that the plaintiff is entitled to
claim his share in the suit properties (Excepting Item 14 which is being
separately discussed herein below). In fact, the First Appellate Court,
13/20
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
S.A. Nos.330 & 331 of 2017
having found that the plaintiff would be entitled to 1/4th share, ought not to
have allowed the Appeal, thereby dismissing the suit for partition intoto.
After the death of Marappa Gonder, his half share would be inherited by the
plaintiff and the first defendant in equal shares thereby, the plaintiff would
become entitled to 1/4th share in all the items of the suit property (except
item 14 which is discussed separately)