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1 - 10 of 20 (1.30 seconds)Surjit Singh & Ors. Etc. Etc vs Harbans Singh & Ors. Etc. Etc on 6 September, 1995
7) Surjit Singh and Ors. Vs. Harbans Singh and Ors.
(1995) 6 SCC 50
"4. As said before, the assignment is by means of a
registered deed. 'The assignment had taken place after
the passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam
singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to
property to that extent stood established. A decree
relating to immovable property worth more than
hundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be
registered, that has instantly been done. It is per se
property, for it relates to the immovable property
involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within
the ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make
any appreciable-difference whether property per se had
been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property.
T.M.A.Pai Foundation & Ors.Etc vs State Of Karnataka & Ors.Etc on 11 August, 1995
11) T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. Vs. State of
Karnataka & Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 1
In this case, suo motu contempt proceedings was
initiated by the Court against Secretary, Deputy
Secretary and Under Secretary to Medical Education
Department and few other officers of the State.
Explanation was given by these officers admitting bona
fide error made in interpreting this Court's order. This
Court having regard to the sequence of events,
extraordinary speed in processing the representation of
the Association and conduct of the officers, held,
explanation not acceptable. Since the order of this Court
was explicit and clear but it was subverted on an ex facie
faulty and deliberately distorted interpretation at the
instance of the Association. Hence, this Court felt that to
accept their unconditional apology would be travesty of
justice and officers were thus held guilty of contempt of
Court and their conduct censured by the Court. This
Court also held that unconditional apology is not a
complete answer to violations and infractions of the
orders of this Court.
Vidya Charan Shukla vs Tamil Nadu Olympic Association And ... on 3 January, 1991
9) Vidya Charan Shukla vs. Tamil Nadu Olympic
Assn. & Anr. AIR 1991 Madras 323 (FB)
"56-57. Adverting to the facts of this case, we knew that
the main relief in the suit to declare that the notice dated
26-5-1990 issued by the first and second defendants on
the basis of the requisition notices convening a Special
General Meeting of the Association on 15-6-1990 is
illegal, null and void cannot be said to have become
infructuous merely because the Court instead of granting
an injunction to hold the meeting on 15-6-1990, gave a
direction to consider an agenda of no-confidence against
the Executive Council and election of new President and
members of the Council in a particular manner. It can
still be found in the suit that the notice was illegal, null
and void and as a consequence, the Court may suitably
modulate the relief or permit the plaintiffs to amend the
relief. Besides this the trial Court will have jurisdiction to
consider the grant of a mandatory injunction even in a
suit which stood disposed of if its decree is found to have
been violated or frustrated. The trial Court being a Court
of Record will have special jurisdiction/inherent power to
pass such orders as are deemed necessary to meet the
ends of justice since this power is saved for it under
Sections 4 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
Articles 215 and 225 of the Constitution. The instant suit
which is still pending, shall give to the Court power to
consider the desirability to grant a mandatory injunction,
for the reason of its interim injunction having been
violated, to remove the violation and until the suit is
finally decided to preserve the property in dispute in
Status Quo."
Century Flour Mills Ltd. vs S. Suppiah And Ors. on 11 March, 1975
10) Century Flour Mills Ltd. vs. S. Suppiah and
Ors. AIR 1975 Madras 270 (FB)
"9. In our opinion, the inherent powers of this court
under Section 151 C.P.C. are wide and are not subject
to any limitation. Where in violation of a stay order or
injunction against a party, something has been done in
disobedience, it will be the duty of the court as a policy
to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of
the wrong doing. In our view, the inherent power will
not only be available in such a case, but it is bound to
be exercised in that manner in the interests of justice.
Kapildeo Prasad Sah & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 25 August, 1999
1. Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar &
Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 569
"For holding the respondents to have committed
contempt, civil contempt at that, it has to be shown
that there has been willful disobedience of the
judgment or order of the court. Power to punish for
contempt is to be resorted to when there is clear
violation of the court's order. Since notice of contempt
and punishment for contempt is of far-reaching
consequence, these powers should be invoked only
when a clear case of willful disobedience of the court's
order has been made out. Whether disobedience is
willful in a particular case depends on the facts and
circumstances of that case. Judicial orders are to be
properly understood and complied with. Even
negligence and carelessness can amount to
disobedience particularly when the attention of the
person is drawn to the court's orders and its
implications. Disobedience of the court's order strikes
at the very root of the rule of law on which Indian
system of governance is based. Power to punish for
contempt is for the maintenance of effective legal
system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the
course of justice. Jurisdiction to punish for contempt
exists to provide ultimate sanction against the person
who refuses to comply with court's order or disregards
the order continuously. No person can defy court's
order. Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bona
fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to
comply with the terms of the order. A petitioner who
complains breach of the court's order must allege
deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the court's
order."
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
The Contempt Of Courts Act, 1971
Ravi S. Naik And Sanjay Bandekar vs Union Of India And Others on 9 February, 1994
6) Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India & Ors. 1994 Supp
(2) SCC 641
"40. We will first examine whether Bandekar and
Chopdekar could be excluded from the group on the
basis of order dated December 13, 1990 holding that
they stood disqualified as members of the Goa
Legislative Assembly. The said two members had filed
Writ Petition No. 321 of 1990 in the Bombay High Court
wherein they challenged the validity of the said order of
disqualification and by order dated December 14, 1990
passed in the said writ petition the High Court had
stayed the operation of the said order of disqualification
dated December 13, 1990 passed by the Speaker. The
effect of the stay of the operation of the order of
disqualification dated December 13, 1990 was that with
effect from December 14, 1990 the Declaration that
Bandekar and Chopdekar were disqualified from being
members of Goa Legislative Assembly under order dated
December 13, 1991 was not operative and on December
24, 1990, the date of the alleged split, it could not be
said that they were not members of Goa Legislative
Assembly. One of the reasons given by the Speaker for
not giving effect to the stay order passed by the High
Court on December 14, 1990, was that the said order
came after the order of disqualification was issued by
him. We are unable to appreciate this reason. Since the
said order was passed in a writ petition challenging the
validity of the order dated December 13, 1990 passed by
the Speaker it, obviouly, had to come after the order of
disqualification was issued by the Speaker. The other
reason given by the Speaker was that Parliament had
held that the Speaker's order cannot be a subject-
matter of court proceedings and his decision is final as
far as Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is concerned.
The said reason is also unsustainable in law. As to
whether the order of the Speaker could be a subject
matter of court proceedings and whether his decision
was final were questions involving the interpretation of
the provisions contained in Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution. On the date of the passing of the stay
order dated December 14, 1990, the said questions were
pending consideration before this Court. In the absence
of an authoritative pronouncement by this Court the
stay order passed by the High Court could not be
ignored by the Speaker on the view that his order could
not be a subject-matter of court proceedings and his
decision was final. It is settled law that an order, even
though interim in nature, is binding till it is set aside by
a competent could and it cannot be ignored on the
ground that the Court which passed the order had no
jurisdiction to pass the same. Moreover the stay order
was passed by the High Court which is a Superior Court
of Record and "in the case of a superior Court of Record,
it is for the court to consider whether any matter falls
within its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a court of limited
jurisdiction, the superior Court is entitled to determine
for itself questions about its own jurisdiction." (See:
Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 413 at
p. 499).
Anil Ratan Sarkar & Ors vs Hirak Ghosh & Ors on 8 March, 2002
4) Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. Vs. Hirak Ghosh & Ors.,
(2002) 4 SCC 21
"20. Similar is the situation in the counter-affidavit filed
presently in this matter as well : Is this fair ? The
answer having regard to the factual backdrop cannot
but be in the negative. It is neither fair nor reasonable
on the part of a senior Civil Service Personnel to feign
ignorance or plead understanding when the direction of
this Court stands crystal clear in the judgment.
Government employees ought to be treated on a par
with another set of employees and this Court on an
earlier occasion lent concurrence to the view of the
learned Single Judge that the Circulars issued by the
State Government cannot but be ascribed to be
arbitrary : Government is not a machinery for
oppression and ours being a welfare State as a matter of
fact be opposed thereto. It is the people's welfare that
the State is primarily concerned with and avoidance of
compliance with a specific order of the Court cannot be
termed to be a proper working of a State body in terms
of the wishes and aspirations of the founding fathers of
our Constitution. Classless, non- discriminate and
egalitarian society are not meaningless jargons so that
they only remain as the basic factors of our socialistic
state on principles only and not to have any application
in the realities of every-day life : one section of the
employees would stand benefited but a similarly placed
employee would not be so favoured why this attitude ?
Obviously there is no answer. Surprisingly, this attitude
persists even after six rounds of litigation travelling from
Calcutta to Delhi more than once the answer as appears
in the counter-affidavit is an expression of sorrow by
reason of the understanding cannot be countenanced in
the facts presently under consideration. A plain reading
of the order negates the understanding of the
Respondent State and the conduct in no uncertain
terms can be ascribed to be the manifestation of an
intent to deprive one section of the employees being
equally circumstanced come what may and this state of
mind is clearly expressed in the counter-affidavit though
however in temperate language. The question of bona
fide understanding thus does not and cannot arise in
the facts presently. Is it a believable state of affairs that
the order of the learned Single Judge as early as the
first writ petition, has not been properly understood by
the senior most bureaucrat of the State Government :