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Gopal Das And Anr. vs Sri Thakurji And Ors. on 3 October, 1935 cites

Gobind Krishna Narain And Anr. vs Khunni Lal on 23 April, 1907

13. About a week before the decision of the appeal by this Court, viz. on 28th March 1911, the decision of this Court in Gobind Krishna Narain v. Khunnn Lal (1907) 29 All 487, had been reversed by the Privy Council, but it appears that at the time of the hearing and decision of the appeal of Sohan Bibi the fact of reversal of the decision in Gobind Krishna Narain v. Khunnn Lal (1907) 29 All 487 was not known and was not communicated to this Court. This Court disagreed with all the findings recorded by the District Judge. It held that by her petition of the year 1860 Manki had retained to herself only the power of controlling and managing the property during her lifetime and had not reserved any absolute interest in her husband's estate, that the arrangements which were made by the will of 1871 were not subsisting at the time of the death of Manki as the will of 1871 was revoked by the subsequent will of 1893 and that oven if Parshotam had ratified the will of 1871 the ratification was of no avail to the defendants as the will of 1871 itself had been revoked; that the receipt alleged to have been executed by Parshotam could not be construed as a relinquishment of his right by him, and lastly that it was not established that Parshotam Das left any will at the time of his death. In short it was held by this Court that Manki Bahu was not competent to execute the will of 1893 and, accordingly, this Court passed a decree declaring that the compromise and the decree of 1896 were not binding on Sohan Bibi "in so far as they affected the village Shivdasa and the houses mentioned in the plaint". The claim of Sohan Bibi as regards moveables and for the appointment of a receiver was dismissed. The defendants preferred an appeal before His Majesty in Council against the decree of the High Court. In the grounds of appeal all the findings of the High Court were challenged and it was urged inter alia that the compromise of 1896 was entered into for the purpose of settling doubtful claims and Bindeshri was competent to enter into the same, and, as such, the compromise was valid and binding on Sohan Bibi. The appeal was heard and decided by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee on 24th April 1914. The respondent was not represented by counsel before their Lordships. The judgment of their Lordships was as follows:
Allahabad High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

Khunni Lal, Kanhaiya Lal And Sarnam ... vs Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain on 28 March, 1911

In this case their Lordships are of opinion that the facts bring it within the decision of Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain (1911) 38 IA 87; in other words, that the compromise in question is in no sense of the word an alienation by a limited owner of the family property, but a family settlement in which each party takes a share of the family property by virtue of the independent title which is, to that extent, and by way of compromise, admitted by the other parties.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 130 - Full Document

Radha Binode Mandal vs Gopal Jiu Thakur on 25 March, 1927

18. The contesting defendants in Sohan Bibi's suit were sued not as managers or Shebaits of Sri Thakurji, but in their personal capacity. They in no sense represented Sri Thakurji in Sohan Bibi's suit. The matter that is in issue between the plaintiffs and defendant 1 in the present suit was not directly and specifically in issue in Sohan Bibi's suit. It follows that the decision in Sohan Bibi's suit does not bar the trial as between the plaintiffs and Sri Thakurji of the question as to whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to possession of bari haveli and village Shivdasa. The view that we take is supported by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Radha Biuode Mandal v Gopal Jiu Thakur 1927 25 ALJ 681.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 16 - Full Document

Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur vs Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi, Bhaba Prasad ... on 28 June, 1911

The learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision in Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi (1905) 32 Cal 129 It was held in that case that the right to the possession and management of dedicated properties belongs to the Shebait who has a right to bring suits for protection of the property and that the right of suit is vested in the Shebait and not in the idol. This case is distinguishable from the case before us on the broad ground that the contesting defendants in the suit of Sohan Bibi, were not sued in their capacity as Shebaits.
Bombay High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 131 - Full Document

V. Venkatanarayana Pillai vs V. Subbammal And Anr. on 12 March, 1912

19. It was also argued on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants that the suit brought by Sohan Bibi, was not a representative suit, and therefore the plaintiffs are not bound by the decision in that suit. Two reliefs were prayed for by Sohan Bibi: (1) that the transfer of the property affected by the compromise of 1896 be declared to be null and void after the death of Bindeshri Bahu "so far as it is prejudicial to the plaintiffs' rights," and (2) that a receiver be appointed for the proper management and protection of the property in suit. It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that the first relief prayed for by Sohan Bibi leaves no room for doubt that she brought the suit not in a representative capacity but for the protection of her own rights. Nevertheless, in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Venkatanarayan Pillai v. Subbammal 1915 38 Mad 406, and Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sheo Pargash. Ojha 1924 23 ALJ 168, we are bound to and overrule this contention of the plaintiff-appellants. It follows from what has boon stated above that the question whether the compromise of 1896 entered into by Bindeshri Bahu is or is not binding on the plaintiffs is an open question and must be decided in the present case. The defendant-respondents question the right of the plaintiffs to maintain the present suit on the ground that even though the decision in Sohan Bibi's suit may not be binding on the plaintiffs it was binding as between Sohan Bibi and the defendants, and therefore the plaintiffs could not sail clear of the binding nature of the decision during Sohan Bibi's lifetime. The defendants also challenged the validity of the deed of surrender on the ground that the surrender was not bona fide and that as it was for consideration it was invalid.
Madras High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 23 - Full Document

Kesho Prasad Singh vs Sheo Pargash Ojha on 29 July, 1924

19. It was also argued on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants that the suit brought by Sohan Bibi, was not a representative suit, and therefore the plaintiffs are not bound by the decision in that suit. Two reliefs were prayed for by Sohan Bibi: (1) that the transfer of the property affected by the compromise of 1896 be declared to be null and void after the death of Bindeshri Bahu "so far as it is prejudicial to the plaintiffs' rights," and (2) that a receiver be appointed for the proper management and protection of the property in suit. It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that the first relief prayed for by Sohan Bibi leaves no room for doubt that she brought the suit not in a representative capacity but for the protection of her own rights. Nevertheless, in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Venkatanarayan Pillai v. Subbammal 1915 38 Mad 406, and Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sheo Pargash. Ojha 1924 23 ALJ 168, we are bound to and overrule this contention of the plaintiff-appellants. It follows from what has boon stated above that the question whether the compromise of 1896 entered into by Bindeshri Bahu is or is not binding on the plaintiffs is an open question and must be decided in the present case. The defendant-respondents question the right of the plaintiffs to maintain the present suit on the ground that even though the decision in Sohan Bibi's suit may not be binding on the plaintiffs it was binding as between Sohan Bibi and the defendants, and therefore the plaintiffs could not sail clear of the binding nature of the decision during Sohan Bibi's lifetime. The defendants also challenged the validity of the deed of surrender on the ground that the surrender was not bona fide and that as it was for consideration it was invalid.
Bombay High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 31 - Full Document

Prafulla Kamini Roy Wondow Of Taranath ... vs Bhabani Nath Roy And Ors. on 8 July, 1925

In support of his contention that as the relinquishment or the surrender by Sohan and Mohan, was for consideration it was invalid, the learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision in Sm. Prafulla Kamini Roy v. Bhabani Nath Roy 1926 Cal 1211. It was held in that case that a surrender which is a mere device for dividing the property or "for transferring it for valuable consideration is invalid." It appears from the recital in the deed of relinquishment executed by the two ladies (p. 285 of the record) that a sum of Rs. 4000 was paid to them for their maintenance by the plaintiffs. This payment, if made was more really in the nature of a provision being made for the maintenance of the two ladies and not consideration for the surrender made by them.
Calcutta High Court Cites 45 - Cited by 20 - Full Document

Mt. Imtiaz Bibi vs Mt. Kabia Bibi on 6 April, 1929

In this connexion reference is made to the notes of the arguments addressed to their Lordships reported in Mt. Hiran Bibi v. Mt. Sohan Bibi 1914 18 CWN 929 at p. 932, and it is pointed out that it was not brought to their Lordships' notice that the compromise entered into by Bindeshri Bahu was not for the benefit of Parshotam's estate but for her own personal advantage. It is argued that Bindeshri Bahu was in the suit of 1895 laying a claim to the properties in dispute not as representing the estate of Parshotam but in her own right.
Allahabad High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Ramsumran Prasad vs Shyam Kumari on 31 May, 1922

In support of these contentions reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on the decisions of their Lordships in Nugenderchunder Ghose v. Sreemutty Kaminee Dossee (1866) 11 MIA 241 and Ramsumran Prasad v. Shyam Kumari 1922 PC 356. It was held in the last mentioned case that a compromise made bona fide for the benefit of the estate and not for the personal advantage of the limited owner will bind the reversioners quite as much as a decree on compromise.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 34 - Full Document

Nirman Bahadur vs Fateh Bahadur Singh And Ors. on 25 July, 1929

To the same effect is the decision of this Court re-ported as Nirman Bahadur v. Fateh Bahadur 1929 52 All 178, and of the Patna High Court in Janak Kishori Kuar v. Babu Debi Prasad Singh 1917 2 PLJ 370. It is a fact that in the litigation of 1895 Bindeshri Bahu claimed to be entitled to the properties left by Parshotam Das as an absolute owner of the same and was thus putting forward a title that was peculiar to her and not in common with the other reversioners. She cannot therefore be said to have been litigating in a representative capacity in the suit of 1895. On the other hand it is argued on behalf of the defendant-respondents that the compromise entered into by Bindeshri Bahu was a bona fide settlement of a disputed claim and it was binding not only on Bindeshri Bahu but all the reversioners of Parshotam. It is said that the plea put forward by Bindeshri Bahu in her written statement in the suit of 1895 that she was the absolute owner of the properties left by Parshotam Das was in consequence of a will executed by Parshotam Das on 9th December 1883, by which he devised absolute proprietary interest in favour of Bindeshri Bahu. It is therefore contended that Bindeshri Bahu was perfectly justified in not only claiming the property as an absolute owner but also by virtue of the compromise taking the property reserved for her as an absolute owner. The argument is that, notwithstanding the fact that Bindeshri Bahu was claiming the properties as an absolute owner by virtue of the alleged will of Parshotam Das, she represented Pashotam's estate in the litigation of 1895.
Allahabad High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 7 - Full Document
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