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1 - 10 of 20 (0.30 seconds)Article 39A in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 34 in Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1974 [Entire Act]
Mahabir Prashad Rungta vs Durga Datt on 31 January, 1961
9. We do not, as we need not, go to that length as to hold in this case that the Division Bench decisions of this Court, noted hereinbefore, have been wrongly decided in view of the Supreme Court decisions in Mahabir Prasad (supra, ) and in Soli Pestonji (supra, ) and in Nathabhai Desaibhai (supra, ). For our present purpose, it would be sufficient to note that the view that the award of pendente lite or post-decree interest is merely discretionary and never obligatory is also, to say the least, a reasonable view, even if
not the only view that would bind us. And that would be good enough for our present purpose.
Sudhangshu Mohan Chakraborty vs Life Insurance Corporation Of India And ... on 14 March, 1988
10. We have recently pointed out in State Bank of India v. Amal Kumar Sen, (1988) 1 Cal LJ 83 : (1988 Lab IC 1585) and then also in Sudhangshu Mohan Chakraborty v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1988) 92 Cal WN 1092, that a forensic combat between the Creditor and the Debtor under the adversary system of trial prevailing in our Courts is very often an unequal combat, notwithstanding all our constitutional pledge to secure Social Justice and our constitutional mandate to ensure Equality. We have pointed out further that Judiciary is also "State" within the meaning of Art. 12 and Art. 36 of the Consti-tution and has all the obligation to promote-"Equal Justice" (Art. 39A) and to "strive to minimise inequalities in income and to endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status facilities and opportunities" and to protect "as effectively as it may a Social Order in which Justice, Social and Economic, shall inform all the institutions of the national life" (Art. 38). And since in the present Indian context, Socio-Economic Justice would obviously mean justice to the weaker and the poorer, we must evolve a new juristic principle, a new jurisprudence, so to say, so that our constitutional resolve to secure and our constitutional mandate to promote Socio-Economic Justice are fruitfully carried out by moulding our laws, both legislative and judicial, whenever necessary and wherever possible.
Pomal Kanji Govindji & Ors vs Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit & Ors on 4 November, 1988
12. As an inevitable corollary to this, it must also then be accepted that if in a given case a Court has in fact promoted and secured Socio-Economic Justice by exercising its discretion in favour of the weaker or the poorer, but may not have done so in strict accordance with the established rules of practice and procedure whereunder such discretion was required to be exercised by articulating reasons therefor, such forensic practice and procedure may no longer stand in the way in view of Socio-Economic Justice having in fact seen administered and may pale into comparative insignificance in view of our fundamental obligation under our Fundamental Law to which all our other laws and rules of procedure and practice must give precedence. We have also noted that in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Pomal v. Vrajlal, , a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through Sabya-sachi Mukharji, J., (at p. 444) has, in a mortgage suit, held that "the law must transform itself to the social awareness" about the poor and "poverty should not be unduly permitted to curtail one's right to borrow money on the ground of justice, equity and good conscience on just terms" and it must see that there "is no taking advantage of the oppressed or depressed people."
Thakur Pratap Singh vs Shri Krishna Gupta And Others on 2 December, 1952
These facts now brought before us can .very well sustain a discretionary order declining award of pendente lite or post-decree interest. And in our view, now that these facts are before us, it would be an idle formality to send the matter back to the trial Court only to have these matters brought on record before the trial Court and to direct it to decide the question of interest with formal articulation. u/s. 107 of the Civil P.C., we, sitting in First Appeal, can exercise all the powers which the trial Court could and since we are in agreement with the trial Court's not awarding interest, we do not like that the matter, already dragging for about 15 years, should be dragged any more only to have a formally reasoned order from the trial Court. The tendency of our Court, as ruled by the Supreme Court in Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta, , must be to deprecate technicalities and to allow the substance to take precedence over formalities. If in substance we are now satisfied that the grant of discretionary interest could be declined on the facts now before us, we would be putting too much premium on mere technicalities in waiting, may be for years, for another order from the trial Court after remand.