Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 12 (0.43 seconds)
U. Krishnan vs Syndicate Bank And Ors. on 31 October, 2005 cites

Satyadhyan Ghosal And Others vs Sm. Deorajin Debi And Another on 20 April, 1960

After taking into consideration of both the parallel views expressed by the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and Smt. Sukhrani (dead) by LR's v. Hari Shanker , the view in Harishankar appears to be sound for the reasons that Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code specifically stipulates that, "No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them, claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court." In an interlocutory stage, the point for determination alone would be considered and issue as required to be considered in Order 14 of the Civil Procedure Code, where issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other. Sub-clause (2) of Order 14 of the Civil Procedure Code states "Material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence." Such an amount of opportunities were not available to the parties at the time of hearing the interlocutory applications and, therefore, the order passed in the interlocutory applications may not fall within the principles of res judicata. Hence, the appellant is not precluded from raising the plea of limitation.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 469 - K C Gupta - Full Document

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation ... vs K.M. Yakub (Died) And Ors. on 24 September, 1993

In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. K. M. Yakub [1996] 2 LW 817, wherein it was held, "In view of the findings in the civil revision petition, it cannot be doubted that the first defendant herein is not in possession. If possession is a sine qua non to claim the benefit of the Act, and if it is found that the first defendant is not in possession, then, he cannot be said to be a tenant under the Act. The finding in C. R. P. No. 2100 of 1985 concludes the matter, even though that was an interlocutory stage. . . I hold that the finding in C. R. P. No. 2100 of 1985 even though it is in the same suit, will be conclusive so far as the first appellant in the second appeal is concerned".
Madras High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

Simon And Another vs Thankammal And Another on 12 April, 1999

The same was the view taken in the case of Simon v. Thankammal [1999] 2 CTC 706, wherein it was held (paras. 7 and 19), "It is not disputed nor can it be disputed that the purpose of the earlier petition which culminated in dismissal by the appellate court and confirmed in revision by this court on the one hand and the object for which I. A. No. 133 of 1997 has been filed on the other are one and the same. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. . . In the teeth of the order in the civil revision petition as at present, the hands of the court are tied and there cannot be a decision contrary to the earlier decision in the civil revision petition. Decisions abound for the position, that an order passed in the course of the suit will operate as res judicata in the subsequent stages of the same proceedings. Thus, it is not open to the respondents at the stage of the suit itself to contend that the order in the earlier civil revision petition can be ignored on the principle of doing justice."
Madras High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

T.S. Pichu Ayyangar vs Sri Perarulala Ramanuja Jeer Swamigal, ... on 6 March, 1940

12. There appear to be two parallel views with regard to the application of the principles of res judicata in respect of a matter decided in an interlocutory stage, would bar a party from raising it before the appellate court and even at the stage of second appeal. But however, the view taken by the Madras High Court in Pichu Ayyangar v. Ramanuja, AIR 1940 Mad 756 : [1940] ILR Mad 901, that any interlocutory order by which a party had been denied the right to raise the question of res judicata cannot give a finality and as such the question of res judicata can be agitated even in the appellate stage.
Madras High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 19 - Full Document

Sukhrani (Dead) By L.Rs. & Ors vs Hari Shanker & Others on 12 April, 1979

After taking into consideration of both the parallel views expressed by the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and Smt. Sukhrani (dead) by LR's v. Hari Shanker , the view in Harishankar appears to be sound for the reasons that Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code specifically stipulates that, "No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them, claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court." In an interlocutory stage, the point for determination alone would be considered and issue as required to be considered in Order 14 of the Civil Procedure Code, where issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other. Sub-clause (2) of Order 14 of the Civil Procedure Code states "Material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence." Such an amount of opportunities were not available to the parties at the time of hearing the interlocutory applications and, therefore, the order passed in the interlocutory applications may not fall within the principles of res judicata. Hence, the appellant is not precluded from raising the plea of limitation.
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 34 - O C Reddy - Full Document

Margaret Lalita Samuel vs Indo Commercial Bank Ltd on 25 September, 1978

13. Now, coming to the defence taken by the appellant that the claim is barred by time, even assuming without admitting that the argument of the appellant is correct, the fact that the appellant had executed a continuing guarantee and that the account is a live account in the sense, that it is not settled and there is no refusal on the part of the guarantor to carry out the obligation, the period of limitation would only run from the date of breach under Article 115 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 (Mrs. Margaret Lalitha Samuel v. Indo-Commercial Bank Ltd. ). That apart, the revocation said to have been made by the appellant would enure only in respect of the future transactions. Hence, the claim of the respondent-bank in the instant case is in time and, therefore, the appellant cannot extricate himself from the liability. In fact, when the appellant admits that the first defendant is liable to pay the amount and that the guarantee executed by the appellant is a continuing guarantee and that the liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872, the liability of the appellant is not barred by time. On that ground also, the plea of the appellant is liable to be rejected.
Supreme Court of India Cites 10 - Cited by 66 - O C Reddy - Full Document
1   2 Next