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1 - 5 of 5 (0.21 seconds)N. Subramania Iyer vs The Official Receiver, Quilon on 24 May, 1957
"Learned counsel for the appellant would, however, contend that, even though the debtor might have had an intention to defeat or delay payment to the creditors, no such intention has been attributed to the appellant and that therefore the transaction in his favour cannot be avoided. He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Subramania Iyer v. Official Receiver , in support of his submission that, unless the transferee is found to have colluded with the debtor, the transaction in his favour cannot be held to be void
under Section 55 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. We are, however, concerned in this appeal only with the question whether the transaction entered into by the debtor with the appellant is an act of insolvency or not, and not, with the question whether the transaction would fall under Section 55 or not. It is sufficient for our purpose to deal with the question whether the transaction between the debtor and the appellant amounts to an act of insolvency and we are clear, on the material on record, that the transaction amounts to an act of insolvency and that the order of adjudication passed by the learned Judge based on such a finding is correct. The appeal is therefore dismissed."
Rm.Nl. Ramaswami Chettiar And Others vs The Official Receiver, Ramanathapuram ... on 28 August, 1959
4. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether the reasoning of the learned Judge (Ramaprasada Rao J.) for allowing the application filed by the Official Assignee, namely Appln. No. 355 of 1977, was right or not, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramaswami Chettiar v. Official Receiver, Ramanathapuram, .
Mahomed Siddique Yusuf vs Official Assignee on 24 March, 1943
"It is therefore abundantly clear that all that the Judicial Committee held in Md. Siddique Yousuf's case, 70 Ind App 93 : AIR 1943 PC 130, was that in a case under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, when the act of insolvency upon which an order of adjudication is founded is a transfer amounting to a fraudulent preference, the transferee cannot so long as the order of adjudication stands, question that finding, namely, that the transfer was a fraudulent preference and that, therefore, in an application by the Official Assignee to have that transfer annulled on the ground that it was a fraudulent preference, the order of adjudication is conclusive proof that the transfer was by way of a fraudulent preference and it was not open to the transferee to lead evidence to prove that the transfer was not a fraudulent preference. In such a case, therefore, the order of annulment had to be made as a matter of course on proof of the order of adjudication. The Judicial Committee did not hold that in such a case the order of adjudication itself annulled the transfer and no separate order of annulment was required for the purpose. In fact, it is obvious that they thought that a separate order annulling the transfer would be necessary even in such a case for otherwise they would not have stated that 'the decision of the High Court avoiding the transfer is plainly right' nor while setting aside the order annulling the transfer reserved the right of the Official Assignee, should the occasion arise, to make a further application to have the transfer declared void. The case, therefore does not support the proposition for which it has been cited. On the contrary, it clearly proceeds on the basis that even where the order of adjudication is based on an act of insolvency constituted by a transfer of property found to be a fraudulent preference, the transfer stands till it is set aside. In our view this is the correct position and nothing to the contrary has
been brought to our notice."
Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909
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