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Ramchandra vs Tukaram And Ors on 24 August, 1965

It was this point which the Supreme Court proceeded to answer. It pointed out that Section 38 which made provisions in the new5 Tenancy Act equivalent to the provisions of Section 19 in the Leases Act consisted of two parts i.e., a procedural part and a substantive part. In the substantive part Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 38 laid down several additional conditions which had to be fulfilled by the landlord before he could obtain an order terminating the tenancy on the ground of his personal cultivation. They then pointed out that upon the facts in Ramchandra v. Tukaram an order had already been passed on July 2, 1957 terminating the tenant's lease with effect from April 1, 1958, upon the landlord's application under Section 8(1)(g). The tenant in that case, as in the present case, had not moved under Section 9(3). They also held that between Section 19(3) of the Leases Act and Section 36(3) of the new Tenancy Act in the matter of procedure there did not appear any substantial difference, but to the trial of the application for enforcement of the right acquired under the Leases Act, Section 38 of the Tenancy Act could not be attracted. Section 38 is, in terms, prospective and does not purport to affect rights acquired before the date on which the new Tenancy Act was brought into force. They, therefore, upheld that part of the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court where it held that if a valid notice is once given under Section 9(1) then a fresh notice under Section 38(1) was not necessary, but they did not accept the view of the High Court that Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 38 apply to an application filed or deemed to be filed under Section 19 of the Leases Act. They pointed out that the words in Section 132(3) "shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act", though no doubt general, clearly indicate that they were intended to apply to tenancies determined under Section 38(1). Once an order was passed under Section 8(1)(g) of the Leases Act by a Revenue Officer, the only enquiry contemplated to be made was under Section 19 of the Act and at that stage there was no scope for the application of the conditions laid down in Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 38, for, in our view, these provisions do not apply to proceedings to enforce right acquired when the Leases Act was in operation.
Supreme Court of India Cites 15 - Cited by 5 - J C Shah - Full Document

Jayantrai And Kanakmal Zambad And Anr. vs Hari Dagdu And Ors. on 20 September, 1961

The case merely illustrates to what extent the industry of counsel normally assists a Court in coming to a correct decision and vice versa, but for the reason that Tarabai v. Bombay Revenue Tribunal was not at all considered, it seems to us that it is no longer open to us to reconsider the decision in Jayantraj's case, because of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramchandra v. Tukaram.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Baburao Laxman Muley vs Shionath Mahadeo on 8 February, 1967

Indeed, that was the view taken by our learned brother Deshmukh J. in Baburao Laxman v. Shionath (1967) 69 Bom. L.R. 734 : S.C. [1967] Mh. L.J. 670 which was the only case brought to our notice which was decided after the Supreme Court case. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by our learned brother. Another decision in Ramchandra v. Mah'tra Rev. Trib. was brought to our notice.
Bombay High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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