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1 - 10 of 12 (0.25 seconds)Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 32 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Secretary, State Of Karnataka And ... vs Umadevi And Others on 10 April, 2006
Since this aspect of the matter has been already dealt with the Constitution Bench in the case of Secretary State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1, admittedly in the present case also since the second respondent has not been appointed under the relevant rules or in adherence to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Surinder Prasad Tiwari vs. U.P Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Ors., should be applied by reversing the impugned award for the simple reason that the second respondent in the present case had entered into the service of the petitioner Management as a daily wager, therefore his engagement is not gauged on proper selection under relevant rules or procedure. That apart, he was also aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature, therefore, such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection.
Surendra Prasad Tewari vs Uttar Pradesh Rajya Krishi Utpadan ... on 8 September, 2006
Since this aspect of the matter has been already dealt with the Constitution Bench in the case of Secretary State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1, admittedly in the present case also since the second respondent has not been appointed under the relevant rules or in adherence to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Surinder Prasad Tiwari vs. U.P Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Ors., should be applied by reversing the impugned award for the simple reason that the second respondent in the present case had entered into the service of the petitioner Management as a daily wager, therefore his engagement is not gauged on proper selection under relevant rules or procedure. That apart, he was also aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature, therefore, such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection.
Section 11A in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Section 30 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Section 32 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Municipal Council, Sujanpur vs Surinder Kumar on 5 May, 2006
In support of his submission he has also relied upon one another judgment in the case of Municipal Council, Sujanpur vs. Surinder Kumar, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 173, for a preposition that since the relief to be granted in terms of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act is discretionary in nature, the Labour Court was required to consider the facts of the case. Only because relief by way of reinstatement with full back wages would be lawful, it would not mean that the same would be granted automatically. But in the present case even without proper finding based on any acceptable evidence, that the second respondent had worked for more than 240 days during the relevant period namely, 01.04.2000 to 16.06.2001 as though the petitioner Management has admitted his continuous employment from 01.04.2000 to 16.06.2001, the learned Industrial Tribunal has come to an erroneous conclusion, therefore, the direction for reinstatement with continuity of service along with 50% backwages cannot be allowed to stand to the scrutiny of the law laid down by this Court as well as the Apex Court, he pleaded.
Dir.,Fisheries Terminal Division vs Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda on 9 November, 2009
8. That apart, Ex.W-10 marked before the learned Industrial Tribunal also clearly shows that as per record the second respondent was employed on temporary basis and his services were utilised during the period 1987 to 1992 for preparing Premium Register, all Outgos' Statements, despatch work and miscellaneous work including the work of sub staff. Again heavily relying on the statement that he had worked as Sub staff for the period commencing from April 2000 to June 2001, Mr. Balan Haridoss, learned counsel would submit that a close and complete reading of Exs.W-6 and W-7 the bunch of vouchers, would clearly prove the case of the second respondent that he has worked for more than 240 days. More than above, the respondent also in their counter filed before learned Industrial Tribunal admitted that the second respondent was employed temporarily to do certain miscellaneous work during the period commencing from April 2000 to June 2001, therefore, when the burden of proof was satisfactorily established by the second respondent proving that he had worked for 240 days in a given year, as per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of the Director, Fisheries Terminal Department vs. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda reported in (2010) 1 SCC 47, the burden of proof shifts to the petitioner Management to show that the employee has not worked for 240 days during the period, but the petitioner Management had miserably failed to discharge the same, therefore, the learned Tribunal accepting the claim of the second respondent held that the claim of the employer has been proved.