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M/S Raymond Limited & Anr., Etc. Etc vs Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board & ... on 16 November, 2000
cites
Orissa State Electricity Board And ... vs M/S. Ipi Steel Ltd. Etc on 21 April, 1995
Adverting to the actual grievance of the consumer in
that case that where the cut in supply, be it even for the
reason of an order passed by the Government under Section 22
B of the 1910 Act, is only to the extent of half of the
contract demand, it was held that during such periods of
restricted supply the consumer had to pay the energy charges
for the actual consumption plus maximum demand charges for
the maximum demand availed of by him at the rate prescribed
in the agreement. As in the cases before us, it seems to
have been projected there also that even during the periods
of restricted supply there were frequent cuts and break
downs as well as irregular supply and the Board cannot levy
full demand charges merely because in any thirty minute
period in a given month, the power is availed at the maximum
demand level, and that except the actual consumption charges
nothing further, particularly the full demand charges could
be collected.
Gwalior Steels Pvt. Ltd. vs The Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board on 3 December, 1992
Though there was an attempt for the consumers to
contend that any shortfall in the supply of the total
quantity of contract demand agreed to be made would relieve
them of all liabilities from payment of the minimum
guaranteed sum undertaken, we are unable to countenance any
such claim, particularly in view of the very question that
was actually referred to and decided by the Full Bench of
the High Court and which on the face of it merely pertained
to the liability or otherwise of the consumer industries to
pay the minimum guaranteed charges even when the minimum 40%
of the contract demand energy is not supplied during the
relevant period by the Board. As a matter of fact, we find,
in the light of the decision in AIR 1993 M.P. 118 (Supra)
the correctness of which was taken up for consideration by
the Full Bench, the question referred to the Full Bench
itself is as to whether the consumer is required to pay
minimum tariff of 40% of the contract load irrespective of
the fact that even 40% of the contract load energy has been
supplied or not to the consumer. Therefore, it is not
permissible for the consumer industries in these appeals to
invite a decision as to the liability or otherwise of the
consumers to pay the minimum guaranteed charges undertaken,
notwithstanding the factual position that the supply made
was actually 40% or even more though not of the extent of
total contract demand agreed to between the parties under
the respective contracts. That apart, countenancing such
claims to be agitated in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution would amount to the extraordinary
jurisdiction being permitted to be availed to rewrite the
contract and read just contractual liabilities and thereby
undertaking an adjudication of rights of parties flowing
under a contract - a function normally assigned to the
ordinary civil courts of the land.
M/S. Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd. Etc. ... vs The Andhra Pradesh State Electricity ... on 2 May, 1991
Again in Andhra Steel
Corporation Ltd. & Others vs Andhra Pradesh State
Electricity Board & Others (1991 (3) SCC 263) this Court
held that the purpose of prescribing minimum charges is to
ensure that no undue loss is caused to the Electricity Board
due to the tendency of the consumer to have connection for
inflated requirement and the Boards agreement to meet such
requirement and the readiness to maintain the supply up to
that requirement, even if no or very little energy is
consumed. The decision of the State Government under
Section 78 A of the Supply Act, 1948, to fix concessional
tariff was also held not sufficient to absolve the consumer
from the liability undertaken to pay the minimum guaranteed
charges.
Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd vs Jalgaon Borough Municipality on 3 September, 1975
In coming to such a conclusion, reliance has also
been placed upon the decisions reported in 1990 (1) SCC 731
(Supra) and The Amalgamated Electricity Company Ltd. vs The
Jalgaon Borough Municipality (1975 (2) SCC 508) wherein this
Court observed as follows:
Saila Bala Roy And On Her Death Malti Rose vs Chairman, Darjeeling Municipality on 10 February, 1936
After referring to the decisions reported in
1990 (1) SCC 731 (Supra), and the other decisions which were
quoted with approval therein such as AIR 1936 Cal.265 (Saila
Bala Roy vs Chairman, Darjeeling Municipality and 1969 (1)
Madras Law Journal 69 (M.G.Natesa Chettiar vs Mad. SEB)
which were quoted with approval earlier by this Court, the
challenge by the consumer came to be rejected. It was also
observed that breakdowns and trippings etc. which are not
confined to periods of restricted supply alone but may occur
during normal times also does not affect the liability of
the consumer and only if there is no supply at all for
considerable periods, the situation would be different,
whether it happens during the period of normal supply or
restricted supply, though on facts the case considered by
the Court was not found to be one such.
State Of Himachal Pradesh And Ors. Etc. ... vs Nurpur Private Bus Operators Union And ... on 6 October, 1999
So far as the challenge made to the judgment of the
Full Bench of the High Court, in confining its operation and
applicability only for future period, Shri G.L. Sanghi,
learned counsel, followed by the others have strongly
contended that the High Court as such cannot apply the
principle of prospective over ruling. Reliance in this
regard has been placed upon the decision reported in State
of H.P. & Others vs Nurpur Private Bus Operators Union &
Others [1999 (9) SCC 559] to which one of us (B.N.Kirpal,
J.) was a party.
I.C. Golak Nath And Ors. vs State Of Punjab And Anr. on 27 February, 1967
The decision in Golak Naths
case as such was subsequently overruled by the decision
reported in Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala (AIR 1973
SC 1461) though not specifically on this point.
Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru ... vs State Of Kerala And Anr on 24 April, 1973
The decision in Golak Naths
case as such was subsequently overruled by the decision
reported in Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala (AIR 1973
SC 1461) though not specifically on this point.
K. S. Venkataraman & Co vs State Of Madras on 18 October, 1965
This submission of the learned counsel overlooks the vital
fact in that case that not only the High Court was found to
exercise under Section 66 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, a
special advisory jurisdiction the scope of which stood
limited by the section conferring such jurisdiction but even
the appeal to the Supreme Court having been made only under
Section 66 A (2) of the said Act was noticed to hold that
the jurisdiction of this Court also does not get enlarged
and that the Supreme Court can also only do what the High
Court could do. Apart from the fact that the writ
jurisdiction conferred upon High Courts under Article 226 of
the Constitution does not carry any restriction in the
quality and content of such the powers, this Court could
always have recourse to the said doctrine or principle or
even dehors the necessity to fall back upon the said
principle pass such orders under powers which are inherent
in its being the highest court in the country whose
dictates, declaration and mandate runs throughout the
country and binds all Courts and every authority or persons
therein and having regard to Articles 141 and 142 of the
Constitution of India. The Appellate powers under Article
136 of the Constitution itself would also be sufficient to
pass any such orders. This Court has been from time to time
exercising such powers whenever found to be necessary in
balancing the rights of parties and in the interests of
justice.