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1 - 10 of 10 (0.28 seconds)Section 100 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 52 in The Indian Easements Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 6 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Thomas Cook (India) Limited vs Hotel Imperial And Ors. on 9 January, 2006
"28. The expressions `due process of law', `due
course of law' and `recourse to law' have been
interchangeably used in the decisions referred to
above which say that the settled possession of even a
person in unlawful possession cannot be disturbed
`forcibly' by the true owner taking law in his own
hands. All these expressions, however, mean the
same thing -- ejectment from settled possession can
only be had by recourse to a court of law. Clearly,
`due process of law' or `due course of law', here,
simply mean that a person in settled possession
cannot be ejected without a court of law having
adjudicated upon his rights qua the true owner.
Now, this `due process' or `due course' condition is
satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are
adjudicated upon by a court of competent
jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the
action to court. It could be the owner in an action for
enforcement of his right to eject the person in
unlawful possession. It could be the person who is
sought to be ejected, in an action preventing the
owner from ejecting him. Whether the action is for
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enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or
protection of a right (injunction against
dispossession), is not of much consequence. What is
important is that in either event it is an action before
the court and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is
done then, the `bare minimum' requirement of `due
process' or `due course' of law would stand satisfied
as recourse to law would have been taken. In this
context, when a party approaches a court seeking a
protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails
in setting up a good case, can it then say that the
other party must now institute an action in a court of
law for enforcing his rights i.e., for taking back
something from the first party who holds it
unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the
injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I
would think not. In any event, the `recourse to law'
stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial
determination is made with regard to the first party's
protective action. Thus, in the present case, the
plaintiff's failure to make out a case for an injunction
does not mean that its consequent cessation of user
of the said two rooms would have been brought
about without recourse to law."
Kikubhai Parshottambhai Patel vs Babubhai Vallabhbhai Patel on 16 December, 2004
21. At this juncture, I may refer to the decision of this Court in
case of Kikubhai Parshottambhai Patel Vs. Babubhai
Vallabhbhai Patel reported in 2005 (1) GLH 602, the relevant
observations are as under:-
Thakur Sukhpal Singh vs Thakur Kalyan Singh on 2 May, 1962
Being the final Court of fact, the first appellate
Court must not record mere general expression of
concurrence with the trial Court judgment rather it must
give reasons for its decision on each point independently to
that of the trial Court. Thus, the entire evidence must be
considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should
be done after formulating the points for consideration in
terms of the said provisions and the Court must proceed in
adherence to the requirements of the said statutory
provisions. (Vide: Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan
Singh & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 146; Girijanandini Devi & Ors.
G. Amalorpavam & Ors vs R.C. Diocese Of Madurai & Ors on 6 March, 2006
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v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124; G.
Amalorpavam & Ors. v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai & Ors.,
(2006) 3 SCC 224; Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh
Kumari, (2007) 8 SCC 600; and Gannmani Anasuya & Ors.
v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary & Ors., AIR 2007 SC
2380)
Shiv Kumar Sharma vs Santosh Kumari on 18 September, 2007
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v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124; G.
Amalorpavam & Ors. v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai & Ors.,
(2006) 3 SCC 224; Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh
Kumari, (2007) 8 SCC 600; and Gannmani Anasuya & Ors.
v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary & Ors., AIR 2007 SC
2380)
Gannmani Anasuya & Ors vs Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary & Ors on 17 May, 2007
68. Thus, the principle discernible from the case law
referred to above, is that whether in a particular case there
has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of
Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC has to be determined on the
nature of the judgment delivered. Noncompliance with the
provisions by itself would not vitiate the judgment and
make it wholly void. If it is possible to make out from the
judgment that there is substantial compliance with the
said requirements and that justice has not thereby
suffered, that would be sufficient. The judgment of the
appellate Court should reflect an honest endeavour to
consider the controversy between the parties and that
there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and
weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other
considerations. If all relevant aspects of the matter are
gone into by the appellate Court and discussed properly,
then the same would be a valid judgment even though it
may not have framed the points for determination."
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