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1 - 8 of 8 (0.26 seconds)Section 14 in The Contempt Of Courts Act, 1971 [Entire Act]
Jang Bahadur Singh vs Baij Nath Tiwari on 26 April, 1968
(See Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, AIR 1969 SC 30).,
Article 141 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 311 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The State Of West Bengal vs Nripendra Nath Bagchi on 10 September, 1965
(3) Whether any disparaging remarks made against a judge in his administrative capacity and not in relation to the discharge by him of judicial functions would amount to contempt of Court; and
(4) Whether the impugned passages as mentioned in the notices issued to the petitioner constituted contempt None of these questions arose for decision in the disciplinary proceedings. Apart from the factual issues involved in the disciplinary proceeding, the only constitutional questions which may be said to have arisen by implication there, were (1) Whether the High Court had the right to place a Judicial Officer under suspension pending initiation and finalisation of disciplinary proceeding against him and (2) whether the High Court has power to reduce a Judicial Officer in rank. As already indicated, the Supreme Court in Bagchi's case AIR 1966 SC 447 had already decided these questions and it was not open to the petitioner to question their correctness. It is thus clear that none of the matters which arose for adjudication in the contempt proceeding was in issue in the disciplinary proceeding started against the petitioner. We would, therefore, reject the contention of the petitioner that the six Judges who participated in the finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner have committed contempt of the Full Bench or that the five Judges who constituted the Full Bench approached the issues which arose for consideration therein with pre-conceived notions and as such are guilty of contempt of Court.
Section 15 in The Contempt Of Courts Act, 1971 [Entire Act]
Mohammad Ghouse vs State Of Andhra on 29 November, 1956
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bagchi's case (The State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447) which rendered in the context of a disciplinary proceeding against an officiating District Judge, as in the case before us, that the control which under Article 235 of the Constitution is vested in the High Court is a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment (including dismissal and removal) and posting and promotion of District Judges, and that in the exercise of that control vested in the High Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishment other than dismissal or removal, subject, however, to the conditions of service, and a right of appeal if granted by the conditions of service and to the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as required by Clause (2) of Article 311, and further in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Ghousa v. State of Andhra, (AIR 1957 SC 246) that an order passed by the High Court suspending a Judicial Officer pending finalisation of disciplinary proceedings is not an order either of dismissal or removal from service, it is idle to contend that these very questions were pendine consideration by the High Court either in the disciplinary proceeding started against the petitioner or in the contempt proceeding pending against him in Court. A matter which has been finally decided in the highest Court of the land, and particularly in view of the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution cannot become res integra merely because a stubborn delinquent continues to question its correctness. The power of the High Court to initiate disciplinary proceeding against a District Judge and to place him under suspension pending finalisation of that proceeding was, therefore, no more open to question, and cannot, and in fact was not a matter in issue. It had been conceded by the petitioner both during the personal hearing in the disciplinary matter and also in the contempt proceeding that if the High Court had power to suspend him, it certainly had also the power to fix his headquarters during suspension. With the opening of argument before the Full Bench in Orgl. Cr. Misc. 8 of 1972 on 4-12-1972, both the learned Advocate General and Mr. Patnaik, Counsel for the Registrar, clearly stated that charge for contempt on the allegation that the contemner had not shifted to Cuttack in compliance with the direction of the Court was not sustainable. The substantial questions which were debated in the judicial proceeding were the following:
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