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1 - 8 of 8 (0.49 seconds)The Delhi Rent Act, 1995
Panchal Mohanlal Ishwardas vs Maheshwari Mills Ltd. on 13 December, 1961
14. Shri Mehta, however, relied upon the decision given by the Supreme Court in Chhotalal v. Kewalkhshna Mehta and contended that in view of this decision, the decision of this Court in Mohanlal v. Maheshwari Mills Ltd. no more remains a good authority. In the Supreme Court case referred to above, the agreement of tenancy stipulated that the tenant should pay electric charges separately over and above the monthly rent fixed between the parties. The High Court held that electric charges, which were payable under the rent note, were part of the rent. The Supreme Court disagreed with this view holding that the electric charges were stipulated to be paid for the actual electric energy consumption by the tenant in each month and since the amount due for the consumption of electricity each month could be known at the end of that month while under the agreement the rent had to be paid every month in advance, it could not be said that the electric charges were payable as part of the rent itself. The facts of the Supreme Court decision were thus quite distinct because that decision is based on the finding that the payment of electric charge did not enter into the concept of rent, which was fixed between the parties. In this case what has happened is that the amount of standard rent, which was fixed, as a result of the compromise between the parties was influenced by the consideration that the tenant was obliged to pay education cess over and above the monthly rent so fixed. Under the circumstances, the education cess became the part of the rent to be paid by the tenant in consideration of the tenancy and since this part of the rent was not to be paid monthly, we find another reason why Clause (a) of Section 12(3) of the Rent Act has no application to the facts of this case.
Shah Dhansukhlal Chhaganlal vs Dalichand Virchand Shroff And Others on 1 March, 1968
In my opinion those observations should be read in light of the facts decided by the Supreme Court in Dhansukhlal Chhaganhl v. Dalichand Virchand Shroff. These facts show that the tenant was regularly in arrears even before the suit was instituted and had not cared to make deposits regularly even during the pendency of the suit. It was only when the suit was about to be disposed of that he made some payment which practically covered the rent in arrears. It was with reference to these facts that the Supreme Court observed that if such a tenant was really ready and willing to pay the rent in arrears, it was expected of him to move the court under Sub-section (3) of Section 11 for fixation of standard rent. This he had not done. Moreover be had also not cared to make the regular deposits of the rent in arrears during the pendency of the major portion of the suit.
Section 11 in The Delhi Rent Act, 1995 [Entire Act]
Mrs. Manorama S. Masurekar vs Mrs. Dhanlaxmi G. Shah And Anr on 23 August, 1966
22. This would not be so if the case falls under Clause (a) of Sub-section (3), because, of the decision given by the Supreme Court in Mrs. Manorama S. Masurekar v. Mrs. Dhanlaxmi G. Shah (supra). In this case the Supreme Court has held that the word "may" which appears in Clause (a) carries with it the effect of "shall" and, therefore, where the requirements of Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) are satisfied, the court is bound to pass a decree for eviction. This decision obviously refers only to those cases which are covered by Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) and the ratio of the decision lies in the fat that on construction of the word "may" as meaning "shall" the court has found that the Legislature has given a command that if a tenant fails to satisfy the requirements of Clause (a), he would not be at liberty to take recourse to the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 and say that though he cannot claim the protection under Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) he would, none-the-less, seek protection under Sub-section (1) of Section 12. This view of the Supreme Court is thus obviously confined to the cases which are covered by Clause (a) of Sub-section (3). In my opinion, therefore, this case is of no help to the landlord in "obtaining a decree for execution against the petitioner-tenant.
Shah Ambalal Chhotalal And Ors. vs Shah Babaldas Dayabhai And Ors. on 12 April, 1962
17. The Scheme of Section 12 contemplates the protection to the tenants at several stages. As pointed out by this Court in Shah Ambalal Chhotalal v. Shah Babatdas Dahyabhai (1962) 3 G.L.R. 625, the Legislature has created safeguards for the tenant available to him at three different stages, as under: (1) if he has been paying or is deemed to be ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases at the date of suit Sub-section (1) of Section 12 protects him, (2) even if he has in fact committed default, but pays up within the time prescribed by Sub-section (2) of Section 12, which would be before the institution of the suit, he would still be protected under Sub-section (1) of Section 12, and (3) even if he has not paid or has not been ready and willing to pay and has in fact committed default, except in cases falling under Sub-section (3)(a) of Section 12, he is still safeguarded by Sub-section (3)(b) of Section 12, if he makes payment on the first day of hearing or on or before such date fixed by the court.
Dr. Chhotalal Jivabhai Patel vs Vadilal Lallubhai Mehta And Ors. on 29 September, 1967
14. Shri Mehta, however, relied upon the decision given by the Supreme Court in Chhotalal v. Kewalkhshna Mehta and contended that in view of this decision, the decision of this Court in Mohanlal v. Maheshwari Mills Ltd. no more remains a good authority. In the Supreme Court case referred to above, the agreement of tenancy stipulated that the tenant should pay electric charges separately over and above the monthly rent fixed between the parties. The High Court held that electric charges, which were payable under the rent note, were part of the rent. The Supreme Court disagreed with this view holding that the electric charges were stipulated to be paid for the actual electric energy consumption by the tenant in each month and since the amount due for the consumption of electricity each month could be known at the end of that month while under the agreement the rent had to be paid every month in advance, it could not be said that the electric charges were payable as part of the rent itself. The facts of the Supreme Court decision were thus quite distinct because that decision is based on the finding that the payment of electric charge did not enter into the concept of rent, which was fixed between the parties. In this case what has happened is that the amount of standard rent, which was fixed, as a result of the compromise between the parties was influenced by the consideration that the tenant was obliged to pay education cess over and above the monthly rent so fixed. Under the circumstances, the education cess became the part of the rent to be paid by the tenant in consideration of the tenancy and since this part of the rent was not to be paid monthly, we find another reason why Clause (a) of Section 12(3) of the Rent Act has no application to the facts of this case.
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