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1 - 10 of 11 (0.20 seconds)THE CONSTITUTION (FIRST AMENDMENT) ACT, 1951
The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949
The State Of Bihar vs Shailabala Devi on 26 May, 1952
In my view, this reason is no longer valid and on two grounds firstly, the scope of Clause (2) of Article 19 has now been widened, and the clause says in express terms that nothing in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of, amongst other things, public order; the clause is no longer confined to the security or over- throw of the State but includes also public order. In other words, any reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right conferred by Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) in the interests of public order is now permissible, and any such reasonable restriction imposed by any existing law will be valid and good. The two decisions of the Supreme Court on which his Lordship Weston C. J. relied were explained in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, in an appeal from a decision of this Court, in - 'State of Bihar v. Sm. Shailabala' .
Niharendu Dutt Majumdar And Ors. vs Emperor on 10 July, 1939
The general effect of these two speeches, as one reads them, is that the Adibasi Mahasabha, of which Debi Soren was the President, wanted a separate state or region called Jharkhand with a separate administration for the Adibasis; and in giving reasons for such a claim or demand criticisms were made of certain administrative and legislative measures of the Government of Bihar. I do not understand how much criticisms can be said to bring the Government of Bihar into hatred or contempt or create any disaffection towards it. Mr. Chakravarty has contended that a demand for a separate region for Adibasis will mean dismemberment of the State of Bihar; that, however, is a political question on which this Court need express no opinion; nor is it necessary or desirable to make any judicial observations with regard to the merits of the controversy which has been recently raised for the formation of linguistic States - a controversy which may be political, economic or even cultural, but which has very little bearing on the questions at issue before us. It is sufficient to point out that our Constitution contains provisions for the formation of new States, alteration of the boundaries of existing states etc.; and an agitation for the formation of a new State does not necessarily come within the mischief of Section 124A. It may, if the agitation is based on an incitement to violence or brings or attempts to bring the existing Government into hatred or contempt etc. This, in my opinion, Debi Soren's speech does not do, though some of the criticisms appear to be ill-informed and couched in crude and impolite language. The general effect of the speeches is that the Government of Bihar have not done much or enough for the Adibaais; therefore, the Adibasis must have a separate Jharkhand. Whether this claim is right or wrong is not the question at issue before us; but it is clear that the expression of such a claim does not necessarily bring one within the mischief of Section 124A or 153A, Penal Code - whether we take the wider interpretation of - 'Tilak's case (F)', or the interpretation of - 'Niharendu Dutt Majundar's case (H)'.
Tara Singh Gopi Chand vs The State on 28 November, 1950
The two learned Counsel for the appellants have placed reliance on the decision in - 'Tara Singh Gopi Chand v. State' AIR 1951 Punj 27 (A), That was a case in which the speeches impugned were delivered after the coming into force of the Constitution of India, and the question arose whether Sections 124A and 153A, Penal Code were void as contravening the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution. Their Lordships held that those two sections were void. Since that decision there has been a change in the Constitution to which a reference must now be made. Article 19(1) (a) lays down that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. Article 19(2) as it originally stood in the Constitution of India said:
Article 40 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Mrs. Annie Besant vs The Advocate General Of Madras on 13 May, 1919
Their Lordships also reaffirmed their earlier decision in - 'Annie Besant v. Advocate General of Madras' AIR 1919 P. C. 31(1) and 'Wallace Johson v. The King', 1940 AC 231 (J).
Emperor vs Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao on 25 January, 1944
The point of difference is that Clause (2) of Article 19 as it originally stood mentioned the security of the State or overthrow of the State; the amendment considerably widened its scope and referred to, 'inter alia', "public order" - an expression which did not occur in the clause as it originally stood. The decision of the East Punjab High Court cited above proceeded on two main grounds: (1) the interpretation of Section 124A as given by the Privy Council in - 'Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan' AIR 1947 PC 82 (B) - an interpretation to which I shall presently refer; and (2) the interpretation of Clause (2) of Article 19 (as it originally stood) given by the Supreme Court of India in two decisions, - 'Bornesh Thapper v. State of Madras' and - 'Brij Bhushan V. State of Delhi' . Of the two reasons given above, the second, in my opinion, is no longer tenable by reason of the alteration made by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.