Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 16 (0.69 seconds)Section 3 in The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 [Entire Act]
State Of Gujarat vs Mohandas Manumal And Ors. on 27 February, 1978
17. Mr. Nanavati submitted that the present scheme is not in the nature of a lottery inasmuch as every purchaser of a container got a coupon and therefore there was no element of a chance. As pointed nut by the earlier in the order, the element of chance enters as the denominations of the coupon are different. That proposition is covered by the case of State of Gujarat v. Mohandas Manumal and Ors. (supra). It needs no further discussion.
Section 9 in The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 [Entire Act]
Section 2 in The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 [Entire Act]
Ramagya Prasad Gupta & Ors vs Murli Prasad on 3 April, 1972
21. Mr. Nanavati submitted that in MRTP Act, there are adequate provisions introduced to suggest that it is a self-contained code and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is, therefore, barred. He referred me to a judgment reported in Ramgaya Prasad Gupta and Ors. v. Murli Prasad and Ors. , where the Andhra Pradesh Estate Abolition Act was discussed and it was observed that on the general principles, the Special Tribunals constituted by the Act must necessarily be held to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes entrusted by the statute to them for their adjudication. It is not necessary for me to refer to this judgment, as it deals with a different statute in altogether a different context. The submission that MRTP Act provides adequate adjectival provisions in regard to the remedies is based upon the provision found in Sections 12, 12A, 12B and 12C of the MRTP Act. Section 12 confers upon the Commission the powers stated therein. These powers relate to summoning of witnesses regarding discovery of documents, reception of evidence on affidavits requisition of any public record from any Court or office, the examination of any witness on Commission. It is also provided that the proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 12A deals with the power of the Commission to grant temporary injunctions. Section 12B deals with the power of the Commission to award compensation and Section 12C deals with the enforcement of the order made by the Commission under Section 12A or 12B. It is provided that every order made by the Commission under Section 12A granting a temporary injunction or under Section 12B directing the owner of an undertaking or other person to make payment of any amount, may be enforced by the Commission in the same manner as if it were a decree or order made by a Court in a suit pending therein. Mr. Nanavati relied upon this provision, to suggest that the remedies are quite adequate and of a nature analogous to those which a Civil Court is entitled to grant. I have pointed out above that Section 12B itself envisages that the remedies to be pursued before the Commission and which may be followed by way of a suit are concurrent remedies. Not only that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not expressly barred, but there is a clear indication in Section 12B that it is open to a party to institute a suit for the recovery of any compensation for the loss or damage caused to it. Of course, so far as Section 12A is concerned, a similar terminology is not found therein, but it is difficult to suppose that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is envisaged for the purpose of the grant of compensation, but that it would be excluded so far as the grant of injunction is concerned. It is again necessary to consider the terminology of Section 12A wherein it is prescribed that where during any inquiry before the Commission it is proved whether by complainant... by affidavit or otherwise that any undertaking is carrying on... unfair trade practice and that it is likely to affect prejudicially the public interest or the interest of any trader, the Commission may, for the purpose of staying or preventing the undertaking, by order grant a temporary injunction... What is to be emphasised is that Section 12A envisages the making of an application for injunction during an inquiry before the Commission. In other words, the inquiry must be pending before such an application can be submitted. These words postulate that before interlocutory injunction can be granted by the Commission the pre-requisite is a pending inquiry. The inquiry itself must arise independent of the prayer for interlocutory injunction. The next question, therefore, is whether an individual like the plaintiff can move the Commission to hold an inquiry. Section 36B of the MRTP Act is as under:
Indian Companies Act, 1913
Dhulabhai And Others vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh And Another on 5 April, 1968
(iii) The Supreme Court in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. and Anr. , fully dealt with the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. It carved out several principles to decide the question of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under different set of circumstances. It observed, inter alia: 'Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is cot decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.' The decrying of the unfair trade practice is a creation of MRTP Act and it carves out a specific liability on the part of the manufacturers to desist from an unfair trade practice. MRTP Act does provide for the determination of the right or liability, but at the same time does not expressly exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, nay it suggests, as pointed out above, by perusal of Section 12B that ft recognises the situation that the remedies under it are concurrent with the remedies available from the Civil Court. It must also be seen that the settled law is that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily inferred.
State Of Gujarat vs Jivanlal Bhimjibhai And Anr. on 5 December, 1967
11. So far as the first element is concerned, there is no contro-versy that the scheme offers a prize inasmuch as a purchaser gets a coupon of a denomination between Re. 1/- and Rs. 25/-. So far as the second element of distribution by chance is concerned it was of course contended that there is no element of chance because each purchaser of the container under the scheme gets a coupon. However, element of chance cannot be gainsaid inasmuch as although every purchaser of the container under the scheme gets a coupon, he does not get the coupon of the same denomination, but the denomination may vary between Re. 1/- to Rs. 25/-. It is in the fact of different denominations of the coupons that the element of chance gets in. The remaining elements are indeed required to be considered, as to whether a person who purchases a container and gets a coupon pays any consideration for the coupon because it is an admitted position that even without the benefit of a coupon, the container contains matches of the quality which is commensurate with its price. The fourth element is risk of loss, which, it is contended, is absent in the scheme. The Division Bench took the view that for deciding the question whether a particular scheme is a lottery or not, the fourth element, namely, risk of loss is not an essential element and in so holding they dissented from the view taken by a single Judge of this Court (Coram: A.D. Desai, J.) in State v. Jayantilal Bhimjibhai [1968] 9 GLR 603, that risk of loss is also one of the four essential elements to constitute lottery. The Division Bench observed that it may be that a person who gets the prize wholly gratuitously, risks nothing. But that does not lead one to a conclusion that in a scheme where distribution of prizes is made unequally depending on mere chance, the fact that the subscriber gets at the end of the scheme what he has contributed and therefore does not risk anything, would not be a lottery. The Division Bench held that the decided cases referred in that judgment did not lead to the conclusion that the risk of loss, though it may be present in great variety of cases is a necessary element of lottery. It is seen above that the first two elements of lottery are satisfied, namely, a purchaser of a container gets a prize or some advantage in the nature of a prize and that the distribution is by a chance, since the denominations of the coupon are different from Re. 1/- to Rs. 25/-. It is a matter only of chance whether a purchaser would get a coupon of Re. 1/- worth or Rs. 25/- worth. So far as the third element of payment of consideration is concerned, reference may be made to the discussion by the Division Bench at Paragraph 8 of its judgment. It is observed as under: