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State 0F Bombay & Others vs The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Others on 29 January, 1960

6. There is in the schedule to the notification dated 31 December 1960 Itself an Indication to Justify the view that the term " Cement" used therein cannot be given a wide connotation so as to include the constructional work of a Cement factory. in the schedule " asbestos Cement" and " engineering " have been separately specified If it had been intended that the manufacture of Cement should be understood in a wide sense so as to include manufacture of every kind of Cement and also the construction of a Cement factory, then the separate enumeration of "asbestos cement" and "engineering," which clearly includes constructional work, becomes purposeless. in that case, manufacture of asbestos cement would be included In the Cement-manufacturing industry and the constructional work of any factory; In any industry would be included in the various industries specified in the schedule. The fact that " engineering, which includes constructional work, is one of the Industries specified in the schedule to the notification, does not, however, lead to the conclusion that the workers employed by the petitioner on the constructional work are employees in an industry to which the Act applies. The reason is that the constructional Activity, which the petitioner-company carries on, is casual and not one systematically or habitually undertaken and, therefore, is not an " industry." la D.N. Banerjee v. P.R. Mukherjee 1953-I L.L J. 195, State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha 1960-I L.L.J. 251, and University of Delhi v. Ram Nath 1963-II LLJ. 335, the Supreme Court has considered the definition of " industry " given in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and of " workman " in Section 2(s) of that Act. These definitions are analogous to the definitions contained in Sections 2 (13) and 2 (19) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960. What the Supreme Court has said in the aforesaid three cases about the scope of the terme "industry" and" workman" occurring in the Act of 1947 applies equally to the definitions of " industry " and " employes " given in the local Act, because the intent underlying the two enactments is the same and the language is almost similar. The Supreme Court has pointed out that it is the character of the Activity which decides the question as to whether the activity in question attracfcs the provisions of Section 2(f) of the Act of 1947 who conducts the Activity and whether it is conducted for profit or not, do not make a material difference. The working principle laid down by the Supreme Court for determining whether a particular form of Activity is an undertaking making it an industry is that
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 550 - P B Gajendragadkar - Full Document

D. N. Banerji vs P. R. Mukherjee And Others on 5 December, 1952

6. There is in the schedule to the notification dated 31 December 1960 Itself an Indication to Justify the view that the term " Cement" used therein cannot be given a wide connotation so as to include the constructional work of a Cement factory. in the schedule " asbestos Cement" and " engineering " have been separately specified If it had been intended that the manufacture of Cement should be understood in a wide sense so as to include manufacture of every kind of Cement and also the construction of a Cement factory, then the separate enumeration of "asbestos cement" and "engineering," which clearly includes constructional work, becomes purposeless. in that case, manufacture of asbestos cement would be included In the Cement-manufacturing industry and the constructional work of any factory; In any industry would be included in the various industries specified in the schedule. The fact that " engineering, which includes constructional work, is one of the Industries specified in the schedule to the notification, does not, however, lead to the conclusion that the workers employed by the petitioner on the constructional work are employees in an industry to which the Act applies. The reason is that the constructional Activity, which the petitioner-company carries on, is casual and not one systematically or habitually undertaken and, therefore, is not an " industry." la D.N. Banerjee v. P.R. Mukherjee 1953-I L.L J. 195, State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha 1960-I L.L.J. 251, and University of Delhi v. Ram Nath 1963-II LLJ. 335, the Supreme Court has considered the definition of " industry " given in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and of " workman " in Section 2(s) of that Act. These definitions are analogous to the definitions contained in Sections 2 (13) and 2 (19) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960. What the Supreme Court has said in the aforesaid three cases about the scope of the terme "industry" and" workman" occurring in the Act of 1947 applies equally to the definitions of " industry " and " employes " given in the local Act, because the intent underlying the two enactments is the same and the language is almost similar. The Supreme Court has pointed out that it is the character of the Activity which decides the question as to whether the activity in question attracfcs the provisions of Section 2(f) of the Act of 1947 who conducts the Activity and whether it is conducted for profit or not, do not make a material difference. The working principle laid down by the Supreme Court for determining whether a particular form of Activity is an undertaking making it an industry is that
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 334 - N C Aiyar - Full Document
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