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1 - 9 of 9 (0.19 seconds)Gajendra Singh vs Durga Kumari on 27 March, 1925
475: (A. I. R. (13) 1926 ALL 501) Mukherji J. in Gajendra Singh v. Durga Kumari, 47 ALL. 637: (A. I. R. (12) 1925 ALL, 501 FB) his in the course of his dissenting judgment observed that the question is a difficult one. He has re erred to the divergence of opinion between the H. Cs. of Bombay, Calcutta & Madras in this matter & has set himself to examine the meaning of Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Civil P. C. He arrives at the conclusion that on the plain meaning of the words "adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise" an award obtained on a reference to arbitration without the intervention of the Ct cannot amount to such an adjustment or compromise. A compromise contemplated under Order 23, Rule 3 according to him can only be the direct result of an agreement between the parties & Rule 3 must betaken as directed only to cases where the par. ties have agreed that the Ct. should decide a matter between themselves in a particular way & that an arbitration cannot come within the purview of Rule 8.
The Arbitration Act, 1940
Article 116 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
V.S.A. Arumuga Mudaliar vs V.S.P. Balasubramania Mudaliar And ... on 20 February, 1945
11. Mr. Ramachandra Rao contends that since the parties had consented before they referred the matter to abide by the decision of the arbitrators, the same & the subsequent award or decision amounts to a compromise as there is nothing to prevent the parties consenting to the decision in advance. He relies for this argument strongly on Arumuga Mudaliar v. Balasubramania Mudaliar, A I. R. (32) 1945 Mad. 294 . (I. L. R. (1946) Mad. 39) & urges that Section 47, Arbitration Act, merely refers to such consent & does not expressly say that the consent must be subsequent to the award. No doubt that decision supports him. I am how-aver not impressed with that argument & I say so with great respect to the learned Judges who have decided that case in that way. By saying that there is nothing in the proviso which precludes antecedent consent' I think the object; of the proviso is practically destroyed. The plain language of the proviso does not support such a construction. The same expressly reads as if an award may be taken into consideration as a compromise only with the consent of all the parties interested.
Manilal Motilal vs Gokaldas Rowji on 20 July, 1920
Rule 3 & has chosen to follow the earlier Bombay view in Manilal Motilal v. Gokaldas Bawji, 45 Bom. 245: (A. I. B. (8) 1921 Bom.
Chanbasappa Gurushantappa Hiremath vs Baslingayya Gokurnaya Hiremath on 14 April, 1927
5. The Bombay H. C. has in Chanbasappa v. Baslingayya, 61 Bom. 908: (A. I. B. (14) 1927 Bom 565 F. B.)
Ram Devi And Ors. vs Ganeshi Lal And Ors. on 2 March, 1926
503 FB) Walsh & Kanhaiya Lal JJ. (Mukerji J. dissenting) have held that an agreement & arbitration operate as an adjustment of the matters in dispute under Order 23 Rule 3, C. P. C. & this view has been followed in Ram Devi v. Ganeshi Lal 48 ALL.
Mahammad Mia Pandit And Ors. vs Osman Ali And Ors. on 6 August, 1934
In Mahammad Mia v. Oosman Ali, A. I. R. (22) 1935 Cal. 239 at p. 241: (62 Cal. 229) Mitter J. has followed this view observing "that so far as our (Calcutta) Ct. is concerned it is now settled law that an award made on a reference without the intervention of the Ct. during the pendency of a suit cannot be recorded as a compromise or adjustment of the suit under Order 23, Rule 3, C. P. C."
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