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1 - 10 of 19 (0.20 seconds)The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882
Section 111 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Itc Limited vs State Of U.P. & Ors on 5 July, 2011
From
the contentions advanced by the learned advocate for the respondent,
it is apparent that the case of the respondent is that the impugned
notice has been issued in exercise of powers under section 106 read
with section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme
Court, in the case of ITC Ltd. v. State of U. P.
(supra) has held that a lease governed exclusively by the provisions
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, can be cancelled only by
filing a civil suit for its cancellation or for a declaration that
it is illegal, null and void and for the consequential relief of
delivery back of possession. Unless and until a court of competent
jurisdiction grants such a decree, the lease will continue to be
effective and binding. Unilateral cancellation of a registered lease
deed by the lessor will neither terminate the lease nor entitle a
lessor to seek possession. This is the position under private law.
But where the grant of lease is governed by a statute or statutory
regulations, and if such statute expressly reserves the power of
cancellation or revocation to the lessor, it will be permissible for
an authority, as the lessor, to cancel a duly executed and
registered lease deed, even if possession has been delivered, on the
specific grounds of cancellation provided in the statute. In the
facts of the present case, though the grant of lease is governed by
statute, the cancellation of lease deed is not sought on the
specific grounds for cancellation provided in the statute. Under the
circumstances, the second part of the said decision would not be
applicable in the facts of the present case. Therefore, when the
lease is sought to be cancelled by resorting to the provisions of
the Transfer of Property Act, it is not permissible for the
respondent to unilaterally cancel the lease deed or to terminate the
lease. For the purpose of cancellation of the lease, the respondent
would be required to institute a civil suit in that regard.
The Major Port Trusts Act, 1963
Section 34 in The Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Hitkarini Sabha, Jabalpur vs The Corporation Of The City Of Jabalpur & ... on 3 May, 1972
have been fraudulently introduced in the lease deed without the
approval of the Central Government. Reliance was placed upon the
provisions of section 34 of the Major Port Trusts Act for the
purpose of contending that since the Central Government had granted
approval for grant of lease for the purpose of construction of
godown, the lease itself is bad on the count of not being in
consonance with the approval granted by the Central Government and
as such, is not binding on the Board. It may be noted that it is not
the case of the respondent that the lease deed has been executed by
a person who was not authorized to execute the lease. Thus, the
officer duly authorized to execute the lease deed has executed the
lease deed in favour of the predecessor in title of the petitioners
containing the aforesaid covenant. Under the circumstances, reliance
placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Hitkarini State v. Corporation of the City of Jabalpur (supra)
would be of no assistance to the respondent, inasmuch as, in the
facts of the said case, the officer who had executed the lease deed
had no power to lease out the property in question and as such,
grant of the lease was ab-initio null and void. In the facts of the
present case, prima facie, grant of lease is not wholly null and
void inasmuch as, the same has been executed by the officer duly
empowered to do so. The only contention is that the covenant which
has been introduced is contrary to the approval of the Central
Government. In the aforesaid premises, this court is of the prima
facie view that if it is the case of the respondent-KPT that the
lease deed is void for the reason that the same is not in consonance
with the approval of the Central Government, it is for the KPT to
approach the appropriate forum for cancellation of the lease deed.
Inderjit Singh Grewal vs State Of Punjab & Anr on 23 August, 2011
It
was submitted that even if it is the case of the respondent KPT that
the lease deed is void as having been tainted by fraud, it is
settled legal position as held by the apex court in the case of
Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab, (2011) 12
SCC 588, that where a person gets an order by making
misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent authority,
such order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law as fraud
unravels everything. However, for setting aside such an order, even
if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. Thus, even
if a decree is void ab initio, declaration to that effect has to be
obtained by the person aggrieved from the competent court. It was
submitted that under the circumstances, the respondent KPT is
required to approach the appropriate forum for a declaration that
the lease deed is void on account of fraud. However, the respondent
does not have any power to adjudicate on its own the question as to
whether the lease deed is void on account of fraud.