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Namdev Vyankat Ghade & Anr vs Chandrakant Ganpat Chadge & Ors on 25 February, 2003 cites

Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs Pandurang Miragu Agalawe & Ors on 22 February, 1988

He urged that the decision in Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe and Ors. [AIR 1988 SC 845], is clearly distinguishable and the courts were wrong in holding that the ratio of that case applied to the facts of the present case on all fours. The courts have failed to notice that it was a case where adoption had taken place during the life time of sole surviving coparcener but in the present case, defendant no. 6 was adopted after the death of sole surviving coparcener, namely Vyankat which makes all the difference.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 49 - E S Venkataramiah - Full Document

Vasant And Anr. vs Dattu And Ors. on 8 December, 1986

"We respectfully agree with the above observations of this Court in Vasant's case (supra). The joint family property does not cease to be joint family property when it passes to the hands of a sole surviving coparcener. If a son is born to the sole surviving coparcener, the said properties become the joint family properties in his hands and in the hands of his son. The only difference between the right of a manager of a joint Hindu family over the joint family properties where there are two or more coparceners and the right of a sole surviving coparcener in respect of the joint family properties is that while the former can alienate the joint family properties only for legal necessity or for family benefit, the latter is entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as if it were his separate property as long as he remains a sole surviving coparcener and he may sell or mortgage the coparcenary property even though there is no legal necessity or family benefit or may even make a gift of the coparcenary property. If a son is subsequently born to or adopted by the sole surviving coparcener or a new coparcener is inducted into the family on an adoption made by a widow of a deceased coparcener an alienation made by the sole surviving coparcener before the birth of a new coparcenor or the induction of a coparcener by adoption into the family whether by way of sale, mortgage or gift would however stand, for the coparcener who is born or adopted after the alienation cannot object to alienations made before he was begotten or adopted."
Supreme Court of India Cites 2 - Cited by 21 - O C Reddy - Full Document

Jivaji Annaji vs Hanmant Ramchandra on 27 June, 1950

Full Bench of Bombay High Court in Jivaji Annaji vs. Hanmant Ramchandra [AIR (37) 1950 Bom. 360], dealing with a case of adoption after collateral's death and the principle of relation back, after referring to number of Privy Council decisions, held that any adoption after the death of collateral will not allow the adopted son to come in as a heir of the collateral. Adoption relates back to the death of the adopting father and an adopted son must be looked upon as if he was in existence at the date of the death of the adopting father. But it is not a correct proposition to say that the rights of adopted son are in all respects identical with that of a natural born son. The principle of relation back is not an absolute principle but it has certain limitations. Chagla, C.J., speaking for himself and on behalf of Gajendragadkar and Shah, JJ., in para 2 of the said judgment, has stated thus: -
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 11 - V Bose - Full Document

Sawan Ram & Others vs Kala Wanti & Others on 19 April, 1967

(emphasis supplied) We are in respectful agreement with the statement of law made in the aforesaid judgment on the point touching the controversy in the present case. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in Sawan Ram and others vs. Kala Wanti and others [1967 (3) SCR 687], after referring to Nara Hanumantha Rao vs. Nara Hanumayya and Anr. [(1964) 1 Andhra Weekly Reporter 156], was unable to accept the interpretation placed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court on Sections 12 and 13 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act but however, found that the conclusion arrived at in that case by the Andhra Pradesh High Court was correct. In that case, the question that arose for consideration was whether E after the adoption by D, the widow of B could divest C of the rights which had already vested in C before the adoption. By the year 1936 C was the sole male member of the Hindu Joint Family which owned the disputed property. B died in the year 1924 and A died in 1936 before Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act had come into force and, consequently, C as the sole male survivor of the family became full owner of the property. This Court further observed "In these circumstances, it was clear that after the adoption of E by D, E could not divest C of the rights already vested in him in view of the special provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso to S.12 of the Act. It appears that, by making such a provision, the Act has narrowed down the rights of an adopted child as compared with the rights of a child born posthumously.
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 5 - V Bhargava - Full Document
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