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1 - 6 of 6 (0.17 seconds)Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 141 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Brij Lal Suri vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh And Ors. on 11 December, 1957
In Brij Lal v. State of U. P., AIR 1958 All 621 a Division Bench of this Court held that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution may be a civil jurisdiction depending upon the nature of the rights decided in the writ, while in Khurjawala Buckles Manufacturing Co. v. Commr. Sales Tax U. P., 1965 All LJ 308: (AIR 1965 All 517) another Division Bench of this Court held that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was neither civil nor criminal. If was merely an extraordinary jurisdiction.
Khurjawala Buckles Manufacturing Co. vs Commissioner, Sales Tax And Anr. on 27 July, 1964
The main reason for taking this view in Khurjawala Buckles Manufacturing Co., case, 1965 All LJ 308 : (AIR 1965 All 517) (supra) was that this Court exercised extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and this extraordinary jurisdiction could not be said to be either civil or criminal, For this observation reliance was placed upon a Single Judge decision of this Court in Slate v. Mukhtar Singh, AIR 1957 All 505 and it was also observed that there was great conflict of decisions on this point between different High Courts and that the Supreme Court had not yet pronounced upon this matter.
Ram Dutt Upadhia vs Ram Sunder Misir on 28 July, 1960
5. The second question has arisen because the order of this Court for the payment of Rs. 40,000/- and odd had been transferred for execution to the Civil Judge, Meerut, and it was that Court which actually realised the money and paid it to the claimant. One of the contentions raised against this application under Section 144 which was made before the learned Single Judge of this Court, whose order under writ, had been reversed, that this application under Section 144 C.P.C. could only be made before the Civil Judge who actually executed the order and realised the money. Reliance for this proposition was placed on Ram Datt Upadhia v. Ram Sunder Misir AIR 1961 All 636. This was a single Judge decision of this court in which the facts were very special. In that case the decree had been transferred for execution to another court. In the transferee court the amount of the decree was realised. But an objection was taken to the executability of the decree as it had become time barred. This objection was rejected by the transferee court. Subsequently an application was moved before the transferor court for withdrawing the certificate of transfer. That application was allowed and the transfer certificate was withdrawn Thereupon an application under Section 144 was made before the transferor court for restitution of the money which the decree-holder realised in the transferee court. This application had been allowed by the court and it was against that order that a revision was filed in this Court. In those circumstances it was held that the court which passed the actual order releasing the money is the proper court which should order restitution and the basis of the decision was that the transferor court may have had the power to recall its certificate but had no power to interfere with the 'orders passed by the transferee court. It could, therefore, be said that by virtue of recalling the certificate the transferor court had set aside the orders of the transferee court. It was on this basis that the transferor court was held not to have any jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 144 C.P.C. We think that that decision has no application to the facts of this case. Section 144 C.P.C. provides:
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