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1 - 10 of 12 (0.24 seconds)Section 291 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 [Entire Act]
Section 191 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 [Entire Act]
Ramanandi Kuer vs Kalawati Kuer on 11 November, 1927
In 19 Cal WN 1108 : (AIR 1915 Cal 421) (L), the challenge to the Will was only one of the several grounds on which revocation was prayed for and this Court rightly pointed out that in such cases the question of invalidity of the will should be taken up, if necessary, by the revocation court only after the other grounds of attack to the grant had been disposed of. This was plainly in accord with the view of law, expressed by the Privy Council, years later, in the case of Ramanandi Kuer v. Kalawati Kuer, 55 Ind App 18: (AIR 1928 PC 2) (M), where their Lordships examined and laid down the procedure (including the question of onus on the issue of validity of the Will) in cases of this type. Clearly, therefore, the actual decision of this Court jn the case cited is not open to any criticism although the observations quoted from page 1109 (of Cal WN) : (at p. 422 of AIR) of the report to the extent that they were suggestive of the broad argument, noted above, might not be strictly correct and might give rise to misconceptions, This indeed, appears to be implicit in their Lordships' decision in where at page 1037 of the report : (at P. 572 of AIR) we find the categorical statement that the said observations in 19 Cal WN 1108 : (AIR 1915 Cal 421) (L) "were made with reference to the facts of the case and were not intended, to be of universal application."
Maharashtra Court-fees Act.
Dinabandhu Roy Brajaraj Saha, Firm vs Sarala Sundari Dassya W/O Haralal Saha on 9 August, 1939
She has chosen not to examine herself in support of her denial. The husband and the wife were all along living together; there is
no story of any estrangement between them; the properties sold away by the husband were carefully omitted from the list of assets, filed by the respondent; there is no explanation why and how they came to be so omitted; the appellant's mortgage suit was pending and was being contested by the respondent's husband when the application for Letters of Administration was filed by the wife. In these circumstances we have not the least doubt in our mind that the respondent was fully aware of her husband's dealings with the testator's properties and about the sales and mortgages effected by him in respect thereof and that she fraudulently suppressed or concealed the said facts from the Probate Court in the proceedings started by her for obtaining Letters of Administration. We are also clearly of the view that these facts were material to the case as, without them, the Court was not in a position to exercise its discretion in the matter of special citation and, as, in our opinion, in the facts of this particular case, where an unregistered Will was sought to be proved after a lapse of about twenty years from the death of the testator to the derogation of the rights of the transferees from the disinherited son during this long interval, these transferees (including the mortgagee appellant) were entitled to special citation, the absence of such citation was a substantial defect or irregularity which rendered the proceedings defective in substance (vide in this connection 50 Cal WN 423 (C) supra). Clearly then just cause both under Clause (a) and Clause (b) of the section (Section 263) was established in the present case and the learned trial Judge was in error in holding otherwise. On the materials before the Court, this conclusion is irresistible and we have little hesitation in recording the same.
The Indian Succession Act, 1925
George Anthony Harris vs Millicent Spencer on 11 August, 1932
See also Mahommad Renu Meah v. Sm. Sabida Khatun 29 Cal LJ 37 at p. 39: 23 Cal WN 658 at p. 659: (AIR 1919 Cal 113 at p. 114) (G); Srish Chandra Choudhury v. Bhaba Tarini Devi and Georga Anthony Harris v. Millicent Spencer AIR 1933 Bom 370 at P. 373 (I). This is not disputed before us. We, accordingly, proceed upon that view.
Anil Behari Ghosh vs Smt. Latika Bala Dassi And Others on 15 April, 1955
In Anil Behari's case (J), the Supreme Court did not intend to go further and the observations relied on by the respondent should be read in that light and with reference to the facts of that case.
Official Trustee Of Bengal vs Kumudini Dasi on 24 January, 1910
14. The net position then is that an applicant for revocation must, in order to succeed, establish just cause within the meaning of Section 263, that is as laid down in Clauses (a) to (e) thereof, but, even if just cause be established, revocation may still be refused by the Court in the exercise of its discretion under that section, if the facts and circumstances of the particular case would warrant such refusal. In this view we shall consider first whether the appellant has succeeded in proving any just cause for revocation in the present case and if we hold in the affirmative on that question we shall consider next whether, in the circumstances of the present case, an order for revocation should be made in the exercise of oar discretion under the section.