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1 - 6 of 6 (0.21 seconds)Section 201 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Sevaka Perumal, Etc vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 7 May, 1991
Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, argued that in the absence of any motive and the
corpus delicti, it is unsafe to place reliance on the circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution; more so when the said
evidence is replete with discrepancies, omissions and
improvements. He pointed out that in regard to a part of the
evidence of the prosecution, the courts below themselves have
not placed reliance, therefore, in a case of circumstantial
evidence of this nature, it would be dangerous to base a
conviction. We do not find much force in this argument of Mr.
Lalit. It is a well-settled principle in law that in a trial for
murder, it is neither an absolute necessity nor an essential
ingredient to establish corpus delicti. The fact of the death of
the deceased must be established like any other fact. Corpus
delicti in some cases may not be possible to be traced or
recovered. There are a number of possibilities where a dead
body could be disposed of without trace, therefore, if the
recovery of the dead body is to be held to be mandatory to
convict an accused, in many a case the accused would manage
to see that the dead body is destroyed which would afford the
accused complete immunity from being held guilty or from
being punished. What is therefore required in law to base a
conviction for an offence of murder is that there should be
reliable and plausible evidence that the offence of murder like
any other factum of death was committed and it must be proved
by direct or circumstantial evidence albeit the dead body may
not be traced. [See Sevaka Perumal & Anr. v. State of Tamil
Nadu [1991 (3) SCC 471]. Therefore, the argument that in the
absence of corpus delicti the prosecution case should be
rejected, cannot be accepted. Similar fate will follow the
argument that in the absence of any specific motive there can be
no conviction. In the instant case PW-1, wife of the deceased,
has spoken about some enmity between A-1 and the deceased.
Assuming that this evidence is insufficient to establish the
motive for murder even then if the prosecution is able to
establish beyond all reasonable doubt from other circumstantial
evidence that it is the accused (including the appellant) alone
who could have committed the murder, the absence of the
motive will not hamper a safe conviction. In the instant case the
chain of circumstances starting from the afternoon of 12.2.1988
right up to 16.2.1988 clearly shows that the deceased was taken
by A-1 and the appellant in the jeep and thereafter the deceased
was never seen. The subsequent conduct of A-1 visiting the
check-post in the night, A-1 and A-2 visiting the check-post
thereafter at different times without an acceptable reason, A-1
and PW-22 visiting the Kerabari Forest Headquarters on
13.2.1988 and thereafter recovery of the belongings of the
deceased from the place where the dead body was allegedly
thrown in the first instance, the apprehension entertained by the
deceased which was made known to PW-3, the apprehension
entertained by PW-5 which was made known to his superior
vide letters Ex. P-2 and P-3, the statements of the accused made
to PW-5 (to the extent they are acceptable), the contradictory
versions given by the appellant to PWs.5 and 36, the presence
of the appellant and A-1 together at the farewell function of
their colleague in the evening of 12.2.1988 and unacceptable
explanation amounting to falsehood given by the appellant in
regard to his whereabouts on 12.2.1988 cumulatively establish
the continuous links in the chain of circumstances which was,
in our opinion, rightly accepted by the courts below to base a
conviction. Having carefully considered the evidence led by the
prosecution in regard to the above circumstances we are of the
opinion that the courts below were justified in arriving at the
finding that the appellant was guilty of the charge framed
against him, and we find no reason whatsoever to disagree with
this finding.
State Of Maharashtra vs Suresh on 10 December, 1999
To PW-36 he told that when they were bringing a
smuggler from Darjeeling side to Ramam check-post i.e. from
the opposite direction the smuggler escaped from the jeep and
in the process of running he fell down and suffered fatal
injuries. In his statement u/s. 313 Cr.PC before the court, he
stated that on 12.2.1988 he had gone to Soreng on the orders of
his S.P. as the Chief Minister was visiting Soreng and on the
evening of that day as he did not have any vehicle, he took a
'lift' in the vehicle of A-1 up to Jorthang from where he went to
his quarters and accused No.1 went to Naya Bazar Dak
bungalow as he was camping there on duty. These 3 different
versions which are self-contradictory further show that the
appellant has not been consistent in his stand as to what
happened on 12.2.1988. This Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000 (1) SCC 471) has held that a false
answer offered by the accused when his attention was drawn to
any inculpating circumstance would render such circumstance
as capable of inculpating him. The Court also held that in such
a situation a false answer can also be counted as providing "a
missing link" in completing the chain. If the said principle in
law is to be accepted, the statement of the appellant made u/s.
313 Cr.PC being palpably false and there being cogent evidence
adduced by the prosecution to show that the appellant had given
two other versions as to the incident of 12.2.1988, we will have
to proceed on the basis that the appellant has not explained the
inculpating circumstances established by the prosecution
against him which would form an additional link in the chain of
circumstances. Then again there is another factor to be taken
note of in regard to the sharing of the common object of A-1 by
the appellant. It has come in evidence of PW-5 that the
appellant had told him that after the body of the deceased was
taken from the place where it had fallen in the first instance, the
appellant had taken away certain possible identification
materials like Panchayat seal and some personal papers with a
view to create a false evidence as to the whereabouts of the
deceased. This also indicates the involvement of the appellant
in the crime. These circumstances and inferences drawn from
such proved circumstances establish beyond all reasonable
doubt that the appellant did share the common intention of A-1
in taking the deceased away in the jeep driven by A-1 and
causing the murder, therefore, the hypothesis of innocence
pleaded on behalf of the appellant in our opinion is not in
consonance with the innocence of the appellant. On the
contrary, from the chain of circumstantial evidence the
prosecution has been able to establish beyond all reasonable
doubt that the appellant did share the common intention of A-1
in abducting the deceased, causing his death as also causing
disappearance of evidence of offence u/s. 201 IPC.
Section 34 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 364 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
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