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1 - 10 of 32 (0.85 seconds)The National Security Act, 1980
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
The Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956
Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs State Of Manipur & Ors on 17 May, 2012
12) The detention order was communicated to the petitioner on
13/05/2021. It was approved by State Govt. on 14/05/2021 i.e.
within statutory limit. As per (2012) 7 SCC 181 (Konungjao
Singh vs. State of Manipur & Ors.), the petitioner was entitled
to receive an information regarding grounds of detention and was
further entitled to get an opportunity to represent against it. Both
the requirements were taken care of. Hence, no interference is
required by this Court. The report of Superintendent of Police
shows that the likelihood of involvement of petitioner in similar
acts was not ruled out. This report became basis for passing of
detention order. The stand of the State is that there was no
suppression or misrepresentation of fact regarding showing the
status of corpus as "absconder". The scope of judicial review in
NSA matters is limited. Necessary parameters on which
interference can be made are missing. Hence, interference may
be declined.
Article 22 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Indira Nehru Gandhi (Smt.) vs Raj Narain & Anr on 24 June, 1975
"K.K. Methew, J. in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi vs.
Raj Narain stated that the major problem of human
society is to combine that degree of liberty without which
law is tyranny with that degree of law without which
liberty becomes licence; and the difficulty has been to
discover the practical means of achieving this grand
objective and to find the opportunity for applying these
means in the ever shifting tangle of human affairs."
State Of Maharashtra & Ors vs Santosh Shankar Acharya on 1 August, 2000
Notably, both these points have been considered by
the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra
and others vs. Santosh Shankar Acharya (2000) 7 SCC
463 in para 5 and 6 in particular. The Supreme Court
following the dictum in the case of Kamleshkumar
restated that non-communication of the fact to the
detenu that he could make a representation to the
detaining Authority so long as order of detention has
not been approved by the State Government in case
the order of detention has been issued by the Officer
other than the State Government, would constitute
infringement of right guaranteed under Article 22(5)
of the Constitution and this ratio of the Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court in Kamlesh kumar
would apply notwithstanding the fact that same has
been made in the context of provisions of COFEPOSA
Act. In para 6 of the reported decision, the Supreme
Court rejected the similar objection canvassed by the
learned counsel for the State relying on VeeramanĂ¢Â™ s
case and noted that the said decision does not help the
respondents in any manner. Inasmuch as, in that case the
Court was called upon to consider the matter in the
context of situation that emerged subsequent to the date
of approval of the order of detention by the State
Government and not prior thereto. In none of the cases on
hand the observation in the case of Veeramani will have
any application. Suffice it to observe that the detention
order and the disclosure of the fact that detenu could
make representation to the detaining Authority before
the State Government considered the proposal for
approval has abridged the right of detenu under
Article 22(5) of the Constitution. As a result, the
continued detention of the detenu on the basis of such
infirm order cannot be countenanced.
Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors. Etc. Etc on 17 April, 1995
In Kamleshkumar (supra), the Apex Court
was dealing with the provisions of COFEPOSA Act and the PIT
NDPS Act and not with NSA Act. Hence, the said constitution Bench
judgment could not have been relied upon.
The State Of Bombay vs Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya on 25 January, 1951
"6. This provision has the same force and sanctity
as any other provision relating to fundamental rights.
(See: State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya
[1951 SCR 167, 186 : AIR 1951 SC 157] .) Article 22(5)
imposes a dual obligation on the authority making the
order of preventive detention: (i) to communicate to the
person detained as soon as may be the grounds on which
the order of detention has been made; and (ii) to afford
the person detained the earliest opportunity of making a
representation against the order of detention. Article
22(5) thus proceeds on the basis that the person detained
has a right to make a representation against the order of
detention and the aforementioned two obligations are
imposed on the authority making the order of detention
with a view to ensure that right of the person detained to
make a representation is a real right and he is able to take
steps for redress of a wrong which he thinks has been
committed. Article 22(5) does not, however, indicate the
authority to whom the representation is to be made. Since
the object and purpose of the representation that is to be
16 W.P. No.9792/2021
made by the person detained is to enable him to obtain
relief at the earliest opportunity, the said representation
has to be made to the authority which can grant such
relief, i.e., the authority which can revoke the order of
detention and set him at liberty. The authority that has
made the order of detention can also revoke it. This
right is inherent in the power to make the order. It is
recognised by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 though it does not flow from it. It can, therefore,
be said that Article 22(5) postulates that the person
detained has a right to make a representation against the
order of detention to the authority making the order. In
addition, such a representation can be made to any other
authority which is empowered by law to revoke the order
of detention.