Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 3 of 3 (0.21 seconds)Ramjibun Serowgy vs Oghore Nath Chatterjee on 19 March, 1897
19. The present case falls into the other category. The promissory note is, by its express terms, payable on demand, that is at. once. The obligation under the note attaches immediately. But the agreement not to make a demand until the specified condition is fulfilled has the intention and effect of suspending the coming into force of that obligation, which is the contract contained in the promissory note. Thus the oral agreement constitutes a condition precedent to the attaching of the obligation and is within the terms of pro. 3 of Section 92. A: case like the present is to be distinguished from that dealt with in Ramjibun Serowgy v. Oghore Nath Chatterjee (1897) I.L.R. 25 Cal. 401, in which the promissory note, though absolute in its terms, was said to be subject to an oral agreement, providing that it was not to be enforceable by suit until the happening of a particular event. Sale J. in rejecting this evidence expressed his opinion that the proper meaning of pro. 3 was that the contemporaneous oral agreement to be admissible must be to the effect that a written contract was to be of no force at all and was to constitute no obligation until the happening of a certain event. This description in their Lordships' judgment applies to the present case.
Walter Mitchell vs A. K. Tennent on 23 April, 1925
To the same effect Page J. in Walter Mitchell v. A.K. Tennent (1925) I.L.R. 52 Cal. 677, held that the collateral agreement alleged in that case constituted a condition precedent to the attachment of any obligation under the cheques in question so that they remained inoperative until the condition was fulfilled. The same view has been applied in other cases, which it is not necessary here to cite specifically.
1