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1 - 10 of 23 (0.35 seconds)The Essential Commodities Act, 1955
Article 19 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 39 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 37 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 243ZI in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969
Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors vs State Of Kerala & Ors on 11 August, 1986
Generally, the legality of public-
private arrangements through contracts made by an executive is
ensured through the principles of executive accountability to the
public and the Constitution. The relationship between the public
and private sectors is normally assessed through the scale of
accountability, premised to eschew arbitrariness. However, in this
case, an argument has been raised that the executive has no power
to curtail the fundamental right to engage in contract through
executive orders, except through the plenary power of the
legislation. Shri Santhosh Mathew, learned counsel for the
appellants and for some of the petitioners relied on the following
judgments: Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala [(1986) 3 SCC 615]
paras.9 to 14, 16 and 17; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, [(2019)
WA No.44/2021 and connected cases
-:20:-
1 SCC 1] para.270.6, 498-504; Raju Sebastian and Others v. Union of
India and Others [2019 (4) KHC 615] para.12 and 13 and 20; and
Bishambar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of UP[(1982) 1 SCC 39]; to
argue that executive instructions or order cannot curtail
fundamental rights. He submitted that in the absence of law enacted
by the Legislature, such restrictions cannot be imposed on
fundamental rights.
Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) vs Union Of India on 26 September, 2018
Generally, the legality of public-
private arrangements through contracts made by an executive is
ensured through the principles of executive accountability to the
public and the Constitution. The relationship between the public
and private sectors is normally assessed through the scale of
accountability, premised to eschew arbitrariness. However, in this
case, an argument has been raised that the executive has no power
to curtail the fundamental right to engage in contract through
executive orders, except through the plenary power of the
legislation. Shri Santhosh Mathew, learned counsel for the
appellants and for some of the petitioners relied on the following
judgments: Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala [(1986) 3 SCC 615]
paras.9 to 14, 16 and 17; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, [(2019)
WA No.44/2021 and connected cases
-:20:-
1 SCC 1] para.270.6, 498-504; Raju Sebastian and Others v. Union of
India and Others [2019 (4) KHC 615] para.12 and 13 and 20; and
Bishambar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of UP[(1982) 1 SCC 39]; to
argue that executive instructions or order cannot curtail
fundamental rights. He submitted that in the absence of law enacted
by the Legislature, such restrictions cannot be imposed on
fundamental rights.
Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan And ... vs State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors on 5 November, 1981
Generally, the legality of public-
private arrangements through contracts made by an executive is
ensured through the principles of executive accountability to the
public and the Constitution. The relationship between the public
and private sectors is normally assessed through the scale of
accountability, premised to eschew arbitrariness. However, in this
case, an argument has been raised that the executive has no power
to curtail the fundamental right to engage in contract through
executive orders, except through the plenary power of the
legislation. Shri Santhosh Mathew, learned counsel for the
appellants and for some of the petitioners relied on the following
judgments: Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala [(1986) 3 SCC 615]
paras.9 to 14, 16 and 17; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, [(2019)
WA No.44/2021 and connected cases
-:20:-
1 SCC 1] para.270.6, 498-504; Raju Sebastian and Others v. Union of
India and Others [2019 (4) KHC 615] para.12 and 13 and 20; and
Bishambar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of UP[(1982) 1 SCC 39]; to
argue that executive instructions or order cannot curtail
fundamental rights. He submitted that in the absence of law enacted
by the Legislature, such restrictions cannot be imposed on
fundamental rights.