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1 - 10 of 19 (0.23 seconds)The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
R.M. Yellatti vs The Asst. Executive Engineer on 7 November, 2005
44. Furthermore, in the case of "R.M. Yellatti vs. The Assistant
Executive Engineer (supra)" itself, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also
considered the decision in "Municipal Corporation, Faridabad vs Siri
Niwas, (2004) 8 SCC 195", wherein the concrete principles in respect to the
concept of 240 days by the workman are laid out. The relevant paragraph is
extracted hereunder.
Municipal Corporation, Faridabad vs Siri Niwas on 6 September, 2004
"In the case of Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas
reported in (2004) 8 SCC 195, the employee had worked from
5.8.1994 to 31.12.1994 as a tube-well operator. He alleged that he
had further worked from 1.1.1995 to 16.5.1995. His services were
terminated on 17.5.1995 whereupon an industrial dispute was
raised. The case of the employee before the tribunal was that he
had completed working for 240 days in a year; the purported
order of retrenchment was illegal as the conditions precedent to
section 25-F of Industrial Dispute Act were not complied with. On
the other hand, the management contended that the employee had
worked for 136 days during the preceding 12 months on daily
wages. Upon considering all the material placed on record by the
parties to the dispute, the tribunal came to the conclusion that the
total number of working days put in by the employee were 184
days and thus he, having not completed 240 days of working in a
year, was not entitled to any relief. The tribunal noticed that
neither the management nor the workman cared to produce the
muster roll w.e.f. August, 1994; that the employee did not summon
muster roll although the management had failed to produce them.
Aggrieved by the decision of the tribunal, the employee filed a writ
petition before the High Court which took the view that since the
management did not produce the relevant documents before the
industrial tribunal, an adverse inference should be drawn against
it as it was in possession of best evidence and thus, it was not
necessary for the employee to call upon the management to do so.
The High Court observed that the burden of proof may not be on
the management but in case of non-production of documents, an
adverse inference could be drawn against the management. Only
on that basis, the writ petition was allowed holding that the
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 23 of 28
employee had worked for 240 days. Overruling the decision of the
High Court, this court found on facts of that case that the
employee had not adduced any evidence before the court in
support of his contention of having complied with the requirement
of section 25-B of Industrial Disputes Act."
Section 25 in The Rubber Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Syed Yakoob vs K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others on 7 October, 1963
13. The Supreme Court in the judgment of Syed Yakoob v. K.S.
Radhakrishnan, 1964 AIR 477, clarified the aforesaid position. The
relevant part of the judgment is extracted hereunder.
Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmad Ishaque And Others on 9 December, 1954
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would
be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ
of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we
must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of
certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to
sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of
evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from
the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ
court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be
legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed
Ishaque(1), Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills
Division and Appeals, Assam(2), and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar
Singh(3)."
Nagendra Nath Bora & Another vs The Commissioner Of Hills Divisionand ... on 7 February, 1958
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would
be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ
of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we
must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of
certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to
sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of
evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from
the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ
court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be
legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed
Ishaque(1), Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills
Division and Appeals, Assam(2), and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar
Singh(3)."
Gopal, Krishnaji Ketkar vs Mahomed Haji Latif & Ors on 19 April, 1968
In another case titled "Gopal, Krishnaji Ketkar Vs Mahomed Haji
Latif & Ors., 1968 AIR 1413", the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised that
even if the burden of proof does not lie on a particular party, the court may
draw an adverse inference if such a party withholds important documents in
their possession which can throw light on the facts in issue. The relevant
part of the judgment is extracted hereunder.