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1 - 10 of 14 (0.90 seconds)Article 15 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The State Of Madras vs Srimathi Champakam Dorairajanandthe ... on 9 April, 1951
Granting that the object of the impugned order before us was
what is claimed for it by the learned Attorney-General, the
question still remains as to how that object has been sought
to be achieved. Obviously that is sought to be done by
denying to all pupils, whose mother tongue is not English,
admission into any School were the medium of instruction is
English. Whatever the object, the immediate ground and
direct cause for the denial is that the. mother tongue of
the pupil is not English. Adapting the language of Lord
Thankerton, it may be said that the laudable object of the
impugned order does not obviate the prohibition of article
29(2) because the effect of the order involves an
infringement of this fundamental right, and that effect is
brought about by denying admission only on the ground of
language. The same principle is implicit in the decision of
this Court in The State, of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam
Dorairajan (1). There also the object of the impugned
communal G.O. was to advance the interest of educationally
backward classes of citizens but, that object
notwithstanding, this Court struck down the order as
unconstitutional because the modus operandi to achieve that
object was directly based only on one of the forbidden
grounds specified in the article. In our opinion the
impugned order offends against the fundamental right
guaranteed to all citizens by article 29(2).
Re. 2:-Coming to the second question as to whether the
impugned order infringes any constitutional right of Barnes
High School, the learned AttorneyGeneral contends that
although any section of the citizens having distinct
language, script or culture of its own,has under article
29(1) the right to conserve the same and although all
minorities, whether based on religion or language, have,
under article 30(1), the right
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 525 at p. 530.
Article 29 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Punjab Province vs Daulat Singh on 30 January, 1946
15. These cases, therefore, have no direct bearing on
article 29(2). The arguments advanced by the learned
Attorney-General overlook the distinction between the object
or motive underlying the impugned -order and the mode and
manner adopted therein for achieving that object. The
object or motive attributed by the learned Attorney-General
to the impugned order is. undoubtedly a laudable one but its
validity has to be judged by the method of Its operation and
its effect on the fundamental right guaranteed by article
29(2). A similar question of construction arose in the case
of Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh (1). One of the ques-
tions in that case was whether the provision of the new
section 13-A of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act was ultra
vires the Provincial Legislature as contravening sub-section
(1) of section 298 of the Government of India Act, 1935, in
that in some cases that section would operate as a
prohibition on the ground of descent alone. Beaumont J. in
his dissenting judgment took the view that it was necessary
for the Court to consider the scope and object of the Act
which was impugned so as to determine the ground on which
such Act was based, and that if the only basis for the Act
was discrimination on one or more of the grounds specified
in section 298 sub-section (1) then the Act was bad but that
if the true basis of the Act was something different the Act
was not invalidated because one of its effects might be to
invoke such discrimination In delivering the Judgment of the
Board Lord Thankerton at page 74 rejected this view in the
words following:
The State Of Bombay vs Narasu Appa Mali on 24 July, 1951
is guaranteed by article 29(1) to the Anglo-Indian Community
as a section of the citizens. It is equally difficult, it
is said, to appreciate why the salutory principle of
imparting education through the medium of the pupil's mother
tongue should require that a pupil whose mother tongue is
not English but is, say, Guzrati, should be debarred from
getting admission only into an Anglo-Indian School where the
medium of instruction is English but not from being admitted
into a School where the medium of instruction is a regional
language, say Konkani, which is not the mother tongue of the
pupil. The rival arguments thus formulated on both sides
involve questions of State policy on education with which
the Court has no concern. The American decisions founded on
the 14th amendment which refers to due process of law may
not be quite helpful in interpretation of our article 29.
We must, therefore, evaluate the argument of the learned
Attorney -General on purely legal considerations bearing. on
the question of construction of article 29(2).
The learned Attorney-General submits that the impugned order
does not deny to pupils who are not Anglo-Indians or
citizens of non-Asiatic descent, admission into an Anglo-
Indian School only on the ground of religion, race, caste,
language or any of them but on the ground that such denial
will promote the advancement of the national language and
facilitate the imparting of education through the medium of
the pupil's mother tongue. He relies on a number of
decisions of the High Courts, e.g., Yusuf Abdul Aziz v.
State (1), Sm. Anjali Roy v. State of West Bengal (), The
State of Bombay v. Narasu AppaMali (3), Srinivasa Ayyar
v.Saraswathi Ammaland Dattatraraya Motiram More v.
State of BombayThese decisions, it should, be noted, were
concernedwith discrimination prohibited by article 15 which
deals with discrimina. tion generally and not with denial of
admission into educational institutions of certain kinds
prohibited by article 29(2). It may also be mentioned that
this
(1) A.I.R 1951 Bom, 470.
Sm. Anjali Roy vs State Of West Bengal And Ors. on 5 June, 1952
is guaranteed by article 29(1) to the Anglo-Indian Community
as a section of the citizens. It is equally difficult, it
is said, to appreciate why the salutory principle of
imparting education through the medium of the pupil's mother
tongue should require that a pupil whose mother tongue is
not English but is, say, Guzrati, should be debarred from
getting admission only into an Anglo-Indian School where the
medium of instruction is English but not from being admitted
into a School where the medium of instruction is a regional
language, say Konkani, which is not the mother tongue of the
pupil. The rival arguments thus formulated on both sides
involve questions of State policy on education with which
the Court has no concern. The American decisions founded on
the 14th amendment which refers to due process of law may
not be quite helpful in interpretation of our article 29.
We must, therefore, evaluate the argument of the learned
Attorney -General on purely legal considerations bearing. on
the question of construction of article 29(2).
The learned Attorney-General submits that the impugned order
does not deny to pupils who are not Anglo-Indians or
citizens of non-Asiatic descent, admission into an Anglo-
Indian School only on the ground of religion, race, caste,
language or any of them but on the ground that such denial
will promote the advancement of the national language and
facilitate the imparting of education through the medium of
the pupil's mother tongue. He relies on a number of
decisions of the High Courts, e.g., Yusuf Abdul Aziz v.
State (1), Sm. Anjali Roy v. State of West Bengal (), The
State of Bombay v. Narasu AppaMali (3), Srinivasa Ayyar
v.Saraswathi Ammaland Dattatraraya Motiram More v.
State of BombayThese decisions, it should, be noted, were
concernedwith discrimination prohibited by article 15 which
deals with discrimina. tion generally and not with denial of
admission into educational institutions of certain kinds
prohibited by article 29(2). It may also be mentioned that
this
(1) A.I.R 1951 Bom, 470.