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1 - 6 of 6 (0.28 seconds)Raj Kumar vs Union Of India on 18 April, 1968
33] In order to determine whether the respondent in the present
case, had submitted his request for withdrawal of resignation within
90 days from the date such resignation became effective, it is
necessary to determine the date on which such resignation became
effective in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
34] At least prima facie, rulings in Raj Kumar (supra) and North
Zone Cultural Centre (supra) support Mrs. Masurkar's contention
that resignation becomes effective on acceptance, even though,
such acceptance may have been communicated later. In the present
case, there is no dispute that the respondent's resignation was
accepted by the competent authority on 26th October 2007, though, it
may have been communicated later. Therefore, if 26 th October 2007
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is taken as the date on which the respondent's resignation became
effective, then, it is apparent that the respondent's request for
withdrawal of such resignation on 12th February 2008, is well beyond
the prescribed period of 90 days in clause (iii) of Rule 26(4). This
means that the respondent, by his own omission brought about a
situation wherein compliance with the condition prescribed in clause
North Zone Cultural Center And Anr. vs Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar on 17 April, 2003
33] In order to determine whether the respondent in the present
case, had submitted his request for withdrawal of resignation within
90 days from the date such resignation became effective, it is
necessary to determine the date on which such resignation became
effective in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
34] At least prima facie, rulings in Raj Kumar (supra) and North
Zone Cultural Centre (supra) support Mrs. Masurkar's contention
that resignation becomes effective on acceptance, even though,
such acceptance may have been communicated later. In the present
case, there is no dispute that the respondent's resignation was
accepted by the competent authority on 26th October 2007, though, it
may have been communicated later. Therefore, if 26 th October 2007
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is taken as the date on which the respondent's resignation became
effective, then, it is apparent that the respondent's request for
withdrawal of such resignation on 12th February 2008, is well beyond
the prescribed period of 90 days in clause (iii) of Rule 26(4). This
means that the respondent, by his own omission brought about a
situation wherein compliance with the condition prescribed in clause
Balram Gupta vs Union Of India & Anr on 1 September, 1987
47] On the aspect of compliance with the condition in clause (I) of
Rule 26(4) of the said Rules, relying upon the authority in Balram
Gupta (supra), it is possible to sustain the finding of the CAT that in
the present case, there was some material on record to say that this
condition stood complied with. However, mere compliance with the
condition in clause (i) would not suffice in a matter of this nature.
There is no material placed on record that there was any public
interest involved in permitting the respondent to withdraw his
resignation which had already become effective. In any case, in the
absence of compliance with a condition in clause (iii) of Rule 26(4),
there was no question of the respondent insisting upon the
acceptance of his request for withdrawal of his resignation which
had already become effective.
Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr vs The Chiief Election Commissioner, New ... on 2 December, 1977
In such circumstances, the
principle in case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) will not apply.
44] This is also not a case where the respondent can seriously
claim any prejudice on account of any ambiguity in reference to the
ground based upon the non fulfillment of the condition in clause (iii)
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of Rule 26(4). The respondent, was quite aware that the request for
withdrawal of resignation had to be made at least within 90 days
from the date the resignation became effective, if not earlier. This is
possibly the reason why the respondent dated his request as 9 th
February 2008 so as to create an impression that such request was
in fact made within the period of 90 days. However, there is no
dispute that though the request letter was dated 9th February 2008,
the same was, for the first time was communicated to the
competent authority by fax only on 12 th February 2008. Secondly,
the respondent, has time and again insisted that the request was
made on 88th or 89th day from the date the resignation became
effective. Factually this is found to be incorrect. From all this, it is
quite evident that the respondent was fully aware that his request for
withdrawal of resignation had to be made within a period of 90 days
from the date his resignation became effective, in the least. Now
that the record bears out that no such request was made by the
respondent within the prescribed period of 90 days, the CAT, was
not at all justified in granting any relief to the respondent.
45] The reasoning of the CAT that because the petitioners took
seven months to take a decision on the respondent's request for
withdrawal of resignation which had already become effective, the
delay on the part of the respondent in making his request for
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withdrawal of the resignation beyond the statutorily prescribed
period of 90 days can be condoned, is a reasoning, which we are
unable to endorse. Rule 26 nowhere prescribes any time limit upon
the competent authority to take a decision in the matter of request
from a government servant for withdrawal of his resignation. Rule 26
does not provide for any legal fiction to the effect that such request
be deemed to be accepted or rejected upon the expiry of any
specified period. No doubt, merely because no period has been
prescribed, that does not mean that the competent authority can
unreasonably delay taking decision. Such decisions have to be
taken within a reasonable period. However, even assuming that the
period of seven months in the facts and circumstances of the
present case, constitutes some delay on the part of the competent
authority, that by itself, is certainly not a ground to extend the
statutorily prescribed period in clause (iii) of Rule 26(4) or to
condone the delay on the part of the respondent in not submitting his
request within the statutorily prescribed period.
46] The CAT has held that 'the rigour of 90 days time limit in rule
has to be construed liberally', since this is a beneficial legislation.
According to us, when the Rule is quite clear there is no scope for
extension of time limits under the guise of liberal interpretation. It is
settled position in law that when the provisions of the statute are
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quite clear, the courts or the tribunals, cannot, under the guise of any
liberal interpretation, rewrite the provisions of the statute or render
any provisions of a statute redundant or otiose.
State Of Punjab vs Amar Singh Harika on 6 January, 1966
5. Our attention was invited to a judgment of
this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika
AIR 1966 SC 1313 in which it was held that an
order of dismissal passed by an authority and kept
on its file without communicating it to the officer
concerned or otherwise publishing it did not take
effect as from the date on which the order was
actually written out by the said authority; such an
order could only be effective after it was
communicated to the Officer concerned or was
otherwise published. The principle of that case has
no application here. Termination of employment by
order passed by the Government does not become
effective until the order is intimated to the
employee. But when a public servant has
invited by his letter of resignation
determination of his employment, his
services normally stand terminated from the
date on which the letter of resignation is
accepted by the appropriate authority, and in
the absence of any law or rule governing the
conditions of his service to the contrary, it
will not be open to the public servant to
withdraw his resignation after it is accepted
by the appropriate authority. Till the
resignation, is accepted by the appropriate
authority in consonance with the rules governing
the acceptance, the public servant concerned has
locus paenitentiae but not thereafter. Undue delay
in intimating to the public servant concerned the
action taken on the letter of resignation may justify
an inference that resignation has not been
accepted. In the present case the resignation was
accepted within a short time after it was received
by the Government of India. Apparently the
State of Rajasthan did not immediately
implement the order and relieve the
appellant of his duties, but the appellant
cannot profit by the delay in intimating
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acceptance or in relieving him of his duties."
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