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M\S. R.S. Rekhchand Mohotaspinning & ... vs State Of Maharashtra on 7 May, 1997 cites

Shankar Narayan Ranade vs Union Of India on 8 February, 1963

Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a judgment of this court in Shankar Narayan Ranade vs. Union of India [(1964) 1 SCR 885 at 893] contending that this court made distinction between still water and flowing water. Water for the purpose of cess and the impost thereof are not referable of cess and the impost thereof are nor referable to flowing water of the river and the river water is nor amenable to land cess; therefore, it is contended that the flowing water is nor exigible to regulation of the land cess. We find no force in the contention. The use of the word "water" in the sand property was construed to exclude the running water of the river and it could nor be said that the title to the flowing water. There existing words of difference between still water in the land like in the pound and flowing water in a river. This court negatived the contention and held that the flowing water vests in the state. In that context, at page 894, the title to the bed of the river was negatived and, therefore, it was held that there were two difficulties in accepting the contention. The first difficulty was that the use of the word "water" in the sand, excluded the running water of the river. Besides, it is by no means clear that the title to the flowing water of the river necessarily goes with the title to the bed of the river.
Supreme Court of India Cites 10 - Cited by 8 - P B Gajendragadkar - Full Document

The State Of Madras vs Gannon Dunkerley & Co.,(Madras) Ltd on 1 April, 1958

Shri Sanghi further contends that this court made distinction between the cess on sale of goods in state of Madras vs. Cannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. [(1959) 1 SCR 379] which is popularly known as first Cannon Dunkerley's case. Therein, the question was whether the material supplied to the company was exigible to sales cess under the Madras sales Tax Act. This Court held that since sale of goods is clearly covered in different legislative Entries, it is nor exigible to sales cess. The ration therein, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case. It is seen that Section 20 of the Code clearly includes flowing water, as investing title thereof in the State as integral part of the land. The definition 'land' includes the right to the water flowing therefrom as in the definition in the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, when the cess has been imposed by virtue of power vested under Section 70 of the Code by the state Government by way of legislation, the power of the state is traceable to the legislation, the power of the state is traceable to the legislative Entry under Entry 45 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Therefore, the demand made is with in the legislative competence and the legislature i s competent to enact law in exercise of the power under Article 246. The Government have power under Section 70 read with section 20 of the Code to levy water cess on the use of water by the Resolution which came to be passed by the state Government determining the rate at which water cess is cessable on use of water for industrial purpose. It is true that the appellant has been using the water for over 70 years but that cannot be construed to mean that it has a right to draw water by artificial contrivance from the flowing river for use in its factory for industrial purpose. Having used the water for industrial purpose, it is taxable as incidence on cess on water as land cess and, therefore, it is liable to pay water cess at the rates prescribed by the Government.
Supreme Court of India Cites 38 - Cited by 719 - Full Document

Navinchandra Mafatlal vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax,Bombay ... on 1 November, 1954

In Navinchandra Mafatlal vs. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay city [(1965) 1 SCR 829 at 836] a Constitution Bench had observed that the question before this court related to the correct interpretation of a word appearing in a Constitution Act which, as has been said , must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense. The interpretation of the statute would apply to the interpretation of the Entries subject to reservation that their application is of necessity conditioned by the subject matter of the enactment itself. It should be remembered that the problem before us is to construe a word appearing in Entry 54 which is a head of legislative power. It cannot be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended to it, It is, therefore, clear that in construing an Entry in a List conferring legislative powers, the widest possible construction , according to their ordinary meaning, must be put upon the words used therein. Reference to legislative practice may be admissible for cutting down the meaning of a word in order to reconcile two conflicting provisions in two legislative lists. The cardinal rule of interpretation, however, is that words should be given their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning subject to the rider that in construing words in a constitutional enactment, conferring legislative power under Article 246, the most liberal construction should be put upon the words in the Entries in the respective Lists in the Seventh Schedule so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude.
Supreme Court of India Cites 20 - Cited by 231 - Full Document
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