Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 17 (0.82 seconds)The Meghalaya Co-operative Societies Act
Section 154B in The Maharashtra Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960 [Entire Act]
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 91 in The Meghalaya Co-operative Societies Act [Entire Act]
Shri Ramtanu Co-Operative Housing ... vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 5 August, 1970
The State cannot compel a
society to amend its bye laws, as such compulsion would defeat
the very purpose of its formation. The inclusion of demolition and
reconstruction in the statutory definition only confers an option on
housing societies to amend their objects, if they so choose. It does
3
::: Uploaded on - 19/12/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/12/2025 23:13:53 :::
wp8889-2024-J.doc
not operate as a mandate. This position is supported by the
judgment in Happy Home Co operative Housing Society Limited v.
State of Maharashtra, reported in (2016) 2 Bom CR 462. The
statutory definition must be read in the context of the object of a
particular housing society. Unless the bye laws of the society
contain demolition and reconstruction as one of its objects, such
activity cannot be treated as its business. In the absence of such an
object in the bye laws, redevelopment cannot be forced into the
fold of the society's business merely on the strength of the
amended definition. Section 154B(31)(1) contains a saving clause
in respect of existing bye laws. It expressly provides that bye laws
in force on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act of
2019 shall continue to apply until they are expressly modified or
amended. This makes it clear that societies governed by Chapter
XIII B are not deemed to have automatically amended their bye
laws to include demolition and reconstruction as an object. The
saving provision does not render Chapter XIII B inapplicable.
However, it also does not create a legal fiction by which existing
bye laws stand amended with immediate effect. As a consequence,
resolutions relating to demolition and reconstruction cannot, by
default, be treated as matters of management or business of such
societies. Sub clause (2) of Section 154B(31) further provides that
pending proceedings shall continue and be decided as if the said
chapter had not been made applicable. This reinforces the
legislative intent underlying the saving provision.
Bhoumik Co-Operative Housing Society ... vs Vina A. Siswawala(Deleted Since ... on 10 August, 2022
4. He submitted that a learned Single Judge of this Court, by
order dated 6 October 2022 in Bhoumik Co operative Housing
4
::: Uploaded on - 19/12/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/12/2025 23:13:53 :::
wp8889-2024-J.doc
Society v. Vina Sisawala and others, has held that Section 154B(1)
(17) is an enabling provision. It was further held that the amended
definition of housing society would not apply where the existing
bye laws do not include redevelopment as one of the objects,
particularly in view of the saving clause under Section 154B(31).
There can be several reasons why a housing society may
consciously decide not to include demolition and reconstruction as
one of its objects. That decision must be left to the collective
wisdom of the society. A society may deliberately avoid making
redevelopment part of its business, as doing so would attract the
bar of civil court jurisdiction and exclude arbitration as a mode of
dispute resolution, having regard to Sections 91 and 163 of the
Act. Section 91 of the Act enumerates the disputes over which the
Co operative Court has jurisdiction. This provision does not restrict
the power of a society to deliberate or resolve upon matters
beyond the subjects falling within such jurisdiction. Through its
general body, a society may take decisions on various aspects,
including those falling within its bye laws. There is a clear
distinction between demolition and reconstruction of a society's
existing building and redevelopment undertaken through a
developer acting as an agent coupled with interest. The differences
are significant.
Margaret Almeida And Ors. Etc vs Bombay Catholic Co-Optv.Hsg.Socy.& ... on 22 March, 2013
Funds raised by the developer are not raised as an
agent of the society. Lending institutions do not have recourse
against the society or the rehabilitation component on the premise
of agency. Indian law recognises the concept of dual ownership,
where a developer, upon payment of requisite premiums and
utilisation of TDR, acquires ownership rights in the free sale
component. For this reason, such a developer is treated as a
promoter under the provisions of MOFA and RERA.The Supreme
Court in Margret Almeida v. Bombay Catholic Co operative
Housing Society Limited, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 642 , has held
that a developer does not fall within the scope of Section 91(1)(c)
or Section 93 of the Act.
Chirag Infra Projects Pvt Ltd vs Vijay Jwala Co-Operative Housing ... on 5 February, 2021
8. He submitted that this view finds support from the judgment
of this Court in Chirag Infra Projects v. Vijay Jwala Co operative
Housing Society Limited 2022 (2) All MR 484. In paragraph 12 of
the said decision, this Court observed that a member is bound by
the resolutions of the general body unless he challenges them by
resorting to the remedies provided under the Maharashtra Co
operative Societies Act. This principle applies even where the
resolutions relate to redevelopment of the society property.
Mohinder Kaur Kochar vs Mayfair Housing Private Ltd. & Ors on 1 August, 2012
9. He submitted that as regards the judgments relied upon by
the petitioner to contend that redevelopment does not touch the
business of the society, the reliance is misplaced. The petitioner has
relied upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in
7
::: Uploaded on - 19/12/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/12/2025 23:13:53 :::
wp8889-2024-J.doc
Mohinder Kaur Kochar v. Mayfair Housing Private Limited, Maya
Developers v. Neelam R. Thakkar, and Parimal H. Solanki v. Bhauik
Co operative Housing Society Limited. The factual context of those
cases is materially different. In those matters, suits were instituted
by developers seeking specific performance of development
agreements executed in their favour. The question of jurisdiction
under Section 91 arose in the context of claims made by
developers under contractual arrangements. In those cases, the
courts were not concerned with the validity of resolutions passed
by the general body or with the legality of the conduct of general
meetings. The discussion was confined to whether such disputes
could be said to touch the business of the society. Those judgments
do not consider, nor do they lay down any binding principle, in
relation to the other categories expressly provided under Section
91, such as conduct of general meetings or management of the
society. For this reason, the said judgments do not govern the
controversy in the present case.